36 20 5655 https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/ce42560b8a2d848c7f77d35f6953b221.pdf f98eba90409046f491e017a174705855 PDF Text Text ���������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 15 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The fields of light Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on April 20, 1984 by Peter Pesic as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984-04-20 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Wave theory of light Light and darkness in literature Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000151 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/35693eae18aa337f65ef5be4b472dfd8.pdf 1802af73c8bb4c91c88bea8f951a7180 PDF Text Text �������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 14 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Force and violence Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on July 21, 1993 by Peter Pesic as part of the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1993-07-21 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Bacon, Francis, 1521-1626. Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000152 Graduate Institute https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/a8aef85ea8da79da17be4c0ce8255b1d.pdf 0ac40d93b8b066b395ae204e41a51a74 PDF Text Text ��������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 21 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Francis Bacon and the ordeal of science Description An account of the resource Transcript of lecture given on October 20, 1995 by Peter Pesic as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-10-20 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Bacon, Francis, 1561-1626. Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000279 https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/9807f1e7e1a81b5dbe665ad6c27fdceb.pdf 2e1b33ff4b11c25585b0ec9e2c31d35e PDF Text Text ����������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 9 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Beyond passion : the inner quest of J.S. Bach Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on April 10, 1998 by Peter Pesic as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1998-04-10 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Bach, Johann Sebastian, 1685-1750. Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000419 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/5a4d7f5f6762732fca220e9f6e8107ce.pdf 0647e6cdfd6c1a0f1d28405f0b0db6dc PDF Text Text ������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 11 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The design of Homer's Odyssey Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on July 30, 1997 by Peter Pesic as part of the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1997-07-30 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Homer. Odyssey. Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000420 Graduate Institute https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/8de47d466a7c1692a7415545efb7ff21.pdf afc33a6b984038341fe835ff08231a78 PDF Text Text �������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 20 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Secrets, symbols, and systems : François Viète and the origins of algebra Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on October 11, 1996 by Peter Pesic as part of the Dean's Concert and Lecture Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1996-10-11 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Viète, François, 1540-1603. Algebra -- History Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000421 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/7014b5460b7a083a12bddd567ab229c3.pdf 7ff0001c36e1d9a19d6e4deaac5aa321 PDF Text Text �������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 14 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Identicality : an interpretation of quantum theory Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on December 2, 1988 by Peter Pesic as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1988-12-02 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Quantum theory Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000473 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/98f995d4651fe88d87a92f08e6469d0e.pdf 6a51bbad429c7c777b7c36b1f6b655f7 PDF Text Text ������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 19 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Seeing the forms Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on October 31, 2003 by Peter Pesic as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003-10-31 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Plato -- Contributions in theory of knowledge Plato Perception (Philosophy) Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000788 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/75e46aa865090bb0a539507fecd4130b.pdf 97fdb7a57c26ad11b27dea248958b8ad PDF Text Text ������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 13 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Plato's Sicilian expeditions Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on July 21, 2004 by Peter Pesic as part of the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2004-07-21 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Plato Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24003341 Graduate Institute https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/e6e16d5578875e06634a162994dec98c.pdf 5872efad82c19fe69421fe303be96d33 PDF Text Text �������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 20 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Johannes Kepler and the song of the earth Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on November 19, 1999 by Peter Pesic as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1999-11-19 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Kepler, Johannes, 1571-1630. Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24003342 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/fd6e5856fbeb98af2b08e036d1296598.pdf e6921337a4d5dbd4b4397e25e20fa174 PDF Text Text ������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 13 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource David's lament : modes, moods, and melody Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on November 14, 1997 by Peter Pesic as part of the Dean's Concert and Lecture Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1997-11-14 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Boethius, -524. De consolatione philosophiae. Music, Greek and Roman Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24003353 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/98d2afa0793ed24d046ceac0cb09e76c.pdf b713522e4b38877caf70fe2a189668ff PDF Text Text ��� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Speeches, presentations, and other lectures Description An account of the resource Speeches, presentations, and other lectures given at St. John's College. These include convocation addresses delivered in both Annapolis, MD and Santa Fe, NM.<br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="Speeches, presentations, and other lectures" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=15">Items in the Speeches, presentations, and other lectures Collection</a></strong> to <span>view and sort all items in the collection.</span> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context speechespresentationsotherlectures Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 32 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The friend Description An account of the resource Transcript of an address given on May 16, 1998 by Peter Pesic as part of the Baccalaureate service in Santa Fe, NM. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1998-05-16 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Bible. New Testament Christianity Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24003356 Baccalaureate service https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/b73181298a4c977da1db5bf2962631cc.pdf 3befc3f18dbff89f2f6b5fac3bdd0f9e PDF Text Text Organum and Persona: The Philosophical Significance ofEarly Polyphony Peter Pesic Theflowering of polyphony in WesternEuropean music has long seemed singular and remarkable. Until well into the twentieth century, polyphony was considered unique in world music, especially by comparison with ancient Greek and Roman practice, which had long been considered purely monophonic.^ Western music historians seemed unaware of anything in other musical repertoires comparable to complex, many-voiced compositions such as medieval motets. The growth of ethnomusicology as a sophisticated, wide-ranging investigation of musical anthropology has provided much more information that has greatly complicated the picture. Though ethnomusicologists now regard polyphony not as exceptional but almost ubiquitous in world musical practice, the Western emphasis on polyphony remains noteworthy for its insistence on particular kinds of independence yet coordination between voices. Given the intense theoretic, philosophical, and theological milieux that surrounded medieval music, it seems natural to ask: what is the significance of the turn of Western music towards polyphony since the ninth century? What theological or philosophical considerations bore on its status compared to monophony? Responding to these questions will involve consideration of the nature of the mind, whether human, angelic, or divine. These begin with the nature of our own minds. Can we really understand many things at once? In our ordinary experience, we seem to attend to one thing at a time, for even a person who is "multitasking" usually does not work on all those tasks at once but turns from one to another as needed, in effect "time-sharing." To say that "something else was on my mind" implies that I was not really paying attention to the matter at hand. Then too, when surrounded by several nearby conversations, equally loud (say at a restaurant), I cannot understand them all but may try to switch my attention from one to another, though with difficulty because their very multiplicity distracts. Aristotle had taught that the human cannot think many things at once, for "it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them" {Topics 11.10114b34). Here Aristotle distinguishes potential subjects of thought, which may be multiple, from the one thing we are actually thinking right now. If indeed we cannot understand multiple spoken conversations, how can we make sense of musical polyphony? This paradox ofpolyphony (as we shall refer to it) poses sharp difficulties for the intelligibility of polyphony, much less its aesthetic appeal, for it seems to contravene Aristotle's general assertion about the unified quality of each act of human thought. Is each of our minds one or many? If each mind is This lecture was given on Friday, October 30,2009 at St. John's College in Santa Fe, NM and is dedicated to Philip LeCuyer, remembering thirty years as colleagues and friends, especially the conversations in which he first directed me to this topic and illuminated its relation to concept of personhood in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. �^ . , essentially one, how can we reconcile this with the manifold differentiation and multiplicity of the world? If each mind is not a single thing but a collection of many sub-minds (as Freud and Proust suggest), how then is it that we seem to understand or grasp anything as one? How could we even form the concept of unity? If, as ethnomusicologists argue, polyphony is a universal tendency, then we should not be surprised that the chant tradition was also subject to this tendency. Consider, for instance, this description of informal music-making in the British isles by Gerald de Barri (Giraldus Cambriensis, 1198), a Welsh churchman and historian: When they made music together, they sing their tunes not in unison, as is done elsewhere, but in part with many simultaneous modes and phrases. Therefore, in a group of singers (which one very often meets with in Wales) you will hear as many melodies as there are people, and a distinct variety of parts; yet, they all accord in one consonant and properly constituted composition. In the northern districts of Britain, beyond the Humber and round about York, the inhabitants use a similar kind of singing in harmony, but in only two different parts, one singing quietly in a low register, and the other soothing and charming the ear above. This specialty of the race is no product of trained musicians, but was acquired through long-standing popular practices.^ Such practiceswere probably long-standing, along with their 'Yapid and lively" playing of musical instruments he also notes. One might imagine that monastic novices might have been familiar with such part-singing in their villages, which choirmasters might have tried to discourage so that they could conform to the prescribed practice of singing in disciplined unison with the other choir monks, again assuming monophony as the prevalent canonical practice. Yet the temptation to try a bit of polyphony might have remained, or perhaps was an alternative tradition that had never really died, even in ecclesiastical practice, but was even more likely to surface in secular or popular singing, given the general tendencies toward heterophony that ethnomusicologists have noted. Thus, early polyphonic church music might have reflected a new synthesis with secular music, of which we know very little because it was scarcely recorded. So the question we are facing is not so much "why polyphony?" if indeed that was such a natural development. Instead, we are trying to understand how and why polyphonic music would be not merely tolerated as a regrettable backwash of popular practice but was taken up with interest by certain elements of the learned clergy, even enshrined as important adjuncts to the high solemnity of great feasts. Ecclesiastical polyphony no less than chant should first of all be considered in its liturgical context. From later descriptions, down to the present day, in the Roman Catholic liturgy polyphony is considered to add "solemnity," which has the specific meaning in this context not merely of pomp or seriousness, but an elevation of protocol appropriate to certain important ecclesiastical occasions. Liturgical solemnity specifically calls for several independent personages (such as the celebrant, deacon, subdeacon) to take different parts in the service, not to speak of the choir that would sing responses in an ordinary high mass. From early Christian times, the choir itself was often divided into two sub-choirs that would alternate, answering back and forth across �the church, thus providing another possible invitation to multiplicity of vocal parts. Thus, ecclesiastical solemnity has a kind of incipient or potential polyphony in its multiple clerical voices, which might have encouraged the use of polyphonic music for such services. Early liturgical dramas also emerged from the many voices of the solemn services for the highest feasts, such as the recitations of the Passion narrative by several voices. For instance, the dramatic dialogue Quemquaeritis? between the disciples seeking the body of Christ and the angel guarding his tomb began as part of the services for Holy Week, a natural development given the drama of this encounter as described in the Gospels read during the services. But any further assessment of the felt implications of polyphony needs comparison with the ancient practices from which it emerged. Polyphony in Ancient Musical Practice Though the nineteenth-century insistence on the uniqueness of Western polyphony was overstated, ancient musical practice (as presently understood) does seem to have been largely monophonic. The presently extant works of Greek musical theory concentrated on a single melodic voice; those available in the Middle Ages were even more monophonically oriented. If the Greeks did add accompaniments, they scarcely commented on them anywhere, in comparison with their voluminous discussions of the modes. Yet Plato's Athenian Stranger does say in the Laxos (812d) that the lyre "must produce notes that are identical in pitch to the words being sung," implying that singers would accompany themselves by playing on the lyre, if only to give themselves their starting pitch and support their melodic line. In fact, such practices of accompaniment (now commonly called heterophony) have been observed in Ethiopian singing to the lyre, as well as in many other traditions involving the performing needs of a singercomposer, including Homeric bards who sang to the lyre-like phorminx.^ Though aware of this, the Athenian Stranger nevertheless argues that "the lyre should not be used to play an elaborate independent melody [heterophonia]: that is, its strings must produce no notes except those of the composer of the melody being played; small intervals should not be combined with large, nor quick tempo with slow, nor low notes with high. Similarly, the rhythms of the music of the lyre must not be tricked out with all sorts of frills and adornments. All this sort of thing must be kept from students who are going to acquire a working knowledge of music in three years, without wasting time. Such conflict and confusion makes learning difficult..." This critique implies that such things did indeed happen frequently enough to annoy Plato's Stranger, though he does not disclaim what he considers the proper or seemly use of the lyre accompanying the voice. Viewed in the larger context of the musical discussions in Plato's Laxvs, such elaborate and increasingly polyphonic developments seem to have been part of newer musical currents that disturbed his conservative sense of received musical practice. For Plato, such new developments had a political import because he judged they would lead to an increasingly individualistic, fragmented polity. The Stranger regrets the divergence between accompaniment and song, whose "conflict and �confusion" distract learners. Virtuoso performers would be tempted to show off their skills through heterophonia, a word Plato seems to have used to denote departures from strict unison music, as compared to its modern usage to refer to the simultaneous use of different forms of the same melody in different voices, as when an accompaniment adds extra tones or ornaments to the singer's melody. Singing together, as one, may be one of the deepest ways political order is consummated; certainly Plato himself brings his ideal city into life through singing and dancing. From Plato's point of view, the ideal city would be nurtured by all its citizens singing a melody in unison, perhaps underlined by instruments that do not seek to rival that song by counterposing a distinct, contradictory voice. Conversely, heterophonia might instill or encourage divisions within the soul of each person as well as in the commonwealth as a whole. The evidence of ethnomusicology suggests that it is difficult to decide what is truly natural and what represents socially ordained behavior. It may be as "unnatural" - or as "natural" ~ to make a group of singers achieve a completely unified unison as it is to make them sing divergent melodic lines. Achieving either extreme requires discipline and practice. The consummate rendition of Gregorian chant with seamless ensemble and unanimity requires expert coordination from a chorus master of great skill, subtlety, and taste, along with active collaboration from the choristers. The difficulties of polyphony are more evident; a group of people who could sing passably in unison might well struggle to sing separate, independent parts. The training of truly independent voices requires each one to maintain its own line while maintaining its coordination with the other voices. Compared to these extremes, the middle ground of mild heterophony may be more comfortable and more widespread. Among many peoples, singers do not use exact unison but join the ensemble more freely, not diverging exactly from the other voices but perhaps starting a bit late or varying the melodic line a little as they join in. Besides the common use of such informal heterophony, Georgian folk music (for instance) has a well-developed tradition of more elaborate heterophony. Then too, African music often includes complex polyrhythms, each line of which is played by percussion instruments, far more intricate than common European folk practice. Such examples, among many others, have left little ground supporting older views of "primitive" versus "high" art, or of simple presumptions about "natural" musical style. In the case of ancient Greek musical practice, our knowledge has grown in the past century, thanks to recently discovered manuscripts. The surviving ancient musical texts use a special code of alphabet-like symbols written above the sung syllables, lacking all the customary visual clues of "rising" or "falling" melodic line that singers can use to grasp the "shape" of the melodic line intuitively, as in the Guidonian staff notation.'^ The ancient alphabetic-symbolic notation called for a highly trained "reader" to decode it, perhaps conforming to a very different sense that musical literacy ought to be reserved to the few so as to guard the guild secrets of the bards. Very few such readers (if any) could have sight-read an unknown melody, as Guido boasted his boys could do. The ancient system of notation was well suited to monophony because each syllable of text is naturally matched with a single sequence of melodic symbols written �above it. Any other simultaneous pitch would require yet another horizontal register beside the two already present. That no other extra registers have been found both confirms the basic monophony and also reinforces the insight that ancient music was deeply dependent on its verbal text because the alphabetic musical notation acts as a kind of meta-text written above the text whose melody it notates, as if indicating the close union of both within a single melos. Even apart from this melodic meta-notation, Greek syllables have built-in rhythms, inherently short and long in quantity, as well as intrinsic pitch-accents (against which the musical line may well have played). Thus, the Greek language itself is a kind of monophony, so musically rich that tibe overlay of additional melodies might well have felt excessive or at least would detract from the melodic qualities of the single line of text/music. Thus, scholars were surprised to find in the Euripides Orestes fragment (for instance) certain notation-symbols without any text syllable underneath; the consensus seems to be that these represent notes of the accompaniment, perhaps giving cues for the aulos players who were known to have accompanied such tragic choruses. In the modem transcription (figure 1), these pitches have been enclosed in parentheses, often sounding the note D that is the final of the fragment. ka-lo-lo-phy TO* inai, ka*to-Io*ph?*n»-mai 0 w u . ^ H(») h<S s'a-na-bac-chcu-ci. • 17—=— ho md-gas <jl - bos ou ' f' a-na dc lai-phosh5s 1 sin en ky - ma-sin p6-non short"or long —). The symbols t and i in6-ni-mosen bro-lois. li* V tis a - kd-iou tho - as ka-id-kly-sen dei-non ma - t^Tos hai-ma sas ti - na - xas dai -mon ill " = p6n-iou [Figure 1: Euripides, Orestes, lines 388344, indicating words whose musical setting was lost on the papyrus by indicating their syllabic length (whether la-broij o-lc-thri-oi respectively denote pitches raised or lowered by one quarter-tone (diesis). Notes in parentheses were assigned to an aulos accompaniment, according to the opinion of modem scholars. Text: [Chorus of women of Argos] "I grieve, 1 grieve ~ your mother's blood that drives you wild. Great prosperity among mortals is not lasting: upsetting it like the sail of a swift sloop some higher power swamps it in the rough doomwaves of fearful toils, as of the sea.''] Current scholarship interprets these extra notes as drone pitches, sustained by the instruments against the moving choral line. The shrill, nasal sound of the aulos would have prolonged this D in a way that would have sounded quite different than had it been plucked on a lyre as a drone note to accompany a Homeric bard. Nor does this secondary pitch remain fixed; for several measures, the drone changes to two pitches, F and C, as the melody itself shifts, indicating a certain dynamic function for the changing drone-notes, which here act to underline a melodic shift (emphasizing the notes Bb and �F) as the text describes the way divine power can swamp the ship symbolizing human pride "in the rough doom-waves of fearful toils." All this might have been acceptable to Plato's Stranger, for in every visible respect these additional notes (whether sustained as drones or not) seem to act to frame the main musical line and its text, which remains the predominant musical determinant throughout. Perhaps the treatises considered such drones and auxiliary notes to be so universally known and accepted that they were not worth much commentary because they were not substantively independent of the melody. At one point in his Manual of Harmonics, the Greek theorist Nichomachus (writing in the first century A.D.) explicitly refers to striking "two strings simultaneously," though most of his other references seem to concern successive, rather than simultaneous, sounds.^ Indeed, the auxiliary notes in the Orestes chorus really do not form a melodic voice of their own, but remains entirely accompanimental, providing backdrop for the vocal line. Though the Stranger's critique points to the existence of more daring heterophonia than the few surviving manuscripts evidence, his description does not go further than indicating increasingly ornate instrumental accompaniment to a vocal line. The Harmony of the Spheres /Ais, As the deepest archetype of music, though, Plato probably had in mind the "music of the spheres," for he held that both the soul and the cosmos were made out of music {Timaeus 35b-37a). In both cases, that primal music seems to have been monophonic, despite some puzzles. For instance, the Republic ends with an mythic description of looking down on heaven and earth, viewing the cosmic spindle of Necessity and hearing its circular whorls, each associated with a planet: "And up above on each of the rims of the circles stood a Siren, who accompanied its revolution, uttering a single sound, one single note. And the concord of the eight notes produced a single harmony [harmonia]" (617b). Yet the word harmonia (literally a joint, as between ship's planks, or a framework, agreement) seems to have meant a single melodic line, as opposed to our "harmony" with its predominant sense of blending different notes into a simultaneous chord. Still, it is hard to imagine those eight Sirens, each singing a single note, without thinking of their simultaneous sound as a chord, rather than as a melody composed of those notes. Nor do such Roman accounts as Macrobius's commentary on Cicero's Dream ofScipio alter this sense that the music of the spheres was a pure melody. The earliest text that considers the celestial music to be a "harmony" in our sense comes in a later Roman work, Martianus Capella's The Marriage of Philology and Mercury (written sometime between 410-439 A.D.), an important source transmitting ancient ideas about the liberal arts to the Middle Ages. Seeking Apollo's advice. Mercury finds him in mysterious cave, calling up visions of the physical world, both past and present, including a musical grove: there, a tuneful melody caused by the whispering winds in the trees rustled with a certain musical vibration. The topmost layers of the tall trees, correspondingly stretched tight, reverberated a high sound, but whatever was close and near to �the ground resounded a deep, heavy note through the down-turning branches. The middle portions of the trees, coming in contact with each other, sang together in the accompaniments [succentibus] of the octave [2:1], the fifth [3:2], the fourth [4:3], and even the whole tone [9:8], without any discontinuities, as long as the semitones were included. In this way, the grove sounded the full harmony and song of the gods in melodic concordance. When the Cyllenian [Mercury] explained this. Virtue became aware that even in the heavens the spheres produce harmony according to the same ratios or combine with other voices in accompaniment [succentibus]; so it is not strange that the grove of Apollo should be so full of harmony, when the same god, in the sun, modulates the spheres of the heavens also.^ Thus, we leam that some spheres accompany others in the celestial ''harmony,'' implying simultaneous sound as confirmed by the striking image of the grove of trees reverberating that heavenly music at once in low, middle, and high registers. Later, Martianus makes even clearer his awareness of polyphony in his description of the feast at which Harmony appears as the last of the prospective brides for Mercury. "Immediately a sweet new sound burst forth, like the strains of auloi, and echoing melodies, surpassing the delight of all sounds, filled the ears of the enchanted gods. For the sound was not a simple one, monotonously produced from one instrument, but a blending of all instrumental sounds creating a full symphony of delectable music" [905]. Martianus emphasizes the newness of this kind of simultaneous music-making, whose novelty and extravagance fits it for a divine feast. When Harmony herself appears, she carries a circular shield "with many inner circles... The encompassing circles of this shield were attuned to each other, and from the circular chords there poured forth a concord of all the modes... All other music - which, by contrast with its sweetness, seemed dissonant - now became silent. Then Jupiter and the other heavenly beings, recognizing the grandeur of the more exalted melodies, which were pouring forth in honor of a certain secret fire and inextinguishable flame, reverenced the profound ancestral song, and one by one arose in homage to extramundane intelligence" [909-910], Thus, the gods bear witness to Martianus's Neoplatonic convictions, for they honor the primal Mind that is higher than they and that here is revealed to be fundamentally polyphonic. Harmony goes on to speak at length of how "the Monad and first hypostasis of intellectual life" [922] ordered her to be the governess of souls emanating from that primal source, though her lengthy description of Pythagorean mathematics does not cast any more light on the question of polyphony versus monophony. Her mention of hypostasis will resonate strongly with our subsequent considerations The Christian Significance of Simultaneous Intervals A common Neoplatonic heritage may help explain the coincidence that, at nearly the same time as Martianus or perhaps a few years earlier, musical simultaneity emerged at �the center of a seminal Christian text. St. Augustine's discussion of the nature of the divine incarnationin On the Trinity (written in the first decades after 400 A.D.) draws upon his own extensive musical and rhetorical education as a brilliant young pagan in Carthage. About ten years earlier, prior to his conversion, he had written a short treatise On Music, which concentrated on poetic rhythm and prosody, rather than melody, but testifies to the depth of Augustine's musical studies and interests. He calls on these concepts at the crux of his discussion of how the divine Word could become flesh. Augustine uses the accord between "single" and "double" in the 1:2 ratio of the octave to describe "how the single [simplum] of our Lord Jesus Christ matches our double [congruit duplo nostro], and in some fashion enters into a harmony of salvation with it."7Though Augustine was steeped in Neoplatonic ideas of the One and of the Dyad, yet there is no precedent in those Neoplatonic writings for Augustine's daring synthesis in his extended metaphor of the octave, which incarnates ideal concepts in audible sounds comparable to the way Christ was the Word made flesh nor did Plotinus's treatment of the One emanating the Two did not make mention of the ratio between them.® In this context, Augustine's rhetorical struggle to find the right word mirrors and intensifies the felt effect of his sonic imagery, leading to the climactic point at which he adapts a new term to match his sense: This match - or agreement or concord or consonance or whatever the right word is for the proportion of one to two - is of enormous importance in every construction or interlock [coaptione] - that is the word I want - of creation. What 1 mean by this interlock, it has just occurred to me, is what the Greeks call harmonia. This is not the place to show the far-reaching importance of the consonant proportion of the single to the double. It is found extensively in us, and is so naturally ingrained in us (and who by, if not by him who created us?), that even the unskilled feel it whether singing themselves or listening to others. It is what makes concord [consonantid\ between high-pitched and deep voices, and if anyone strays discordantly away from it, it is not our knowledge, which many lack, but our very sense of hearing that is painfully offended. To explain it would require a long lecture; but anyone who knows how can demonstrate it to our ears with a monochord. This fascinating passage describes high- and low-pitched voices (such as boys and men) singing in octaves. Though the singers may not be educated and do not know the learned mathematics Augustine refers to, they feel acutely and immediately whether their interval is exactly in tune. Indeed, such practices of singing at the octave are almost inevitable (and often happen unintentionally) when mixed groups sing together whose vocal ranges are sufficiently diverse. Augustine may also have been acquainted with the ancient stringed instrument called "magadis," which was strung so that the same tune could be played in two octaves simultaneously. Using the name of this instrument as a term for octave singing ("magadizing"), students of Aristotle included in their collection of Problems (long, though incorrectly, ascribed to their teacher himself) the question "Why do people sing only the concord of the octave? For they magadize in this concord, but no other."^ The �students' speculations go on to explore the special character of the octave as it would be experienced when sung simultaneously: "Is it because it alone is constituted out of corresponding notes, and in corresponding notes, whichever of them one sings, the effectis the same? For the one of them contains in some way the sounds of both, so that when one of them is sung in this concord the concord is sung, and when people sing both, or when one is sung and the other played on the aulos, it is as if they both sing one note. Hence that note along is sung, since things in correspondence have the sound of a single note." Thus Aristotle's students wondered at the peculiar resonance of a simultaneously sounded octave, in which two sounds somehow merge into one, whether instruments and voices combine or voices alone. They resolved the problem of two sounds becoming one by arguing that "one of them contains in some way the sounds of both." By taking this insight much further, Augustine turns what had been a purely musical practice into something of great theological significance. His use of the image of octave singing makes clear that Christ, as the One, "matches our double" simultaneously, for if not, his divine nature would never finally blend with ours and we could never "participate in the Word, that is, in that life which is the light ofmen" Thus, Augustine uses our natural reaction to the octave to show that we have an innate awareness that is not externally learned; his daring comparison of the octave with the "interlock" (coaptione) between soul and Christ expresses the divine origin of both, for how else could such perfection be found in our flawed human understanding? He takes the simultaneous octave to symbolize Christian incarnation and human redemption. Compared to his Neoplatonic masters, Augustine is far more interested in the physicality of sound precisely because he understands it as the perfect image of the union of human and divine natures essential to Christian teaching. At the same time, he retains touch with the Neoplatonic argument that "all that is eternal is a simultaneous whole." Augustine uses this significant simultaneity as the crux of his musical metaphor, in which the human soul tastes eternity in simultaneous sonorities, reverberating the eternal Word.^o Person, Substance, and Hypostasis Augustine here is addressing what was arguably the most difficult and controversial theological question of his time, the relation between the divine and human natures in the person of the Christ. By the First Council of Nicea (325), the essential outlines of the doctrine of the Trinity had been agreed by the Eastern and Western Churches, though Augustine himself was involved in further controversies about the procession of the Holy Spirit that to this day remain points of disagreement between those two churches (though those disagreements only really emerged later and still share the fundamental premises of the Trinity as such). Yet as difficult as the concept of the Trinity was, the problem of the two natures was even more vexed; during Augustine's lifetime and into the centuries beyond it, the Arian contention that Christ was a created, though divine, being, divided the Christian world far more directly than other Trinitarian issues. As �we will see, powerful ecclesiastical and politicalfigures took up the Arian cause, including barbarian warlords and even ruling emperors. The passage in Augustine we have just been considering uses the musical analogy of the octave to instantiate his contention that Christ had both divine and human natures. In this context, Augustine carried his argument further by using the term "person," which had first been introduced by Tertullian as a way of emphasizing the differences between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, lest they seem merely different aspects of a single entity, rather than three distinct beings. Here, we need to recover the original Greek terms that were at stake in these Latin controversies. These arguments rely on the distinction between "being" {ousia, in Greek, rendered into Latin as essentia but sometimes as substantia) and "substance" (hypostasis, which Latin rendered as substantia). Partly because of these overlapping and confusing Latin renderings, we need to go back to the Greek to discern what otherwise may be obscured or even falsified by our common words. The Greek noun ousia, derived from the verb "to be" {einai), has the general sense of "being-ness." Originally it meant "that which is one's own, one's substance, property," as in the English phrase "a man of substance," someone who has substantial assets, in the first instance land, which is the "reality" implicit in the term "real estate." From this, ousia came also to denote stable being, immutable reality, hence essence and substance as an abstract term, which the Romans rendered as essentia. On the other hand, hypostasis means literally "standing under, supporting" (hypo-stasis)^ as "hypothesis" means "that which is put under," (hypo-thesis) in the way a premise "underlies" an argument. Tellingly, we have taken "hypothesis" into our language, but not "hypostasis," for which we follow the Latin translation of this as "substance," literally "standing-under" (sub-stantia). In Greek, hypostasis denotes the foundation of a temple (for instance), the courage or steadfastness of soldiers, a promise or resolution, hence substance or reality in the sense of the full expression of something (such as the soldiers' resoluteness, manifest in their courage). But where ousia might denote real estate, hypostasis in the plural (hypostaseis) could designate the title deeds or documents that record and express ownership. Figuratively, ousia is the land itself, while hypostasis denotes the foundation or groundwork of the temple standing on that land. When Augustine was trying to explain "three what?" are in the Trinity, he noted that the Greeks make a distinction that is rather obscure to me between ousia and hypostasis, so that most of our people who treat of these matters in Greek are accustomed to say mia ousia, treis hypostaseis, which in English is literally one being, three substances. But because we have grown accustomed in our usage to meaning the same thing by "being" as "substance," we do not dare say one being, three substances. Rather, one being or substance, three persons is what many Latin authors, whose authority carries weight, have said when treating of these matters, being able to find no more suitable way of expressing in words what they understood without words.^^ 10 �Thus, Augustine adopts the term ''person" rather than "hypostasis" out of convenience and to conformto the usage of other Latinauthors, but he does not really make a sharp distinctionbetween them and thinks that the Greeks, "if they like, could also say three persons, triaprosopa, just as they say three substances, treis hypostaseis. But they prefer this latter expression, because I imagine it fits the usage of their language better."^^ Augustine is aware that "scripture calls these three neither one person nor three persons - we read of the person ofthe Jjord, but not of the Lord called person —we are allowed to talk about three persons and the needs of discussionand argument require; not because scripture says it, but because it does not gainsay it. Whereas if we were to say three Gods scripture would gainsay us, saying Hear, O Israel, the Lord yourGod is one God."'^^ In his view, we choose the word "person" not so much because it is the only possible term but as a concession to the inadequacy of human words in response to "the sheer necessity of saying something, when the fullest possible argument was calledfor against the traps or the errors of the heretics." Augustine's famous Confessions are notably personal, in the modern senseof the word, vivid and emotionally fraught, including many aspects of his inner and outer lives that he considers shameful but essential parts of his spiritual journey. In so doing, Augustine discloses a new depth of interiority that have more to do with the radically self-reflexive notion of "self" than with the less reflexive "soul" knownto ancient philosophy.^^ Yet, though Augustine was arguably the first thinker in the Westto emphasize and analyzethe concept of person, he still seems not to put the greatest possible weight on the term itself. Persona and Personhood In order to weigh the full nature and consequences of the conceptof personhood, which we tend to takefor granted, we need to consider its origins and history. In Latin, persona namedthe mask worn by an actorin tragic drama,the visible facade through which their voice sounded (per-sonare). Fromthis, it cameto have a legalconnotation of someone who could appear in the "theater" of the law courts, address the court, give evidence, take oaths. In Romantimes, personhoodwas a high and exclusive distinction, reserved in each family only to the paterfamilias, not to his wife, sons, daughters, or slavesunless he conferred it on them in a special ceremony conducted beforean appropriate tribunal. There, the paterfamilias couldgivethem personhood through the process of manumission, literally"releasingby hand." Because so many Romancitizens did not speak Latin, this ceremony sometimes took the form of a wordless charade: the paterfamilias would face the court, his son (or whoeverwas receiving manumission) facing him, hence with his back to the court. The father would then strike his son a ceremonial slap in the face that would then turn him around to face the court, after which the son would then be a person in his own right, able to address the court. Nor was personhood reserved to individual human beings; Romanlaw began the conceptof corporation, an "artificial person" that was also able to appear in court and was immortal (unlike "natural persons"). 11 �As suggestive as these Roman ceremonies and symbols are, the concept of person has still deeper roots that go beyond masks, facades, legal surrogates. The Latin word persona ultimately goes back to the Greek prosopon, literally ''that which is before/across from the eyes (pros-apsis)/' first of all meaning the face or countenance. Greek literature set the precedent for a larger, more subtle understanding of what prosopon meant. Homer already uses this word in a plural form (prosdpa) even when referring to a single person, implicitly indicating that even a single solitary "face" is implicitly regarded by another face, part of a larger world of faces. The word also means "one's look, countenance," which also implies some onlooker, someone "before one's eyes." Prosopon also came to mean "character" in the sense of a dramatic part and hence also was used for the masks in the theater that expressed the character of each personage in the drama. But here too the concept of "character" should be taken in the larger sense of how each character is embedded in the whole drama, not standing purely by him- or herself, apart from the other characters. Thus, the Greek concept of person rested on an implicit communion ofpersons, in which personhood is here understood as essentially a relation between persons, as opposed to some quality each person could be said to have independent of the others.^^ As touchstone of personhood, rather than external formalities of masks or legal charades, we should think of intimate conversation,/ace to face, as we still call encounters person toperson. Such language already is important in the Hebrew Scriptures, in which Moses speaks to God "face to face, as a man talks with his friend." Hence the concept of person became an important point of reference as Christians struggled to express their novel concept of the Godhead without either connoting polytheism or conflating the distinct relations within the Trinity. But the even more difficult challenge was to reconcile the different natures of Christ within one person. Boethius and the Concept of Personhood Compared to Augustine, his younger contemporary Boethius defined personhood more closely in his theological writings. Boethius also wrote the Fundamentals ofMusic, the most important text transmitting ancient musical theory for the next thousand years. Boethius considered himself a translator, rather than an innovator; writing after the fall of Rome at the hands of barbarian invaders and himself the chief minister to the Ostrogothic king Theodoric, he felt the need to record Greek philosophy in the Latin language, as if he sensed that it would soon be lost. He himself only was able to complete a small part of his plan. His dilemma comes forward in his Consolation of Philosophy, which he wrote in prison, awaiting execution on trumped-up charges brought by his suspicious king. This brief book became one of the most popular books throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance, translated successively by the Anglo-Saxon King Alfred, Geoffrey Chaucer, and Queen Elizabeth I. In fact, Boethius was trying to mediate between Theodoric, an Arian, and the orthodox emperor, seeking a compromise solution to the controversy about the two natures of Christ. Theodoric took this as evidence that 12 �Boethius was conspiring against him with the emperor. Facing imminent death, Boethius sought consolationand reassurance from Philosophy in person, a grave, tall woman who rebukes his tears. Her stern response brings to mind his life's project, to translate Aristotle, Plato, and other ancients into contemporary Latin. By comparison with Augustine's Confessions, the way Boethius depicts himself in his Consolation of Philosophy is less inward and self-reflexive but nevertheless gives a notably personal shape to his dialogue. Though he takes Plato's dialogues as his model, he uses his own dilemma as the central occasion of the dialogue with Philosophy; his personal agony takes the work beyond conventionalized allegory to something with the kind of existential force that must have touched medieval readers, as it still continues to do. Even Boethius'snotable avoidance of Christian theology in this work seems to speak to his personal relationwith Philosophy herself, apart from the theological issues that engaged him elsewhere; his own loyalties included both the pagan philosophic tradition and the new faith. Though he attributes his inspiration to Augustine's On the Trinity, in his dialogue On Person and the Two Natures Against Eutyches andNestorius, Boethius specifically grapples with the problem of the dual nature of Christ as man and God, for which he provides a definition of person as "the individual substance of a rational nature." Even as he follows and respects Augustine, Boethius's definition stresses both individuality and rationality because a stone, a tree, or a horsecannotbe a person, "but we say there is a personof a man, of God, of an angel."^® Using this criterion, Boethius then rejects the Nestorian heresy that the two natures in Christimply that He is two persons. In that case, Boethius objects, there would be no union between those two persons, human and divine, onlya mere juxtaposition, hence "Christ is,according to Nestorius, in no respect one, and therefore He is absolutely nothing." We can only conceive that Christ saved the human race, Boethius insists, if he united human and divine natures in his one person. On the other hand, that single personhood of the Redeemerdoes not imply that he has, as Eutyches had argued, only one single nature that utterly absorbed human into divine nature. For Boethius, personhood is precisely the way in which the multiplicity of natures (human and divine) can stillsubsist in the oneness of the person of the Christ, a oneness Boethiusconsidered a precondition for human salvation. Where Augustine reserves the term "person" for the exalted individuals in the Trinity, Boethius also used it for angels and human beings, thus extending the concept of personhood widely. He also emphasizes that personare comes from sonus, sound "and for this reason, that the hollow mask necessarily produces a largersound" so that, by thoseamplifying masks, we can recognize each personage in a tragedy. Thus, Boethius explicitly directs us to sound, to voice, as essential to personhood. This connection will remain important as we apply these concepts to polyphony. Organum and its Ninth-Century Philosophical Context Four centuries pass before the ideas we have been discussing come to light again; only in the ninth century did Boethiusand Martianus Capella became available again in 13 �manuscript, along with the earliest written examples of polyphony in Musica enchiriadis and Scholica enchiriadis. These texts described ''organum'' built on a plainchant voice (called the "tenor" or "vox principalis"), practices probably already well established before these treatises were written. Because the earliestsurviving written evidence of the chant is roughly contemporary with these treatises, we cannot assume that monophony simply preceded polyphony; morelikely, both traditions coexisted, though ecclesiastical practice gave a special place to the monophonic chant.^^ Then too, these anonymous treatises seem to have been written somewhere to the north of the Carolingian realm, perhaps bringing contemporary practices to more remote regions, rather than themselves making any claim to innovation. These and other early collections of organum seem to follow an intelligible pattern of gradually growing independence of voices, beginning with the monophonic chant and adding parallel organal voices to form what the Enchiriadis treatises call "symphonies" (fig. 2), each ofwhich is "asweet combination of different pitches joined to one another."20 qui vivimus benedicimus do - tni - num qui vivimus benedtcimus do - mi - num qui vivtmus benedicimus do - mi - num quI vivimus benedicimus do - mi • num qui vivimus benedicimus do • — exhocnune 1. e( us • que in mi - num w sc - cu - lum. _ >L ' ex hoe nunc el ex hoc nunc ct us - que m... * in us • quc in * ....m , ex hoc nunc ct us - que in se - cu - lum. ex hoc nunc et us - quc in se - cu - lum. se . cu - lum. sc - cu - turn. Figure x8 [Fig. 2: Examples of parallel organum (a) at the octaveand (b) at the fifth, from the Scolica enchiriadis (ca. 850 A.D.). Text: We who live bless the Lord, both now and to the ages.] Other examples involve freer motion of the organal voice against a "drone," in which the organal voice will sometimesconverge on that same final pitch {occursus), a natural way of accommodating the separate voices to their mutual conclusion (fig. 3). Rex cae - 11 Ty - tan - is 14 do - mi - ne ma - ris un - di - so - ni. ni - li - di qua! - li - di - que so - li. �[Fig. 3: Example of obliquely moving organum from Musicaenchiriadis, in which each line move towards a unison close (occursus) on the final note, E.] As they stand, the Enchiriadis texts came near the beginning of an extraordinary flowering of polyphonic music that involved the most innovative intellectual centers of Europe. How did the partisans of polyphony conceive what they were promoting in terms of their intellectual priorities? How did they understand polyphony in relation to the great monophonic tradition of chant? If indeed polyphony opened a new intellectual as well as musical door, to what exactly did they think it led? How did they conceive it to be related to the sources and traditions they knew? Another contemporary author, Remigius of Auxerre (d. 908), directly connects these developments with the text of Martianus, commenting on his description of the mysterious grove we considered earlier: "Concentus is the uniting of tones that are alike. Succentus occurs when different tones sound together, as, for example, in organum.^'^i Remigius specifically understands what was heard in Apollo's grove - and hence in the music of the spheres resounding there - to be essentially the same as the contemporary organum he knew. The most likely source about commonalitiesbetween polyphony and theology may be Boethius himself, the main authority cited by the Enchiriadis treatises, which call him doctor magnificus. ^ Where Boethius used the term symphonia to mean "consonance," the Enchiriadis treatises use this term to refer to "a sweet combination of different pitches joined to one another," specifically when sounded simultaneously in organum. Though most of Boethiuscan be read as referring only to a single melodic line whose notes are sounded successively, not simultaneously, the Enchiriadis treatise quotes his discussion of two strings plucked at once, which he in turn drew from Nicomachus: when tuned an octave apart, two strings "combine and are united together in sound so that one pitch \vox\, as if produced from one string and not mixed from two, strike the hearing."23 "Thus says Boethius," the treatise notes, invoking his authority on a matter it considers especially important and difficult, noting that "why some tones agree with each other in a sweet commingling, whereas others disagree unpleasantly, being unwilling to blend with each other, has a rather profound and divine explanation, and in some respects is among the most hidden things of nature."24 Here, the agreement or disagreement of specifically simultaneous tones has a special importance for the Enchiriadis author, which he connects with larger issues: "This principle, whose operations in this realm the Lord also permits us to penetrate, is treated in the writings of the ancients. In these is asserted, with most convincing arguments, that the same guiding principle that controls the concord of pitches regulates the natures of mortals. Through these numerical relationships, by which unlike sounds concord with each other, the eternal harmony of life and of the conflicting elements of the whole world is united as one with material things." Thus, the Enchiriadis treatise connects the problem of concord and discord between simultaneous voices with "the natures of mortals," specifically with the way "the eternal harmony of life" is united with "material things." This indeed describes the 15 �exact problem of the possible "concord'' of divine and human nature in the person of the Christ; the author's reference to the Lord (the first and only such in this treatise, except for its concluding prayer) also signals that we are in fact dealing with a matter whose mysterious hiddenness specifically depends on matters that only the Lord can enable us to penetrate, hence also presumably implying also that they have to do with the Lord Himself. The author of the Enchiriadis treatises was probably also aware of the theological works of Boethius (whose manuscripts were extant even before those of his mathematical and musical writings) and hence his reference to the Lord and the problem of the dual nature may well also refer to Boethius's formulation and his teachings about personhood. If so, this gives contemporary evidence connecting the problem of musical polyphony with the "theological polyphony" inherent in the person of Christ, giving us some indication of how this early treatise on polyphony thought about its nature and implications in its larger theological and philosophic context. In this nexus of interconnected references and problems, Boethius was a central figure. Persona and Polyphony Returning now to the Enchiriadis treatise in light of these distinctions, we can view a polyphonic composition as a kind of virtual person because it unites several separate "natures" (here, the distinct voices) into one persona, the unified individuality of the musical work itself. Because the theological concept of person seems to have explicitly informed the way the author of Enchiriadis spoke about polyphony, we may infer that he implicitly understood polyphony as analogous to the way in which we encounter persons, as opposed to the ways we encounter beings that are not persons. Augustine, following the usage of philosophers before him, spoke of human souls, rather than human persons; the distinction is subtle but telling precisely because the soul (anima or psyche in Greek) denotes some life-giving, animating principle within each animated being, whereas person is more deeply social, denoting a face surrounded by other faces, or (in the case of Christ) two distinct natures that are together unified into one person. That is, "person" seems to indicate the encounter as a unity with a certain kind of multiplicity. For Boethius, the encounter with Christ involves human and divine natures united within one person. For the Enchiriadis author, the encounter with polyphony "permits us to penetrate ... that the same guiding principle that controls the concord of pitches regulates the natures of mortals." In that way, polyphony becomes a privileged new way to apprehend the mysterious truths of theology not just as concepts but in the intimate experience of our own polyphonic persona. These considerations illuminate also the further innovations associated with the School of Notre Dame. For instance, in Leonin's setting of the Gregorian Gradual for Christmas Day, Viderunt omnes, the chant is heard in long, unmeasured notes held in the lower of the two voices. Above the chant, the organal voice (called the "discant" by Anonymous IV) weaves a free course that touches on the chant pitch but also uses many other notes freely against it, some quite dissonant (such as the initial E). Compared to the restrained pitch range of the chant, the discant's range is huge (an 16 �octave plus a fourth) and its fioriture demanding, requiring a virtuoso executant, not just one of the anonymous choir singers intoning the chant. Though this development was already underway in the increasingly elaborate free organum (such as that of St. Martial), Leonin's piece implies a whole new "political" reality of the soloist set against the chant (presumably intoned by a chorus), which cannot help but alter our perception of the chant as "holding" (as the word "tenor" literally indicates) the musical background against which the discant shines forth. M1. Viwrufit I—» ' [Fig. 4: Leonin, Viderunt omnes, based on the Gradual for Christmas Day. Text: All [the ends of the earth] shall see [the salvation of our God: all the earth shall rejoice in God.]] The sense of the chant syllable (much less the complete word) is lost behind in the play of the discant. The timeless quality of the chant is further heightened by this fading of linguistic coherence: a single word of text now occupies so long a time that the mind only dimly tracks it. In Perotin's setting of this same Gradual, not only is the number of voices greater but the sheer extension of each syllable of the chant is also immensely dilated; we hear forty measures of "Vi-" before changing to "-de-." Though using the same rhythmic mode as Leonin, Perotin's three voices result in a qualitatively very different texture, so closely spaced and overlapping in range that one often cannot tell one of them from the other. The ear is dazzled, unsure of when the voices intertwine and cross, when they move apart. This confusion results partly from the greater multiplicity of voices: the ear attends differently to four voices than to two. Perotin seems to want a new texture of interwoven 17 �voices, as compared with one or more distinct voices. Here texture enters music in a new. way, denoting a complex effect emerging from the synthesis of a number of elements that together produce a net effect qualitatively different than their mere sum. Compared to the soaring individuality of Leonin's discant, Perotin's voices have a wholly other mode of being, independent yet indistinguishable in their intricate interconnection. Though their overall structural plans are similar, by radically extending the outer organum sections (over 100 measures compared to Leonin's 17), one no longer perceives Perotin's structure in anything like the same way. Perotin's organum goes on at such length that one really looses oneself in it, far more so than in Leonin's much more compact setting. The very excess of Perotin's proceeding suggests that he himself was not merely carried away by exuberance but more intended his hearers to be agape, perhaps as those might feel when first entering in a Gothic cathedral with much higher vaults and ceilings than they had ever before encountered. Such a person might well feel disoriented, overwhelmed, perhaps experience a kind of vertigo gazing into the heights. Leonin and Perotin reduced their texts almost to incomprehensibility, at least to a human mind that can only understand words pronounced near their normal speeds, not so radically slowed and prolonged. Though we confront their works as written compositions, we should bear in mind the strong evidence that ecclesiastical polyphony was probably improvised according to carefulformulae committed to memory, each prescribingpossible counterpoints to a given intervallic motion in the underlying chant.^s For example, careful examination of the account-books of the Cathedral of Notre Dame has indicated that its allotment of candles was not great enough to allow music to have been read in the dim light, only performed by heart. In that case, the written music may have been more a reminder or sample than a definitive, exclusive text. If so, those improvisers confronted even more directly the difficulties of generating (as well as apprehending) and coordinating many musical lines at once. Thomas's Polyphonic Mind These arguments remind us of the relation between polyphony and the mind. In the slow unfolding of this subtle and complex issue, it will prove helpful to begin by looking back from the vantage point of the mature works of Thomas Aquinas, writing a century after Leoriinwrote his Magnus liber organi. Born about the time that Perotin died (ca.1220), Thomas himself was a product of the University of Paris, whose intellectual milieu literally and figuratively surrounded the School of Notre Dame and its cathedral. As the historian William of Armorica noted, in that time [1210] letters flourished at Paris. Never before in any time or in any part of the world, whether in Athens or in Egypt, had there been such a multitude of students. The reason for this must be sought not only in the admirable beauty of Paris, but also in the special privileges which King Philip and his father before him conferred upon the scholars. In that great city the study of the trivium and the quadrivium, of canon and civil law, as also of the science which empowers one to preserve the health of the body and cure its ills, were held in high esteem. But the crowd pressed with a special zeal about the chairs where Holy Scripture was taught, or where problems of theology were solved.^^ 18 �That unprecedented body ofstudents (who themselves constituted a city within the city of Paris, proudly defending their own privileges and power) may have affected the reception and understanding of the new polyphony in the Cathedral in ways that may be comparable to the theological debates Thomas encountered after he himself arrived in Paris in 1245 as a student.27 We see something of the spirit and method of these debates in the "questions'' Thomas used throughout his Summa Theologiae. Each question begins with a statement of the issue at hand (for example, "is God a person?"), to which Thomas first givesa series of objections, each in the voice of those who hold it, along with their reasoning, followed by what Thomas considers, "on the contrary," to be the decisive argument against the view held by these objections. Then Thomas responds "I answer that....," summarizing the theological crux in lightofthat decisive argument, followed by a reply to each objection. Given their keen attention to these theological debates, Parisian students would likely have been struck by the question about polyphony. Indeed, the multiple conflicting "voices" in a scholastic "question" themselves form a kind ofintellectual polyphony. The students' thinking would have beenshapedlargely by Boethius's Fundamentals ofMusic, which they all studied as part of the quadrivium. Thomas too would have known this text well, no less than Boethius's theological works such as On the Trinity, on which Thomas as a young man wrote the only commentary dating from his century.28 Thomas also adopted as canonic Boethius's definition of the concept of person. In his Summa Theologiae, Thomas cites the argument of Augustine that "this word person of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence, as this name God and this word Wise." 29 But Thomas alsoreviews the subsequent controversies whether "person" really signified an essence or a relation, to which he answers that "the name personsignifies relationdirectly, and the essence indirectly." In this way, Thomas phrases the orthodox viewby sayingthat the Trinity comprises three persons and one hypostasis (underlying substance, as discussed above), which formulates both the unity and trinity essential to the triune God. The personhood of the Son is his sonship, in relation to the Father, whose fatherhood only emerges in relationto his Son, continuing on through all the interrelations that are essential to the Trinity, where "relation" implies both the common ground of the two related persons and also their difference (between Father and Son, for instance). These relations were famously controversial; part of the schism between Eastern and Western churches concerned whether or not the Spirit could proceed from the Father and from the Son (thefilioque of the Roman creed) or only from the Father (as the orthodox East insisted). Thomas, with Aristotle, held that the human mind cannot think many things at once, for "itmay happen that many things are known, but only one understood.''^® Thinking back to the example of listening to multiple conversations at once, Thomas might argue that they are so distinct that we cannot know them "through the one form of the whole," namely through "one species it [the mind] can understand at the same time; hence it is that God sees all things at the same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time," for the same reason that "it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes," which in this example correspond to the "different species" that in general characterize the differentiating qualities through which we recognize different beings in the world. 19 �In confronting the general paradox of polyphony, Thomas never refers directly to polyphonyor music but is very much engaged with the closely related consideration of the differences between divine, angelic, and human minds. In assessingthese distinctions of his, we should bear in mind that they do not necessarily require some doctrinal acceptance of revealed truth or religious dogma; in this phase of his work, Thomas is trying to reach the furthest implications that can be drawn by ordinary human reason, withoutthe benefit of revdation, to establish the logical truths that ought to be accepted by any reasonable mind. In the process, it is importantto establish the character and scope of such a mind, which may most readily be done by comparison with other kinds of mind that are more or less than human; whether they are actual or merely hypothetical possibilities goes beyond this discussion and requires addressing issues of experience and revelation. In his time as well as our own, the human mind persistently reaches out toward and beyond its own limitations (whateverthey may be, whether a result of a presumed, given "nature'' or as a productofsocial convention), towards what may be more than human. Looking to the extreme side of such trans-human possibilities in one direction, a supreme and infinite Being would be the ultimate logical extrapolation. Yet even were sucha Being to exist, the question would remain whether and how a purelyfinite human intellect couldever know such a transcendent Being. After all, such a Being couldexist so far above human knowledge as to be utterly unknowable to humans and hence entirely disconnected from any human concern. SoThomas's questions about the nature and existence of divine and angelic beingsconcern their possible interaction with humans,not merely their existence in themselves, absolutely apartfrom humanintelligence, hence his project require determining how far beyond itselfhuman intelligence can reach. Theself-contradictory quality of trying to reachbeyond oneself returns us to what we can know, by and in ourselves. Here Aristotle helps Thomasexpress how it is that we see, and hence know: "Twothings are required both for sensible and intellectual vision namely, power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. Forvisionis made actual only when the things seen is in a certain way in the seer.... Therefore in order to see God, there mustbesome likeness ofGod on the part oftheseeing power whereby the intellect is made capable ofseeing God."^^ We could only see — understand — or something beyond ourselves if there is something ofthat higher being in us; otherwise, it would remain utterly unfamiliar and incomprehensible to us. Our recurrent aspiration to seea higher power beyond ourselves is thus read as evidence that that higher power does exist and alsothat we share enough in common with it that we might aspire towards it, to come into contact with it or perhaps even to become morelike it. Thomas argues that our aspiration to know a being higher than ourselves means that some human intellects will actually see the essence of God, not merely His bare possibility or a few of His attributes, because God, as supreme actuality, "is in Himself supremely knowable," in the sense that knowledge in general is the actualization of some potential for knowing, as Aristotle had argued.32 Thomas divides all created beingsinto those that are either purely corporeal (such as inanimate matter), those that are partly corporeal and partly spiritual (suchas humans), and those that are purely spiritual, hence wholly incorporeal (such as those called "angels" in theScriptures). As such, the angels form an interesting middle groundbetween purely finite, corporeal beings, such as ourselves, and a purely incorporeal, infinite God. Thomas 20 �argues that, as entirely actualized spiritual beings, such angels would naturallyknow God "by His own likeness refulgent in the angel itself.In his Treatise onAngels, Thomas goes on to exploremany aspects of angelic knowledge and action. Angelswould be far closerto the ultimate actualization of the supremeBeing and hence would then know God through their own natural powers (ascan humans also, through reason, Thomas argues, though less completely). Angels would accordingly know themselves perfectly, thus fulfilling the ancient injunction of the Delphic oracle: know thyself. Despite this, even angelic minds have their limitations, which Thomas does not merelyclaimto be coincidental but deduces as logically necessary, given their nature and essence. He argues that angels cannot know the future or the secret thoughts of men.^^ Angels cannot be in several places at once, nor can several angels be in the same place at the same time; they move through space sequentiallywith finite speed, not instantaneously.36 These deductions all follow from angels sharing the fundamental aspects and limitations of all finite entities. On the other hand, Thomasargues that "an angel can understand many things at the same time." In this, the angels show their essential kinship with God, who "sees all things in one thing, which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively as we have held."37 in contrast, "we understand [many things] simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if,for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror." Thomas takes up this image of a mirror as the crux of our reflections, both literal and figurative. "A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one species," meaning a certain mode of likeness or of shared being, in this case the species of light common to luminous objects and to the seeing eye. "But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror," bringing to mind the paradox of a supreme mirror, whose perfect reflectivity, even apart from all objects, seems virtually to shine in the darkness. Thomas sununarizes the argument we have just been considering by noting that God's own knowledge is not discursive, unlike our common modes of cognition, which proceed through separating and delineating the strands of succession and causality in ways necessary to human understanding. God, in contrast, sees all in Himself, and the angels, beholding Him directly, can also see many things as one, through Him. Thereby we receive a resolution of our paradox of polyphony: only a completely unified mind can see many things as one, through itself, a superlative form of vision which then becomes a possibility for those who behold that mind. Here the unity of God as supreme Being is essential, rather than His infinity - or perhaps we here confront unity as an essential, surprising face of infinity. Our puzzlement may also reflect our unexamined modern presupposition that "one" is merely a number, the first in a series of integers: one, two, three, four,,... But in ancient mathematics, "one" is not included as a number, which begins with two, three,... The Greek word for "one," monad, comes from monos, alone, solitary, with the sense of preeminence: the One. In this exalted sense, oneness is a transcendent state, something superhuman and divine, not to be put on the same level with twoness or threeness or multiplicity in general. Thomas was well aware of the tradition of Neoplatonic philosophy and theology that reflected centrally on the supreme mystery of the One and how it could "overflow" into the Many. As did Augustine, Thomas relies on the Neoplatonic argument that "all that is eternal is a simultaneous whole," implying that understanding the eternal means grasping the simultaneity of all the diverse voices in the universe.^s 21 �Here, then, we may bestsituate the paradox of polyphony in its full philosophical and theological context. Ifindeed the mind ofGod is polyphonic, in the sense ofuniting together many thingsas one,simultaneously, then those who practice polyphony are implicitly attemptingto turn their minds towards that divine potentiality. Butgiven what we havejust heard from Aristotle and Thomas, this is not possible for human beings, as such - hence the paradox. In the context of the Enchiriadis treatises, its true resolution lies more in the context of the theological controversies about the nature of Christ, whose divine and human natures unite in the mystery of personhood. Thus, polyphony calls attention to the way personhood represents the exact point of connection between human and divine natures crucial for Christology. By comparison with our earlier discussion of human and divine minds, Thomas implies that understanding such a god-man requires that we step beyond what is knowable to the unaided human reason, at leastin certain respects. Themere possibility of sucha being is important, quite apart from the question of whether it ever actually existed, which (Thomas judges) we could onlyknow through revelation. With that hypothetical question in mind, then, we can ask: what would be required for some being to partake equally of divine and human natures, or is that logically self-contradictory to the point of impossibility, like a round square or an odd even number? Thomas's answer relies on the language of personhood, which opens new possibilities of phrasing a complex combination of unity and multiplicity in ways that emphasizestrong parallels between these theological problems and the novel paradoxes of polyphony. Granting that a purely "natural man" cannot grasp the many-in-one of the Trinity,Thomas relies on the concept of personhood to give an intelligibleform to the mysterious sacred texts he is interpreting. He is working within a theological tradition that views human psychology in terms of a "trinity" of faculties in the soul, each of which are explicit images of the Trinity that made man. Augustine had described a number of such "trinities" in the human soul, such as memory, understanding, and will, or wisdom, understanding, and memory, or lover, beloved, and love.^^ Ultimately, Thomas considers that human beings have been given the capacity to contemplate the divine Trinity and its personhood because they themselves are persons, through the grace of God. Thus, the interplay of polyphonic voices may reflect the interplay of separate but deeply unified and correlated persons within the godhead as well as the parallel inner faculties by which humans might be attuned to them. Indeed, the connection of humanity to this divine unity-in-multiplicity is the crux of the most radical and controversial Christian doctrine of the union of divine and human natures in Christ Himself. Having established that He is a person co-equal to the other persons in the Trinity, Thomas argues that "the union of the two natures [human and divine] in Christ is the greatest of all unions" and that union "took place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature.''^^ In this case, the personhood of Christ is precisely the way He could unify two seemingly antithetical natures, human and divine, mortal and immortal. According to this view, a newly extended concept of person is the essential precondition for the coherence and logical consistency of Christian doctrine. Understanding and hearing polyphony also required the new capability to hear that such a sublime conception of personhood implied: the process of apprehending the mysterious truth of the union of the two natures in the person of Christ parallels hearing two different polyphonic voices as one, while still noticing their differences. Here we 22 �return to our starting point, Aristotle's (and Thomas's) insistence that we can finally only know one thing at a time, which now is extended (but not violated) by this new kind of polyphonic apprehension, in whichwe grasp many things as one precisely through a kind ofbroadening or deepening ofthe human personthat is intrinsic to the Christian message. For if,as Thomas seems to imply, Aristotle really describedthe full potentialities of human nature (at least in broad outline), both Christian revelation and polyphony require and demonstrate the ways in which rationalhumanity can expand or extend its capabilities through the actions of divine grace. In this reading, polyphony may then be a kind of experimental demonstration of the effect of Christian grace on human hearing, as Thomas'sextension of Aristotle manifests the effect of that grace on ancient wisdom. To be sure, we lack any direct testimony to these inferences from contemporary sources, whichreally do not address the questionof how they understood polyphony or what sense they made of it, philosophically. Yet the parallels we have drawn are so strong and directthat it is hard to believe that they werenot noticed at the time, even thoughwe do not possess any directevidence. Thesamecrowds of excited students who pressed around the chairs of theology, hearing arguments about personhood and the union of the two natures or about the Trinity, probably alsoheard (or even sang) the new polyphony of theSchool ofNotre Dame. The theme ofnewness iscommon and worth remarking: the works of Leonin and Perotinwere obviously new, as Anonymous IVmakesclear, as were the teachings of Thomas. And here we recall also that "newness" was not then a term of praise, as it generally is for us; Thomas himself came under investigation for heresy, which precisely seeks out dangerous and misleading novelties. His new use of the ancient philosophers, especially Aristotle, was highly controversial; Thomas used his immense rhetorical and logical skill to persuade hiscontemporaries to accept this new synthesis of faith and reason, for which his model was Boethius, who had brought knowledge of Aristotle to the Christian West. Throughout this period, polyphony remained controversial. In 1159, John of Salisbury (aclose associate of Thomas a Becket) argued that "musicsullies the Divine Service" on account ofthe "effete emotings oftheir before-singing and theirafter-singing, theirsinging and their counter-singing, their in-between-singing and their ill-advised singing... to such an extent are the highest notes mixed together with the low or lowest ones. Indeed, when such practices go too far, they can more easily occasion titillation between the legs than a senseof devotion in the brain."'*^ In 1323, PopeJohnXXII's bull Docta sanctorum proscribed manyforms of polyphonic music, quoting Boethius that "a person who is intrinsically sensuous will delight in hearing these indecent melodies and onewholistens to themfrequently will be weakened thereby and lose his virility of soul."42 The pope referred to polyphony as a "common" state of things, whichimplies that objections must also have become common; he exempts "the occasional use of some consonances, which heighten the beauty of the melody," indicating ways in which polyphonic practice was by then deeply ingrained. Though he did not write directly on music, some ofThomas's otherwritings give us insight into hisviews. We know that he composed the liturgical texts for the newly established feast ofCorpus Christ, instituted in 1264 by Pope Urban IV, whose liturgy involved newly composed chantssettingThomas's texts, including the famous Tantum ergo sacramentum. One wonders how he would have regarded these musicalsettings, especially in relation to the mystical theology of the Eucharist to which Thomas seems to 23 �have been deeply drawn. We have unambiguous evidence of his concern with sound in his Eucharistic poem Adoro te, which includes the revealing lines "Visus, tactus, gustus in ^ • te fallitur, / Sed auditu solo tuto creditur.'' As Gerard Manley Hopkins rendered it, ''Seeing, touching, tasting are in thee deceived: / How says trusty hearing? that shall be believed." Just as Augustine was finally converted by a mysterious childlike voice that piped over and over again the sing-song words "Take it and read," Thomas here asserts the peculiar importance of hearing as a mode through which the divine may made known to the human soul. Accordingly, he implicitly places a high value on music, which may well have complemented in his mind the heard quality of the disputations and questions that formed the body of his theological works. This emphasis on hearing also is manifest in the spoken quality of his work. After his youth, Thomas customarily dictated, rather than wrote, his works. His output was staggering, amoimting (on careful calculation) to more than twelve printed pages a day of closely argued prose, on a pace maintained over many years. In order to do this, several independent accounts by his associates noted that he "dictated at the same time on diverse subjects to three secretaries and sometimesfourThus, Thomas's own mind seemed to have operated in a way that was distinctly polyphonic. One of his amanuenses even recorded that once "after dictating to him and to two other secretaries that he [Thomas] had, sitting to rest for a bit, he fell asleep and continued dictating even while sleeping."^^ Such stories of simultaneous dictation also were told of Caesar as evidence that his abilities exceeded the human norm. But where his prodigious feats merely indicated his superhuman talents, in Thomas's case, his ability to function polyphonically corresponds strikingly with the questions about human, angelic, and divine minds he had argued so closely, perhaps to several secretaries simultaneously. Thomas's multiple dictation indicates how far a human mind could go into the polyphonic realm of angelic mentality. Though his secretaries might have considered his feats to be miracles, Thomas himself would probably not have agreed, given his respect for what human reason and willpower could accomplish without presuming to draw on divine grace. Thomas also knew his limitations and evidently became so weary that he would fall asleep while trying to work, as you or I might. But, unlike us, he just kept on dictating. A monk whose cell was nearby "frequently heard him talking and disputing with himself when he remained alone and without anyone else in his cell." That singular mind, capable of dictating several complex texts at once, may have been shaped by those solitary, ceaseless disputations, as if those intricate arguments in which spoke aloud and heard himself as advocate, opponent, and judge were the crucible in which that polyphonic mind was formed. The Overflowing Source Though his perspective on the general questions of mind and person is rich and suggestive, Thomas wrote centuries after polyphony had begun to flower; its sources should, therefore, be sought closer in time to its beginnings. On the basis of the texts we have assembled, those sources seem to be Neoplatonic, as evidenced especially by Martianus's specific examples. The fundamental importance of the overflowing of the One into the Many in Neoplatonic thought is deeply congruent with the historical unfolding of polyphony, the One of chant bifurcating into the two voices of early organum, at first strictly parallel and then more freely independent. After these early dyads, then three and 24 �more voices emerged. Even apart from this close analogy between Neoplatonic ontology and music history, that ontology grounds the relation of the successive voices to the One in just the way that the One overflows into the Many in every facet of Becoming. The question at issue here not only concerns the nature of the mind but the very heart of what it means to grasp anything as one. The Neoplatonic sources look back to the initial statement of the fundamental question in Plato's Phaedo 97a-b, where Socrates is recounting his early experiences with natural philosophy: I will not even allow myself to say that where one is added to one either the one to which it is added or the one that is added becomes two, or that the one added and the one to which it is added become two because of the addition of the one to the other. I wonder that, when each of them is separate from the other, each of them is one, nor are then then two, but that, when they come near to one another, this is the cause of their becoming two, the coming together and being placed closer to one another. Nor can I any longer be persuaded that when one thing is divided, this division is the cause of its becomingtwo, for just now the cause of becoming two was the opposite. At that time it was their coming close together and one was added to the other, but now it is because one is taken and separated from the other. Theprimalarithmetic assertion that "one plus one is two" turns out to be a profound mystery; we seem only to parrot this statement (and so many other mathematical truths that follow upon it) withoutreally understanding anything about what it really means or how the Onecould ever be said to "turn into" the Dyad, a paradox that verges on flat selfcontradiction. NeitherSocrates nor Platoseem to resolve this enigma, at onceso simple and so deep, nor can the Neoplatonists, save perhaps through a kind of poetic evocation. When Plotinus {Enneads VI.6.1), addresses the origin of number, he falls back not so much on argument in any ordinary sense as a kind of inspired description: A thing, in fact, becomes a manifold when, unable to remain self-centered, it flows outward and by that dissipation takes extension: utterly losingunity it becomes a manifold since there is nothing to bind part to part; when, with all this outflowing, it becomessomething definite, there is a magnitude. The very concept of "outflowing" may stand for us as a kind of intuition that the One is not static or self-contained but seems to pour forth states of higher multiplicity that still bear the mark of the One insofar as we grasp their unity: the three upper voices of Perotin seem to be emanations of the chant voicebelow them, so that all four voices really are a mask of the One.But we remain at the very begirming of this deep and perennial question: how can we grasp anything as One? and how, then, can we grasp the Many as One, or One in Many? Here we may outline two possible roads. The Roman manifestationsof polyphony such as Martianus described may have hewed to the Neoplatonic ascent that begins with the Many but leaves the Many behind as it reaches past reason to grasp the One. Plotinus understands this as utterly transcending all multiplicityand returning to the One as "selfseeing": "In this seeing, we neither hold an object nor trace distinction; there is no two. The man is changed, no longer himselfnor self-belonging; he is merged with the Supreme... Therewere not two; beholder was one with beheld; it was not a vision compassed but a 25 �unity apprehended.... When the soul begins again to mount, it comesnot to something alien but to its very self... the flight of the alone to the alone" (Enneads VI.9.10-11). The Christians, on the other hand, seem to understand that One still to maintain Trinity, even at the height of mystical vision, a One that is not our "very self" in its supreme aloneness but something Wholly Other Who ultimately meets us person to person, face to face. These questions of mystical theology are desperately difficult, for they defy reason and speech, according both to Christians or Neoplatonists. Perhaps only the felt experience and interrogation of the works of music themselves may help us. Is the experience of polyphony the evocation of emergence from and return to a monophonic Unity, or is the deepest ground of reality finally polyphonic? ^Georgiades, T. G. (1973). Greek music, verse, and dance. New York,, Da Capo Press., 23-38, argues that (according to his reading) the nature of Greek rhythms made polyphony "impossible," in the later Western sense. 2Weiss, P. and R. Taruskin (2008). Music in the Western World : a history in documents. Australia; Belmont, CA, Thomson/Schirmer., 60-61. ^West, M. L. (1992). Ancient Greek music. Oxford, Clarendon Press., 205-207 at 207, discusses the surviving evidence of heterophony in Greek music, including its mentions in Aristoxenus's important treatise. ^For a general overview of this and other ancient musical notations, see Ibid., 254-276. ® Nicomachus and F. R. Levin(1994). The manual of harmonics of Nicomachus the Pythagorean. Grand Rapids, MI, USA, Phanes Press., 84; see also 173. ®Cited and translated in the excellent articleby Sullivan, B. (1997). "The Polyphony of the Spheres." Viator 28:33-43., 36.See also Martianus, C., W. H. Stahl, et al. (1977). The marriage of Philology and Mercury. New York, Columbia University Press., 2:9-10, [11]-[12]. Augustine, E. Hill, et al. (1990). The works of Saint Augustine : a translation for the 21st century. Brooklyn, N.Y., New City Press., 155-157, at 155 (4.4-5). For a general discussion of Augustine's work on music, see Schueller, H. M. (1988). The idea of music: an introduction to musical aesthetics in antiquity and the Middle Ages. Kalamazoo, MI, Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University., 239-256. ®See Plotinus, Enneads V.4. ' Barker, A. (2004). Greek musical writings. Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press., 194-195; for the attribution of these Problems to his school, see 190. Proclus, D. and E. R. Dodds (1963). The elements of theology =Stoichei*osis theologik*e. Oxford,, ClarendonPress., 51, proposition 52; Augustine refersto this seminal text on many occasions in his work on the Trinity. " Augustine, E. Hill, et al. (1990). The works of SaintAugustine: a translation for the 21st century. Brooklyn, N.Y., New City Press., 196 (5.10). Ibid., 228 (7.11). Tertullian addresses the concept of person in Against Praxeas (written not earlier than 208 A.D.), Roberts, A., J. Donaldson, et al. (1885). The Ante-Nicene fathers. Translations of the writings of the fathers down to A.D. 325. Buffalo,, The Christian literature publishing company., 3:597-627, especially ch. 7 (601-602), and may have been the earliest Latin Christian author Augustine may have had in mind. 26 �" Ibid., 226-227 (7.8); the scriptural citations are from 2 Cor. 2:10 and Deut. 6:4. " For instance, Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: the making of the modem identity. • Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press., 131, argues that Augustine "introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of thought." Henry, P. (1960). Saint Augustine on personality. Macmillan. argues that "in the history of thought and civilization Saint Augustine appears to me to be the first thinker who brought into prominence and undertook an analysis of the philosophical and psychological concepts of person and personality" (1). While granting this, I would like also to bring forward the ways in which Augustine also expressed his hesitations about this concept, leaving room for the later additions of Boethius and Thomas, among others. For a general survey, see Borkowski, J. A. (1997). Textbook on Roman law. London, Blackstone Press., 84-87;see also Duff, P. W. (1971). Personality in Roman private law. New York,, A. M. Kelley. and Watson, A. (1967). The law of persons in the later Roman Republic. Oxford,, Clarendon P.. Here I am indebted to the insights of Bruce Venable, "The Name and Nature of the Person," in (Stickney 1993), 260-274. See also Peacocke, A. R., G. Gillett, et al. (1987). Persons and personality: a contemporary inquiry. Oxford, UK; New York, NY, USA, B. Blackwell.. Boethius, H. F. Stewart, et al. (1936). The theological tractates. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University press., 83-85. Taruskin, R. (2005). The Oxford history of western music. Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press.,l:147-148 argues this point cogently. 2" Erickson, R. and C. V. Palisca (1995). Musica enchiriadis : and. Scolica enchiriadis. New Haven, YaleUniversity Press., 13, which contains a full translation and excellent commentary on these works. For Guidons somewhat different treatment of "diaphony" or organum, see Hucbald, Guido, et al. (1978). Hucbald. Guido. and Tohn on music: three medieval treatises. New Haven, Yale University Press., 77-82. For the Syrian practice of organum, see Husmann, H. (1966). The Practice of Organum in the Liturgical Singing of the Syrian Chruches of the Near and Middle East. Aspects of Medieval and Renaissance Music: A Birthday Offering to Gustav Reese. J. LaRue. New York, W. W. Norton: 433-439.. Discussed in (Sullivan 1997), 39. 22 Because the ninth-century Irish theologian Johannes Scottus Eriugena used the phrase organicum melos, which the Musica enchiriadis treatise used in reference to polyphony, some musicologists (including Hugo Riemann) took this as indicating that Eriugena was referring to this treatise and to contemporary organum or alternatively that the treatise drew its Neoplatonic elements from Eriugena. Yet subsequent investigations showed that the phrase organicum melos could also refer to non-polyphonic practice (such as fixed mathematical ratios used to build instruments, organa). Also, the Neoplatonic references in the Enchiriadistreatises all could have been derived from writings of Boethius or Augustine, whom the treatises explicitly mention, as opposed to Eriugena, whom they never mention. Raymond Erickson and Claude V. Palisca, Musica enchiriadis; and, Scolica enchiriadis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), xliv-xlvi, and also Erickson, R., Ed. (1992). Eriugena. Boethius and the Neoplatonism of Musica and Scolica Enchiriadis. Stuyvesant, NY, Pendragon Press., which gives a detailed account of the controversy; some eminent musicologists, such as Michel Huglo, still remain persuaded of the Eriugena connection. 27 �23 Erickson, R. and C. V. Palisca (1995). Musica enchiriadis: and. Scolica enchiriadis. New Haven, Yale University Press., 26, citing Boethius, C. M. Bower, et al. (1989). Fundamentals of music. New Haven, Yale University Press., 169 (5.9). Nicomachus and F. R. Levin (1994). The manual of harmonics of Nicomachus the Pythagorean. Grand Rapids, MI, USA, Phanes Press., 173, one of Boethius's most important Greek sources, also notes that "systems [i.e., combinations of two or more intervals] are consonant when the notes comprising them, though different in compass, are, when struck simultaneously or sounded in some way, intermingled with one another in such a manner that there is produced from them a single sound like one voice." 2'» Erickson, R. and C. V. Palisca (1995). Musica enchiriadis : and. Scolica enchiriadis. New Haven, Yale University Press., 30. 25 See Berger, A. M. B. (2005). Medieval music and the art of memory. Berkeley, University of California Press.. 2^ Cited in Waite, W. G. and Leonin (1973). The rhythm of twelfth-century polyphony, its theory and practice. Westport, Conn.,, Greenwood Press., 1-2. 22 Torrell, J.-P. and R. Royal (2005). Saint Thomas Aquinas. Volume 1. the person and his work. Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press, gives a particularly clear account of the career of Thomas in light of recent research; for his Parisian studies (1245-1248) under Albertus Magnus, see 18-35.Thomas served two periods as a master in Paris, from 1252-1259 (36-95) and then again from 1268-1272 (179-223). 28 For Thomas's relation to Boethius, see ibid., 68, 226. Thomas's commentary on Boethius's On the Trinityis one of his earliest writings (ca. 1257-1259) and shows his close study of Boethius's theological work; see Thomas, Thomas, et al. (1946). The Trinity and The unicity of the intellect. St. Louis, Mo., London,, B. Herder book co. 25 STI, Q. 29, art. 4. Though he did not know Greek, Thomas considers the Greek word prosopon important enough to quote verbatim, noting that it refers to masks that were "placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes." ST I, Q. 29, art. 3. 58 Aristotle, Topics 11.10 (114b34), which is cited by Thomas in ST IQ. 12, art. 10, obj. 1; Q. 58, art. 2, obj. 1, and Q. 85, art. 5, which gives his sustained discussion of "whether we can understand many things at the same time?" 31 ST IQ. 12, art. 2. 32 ST IQ. 12. 35 ST IQ. 12., art. 4, repl. obj. 1. 34 ST 35 ST 35 ST 32 ST I, Q. 56, art. 3,1. IQ. 57, art. 3,4. IQ. 52, art. 1-3; Q. 53, art. 1-3. IQ. 14, art. 7. 38 Proclus, D. and E. R. Dodds (1963). The elements of theology = Stoichei^osis theologik*e. Oxford,, Clarendon Press., 51. 35 Augustine, E. Hill, et al. (1990). The works of Saint Augustine : a translation for the 21st century. Brooklyn, N.Y., New City Press., 403-404 (15.12). 48 ST III, Q. 2, art. 9, 2. Weiss, P. and R. Taruskin (2008). Music in the Western World : a history in documents. Australia ; Belmont, CA, Thomson/Schirmer., 62. 28 �Ibid., 70-71 (excerpt). 43 Torrell, J.-P. and R. Royal (2005). Saint Thomas Aquinas. Volume 1. the person and his work. Washington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press., 239-244, reviews all these stories, including the two cited here (241-242). 29 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 29 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Organum and persona : the philosophical significance of early polyphony Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on October 30, 2009 by Peter Pesic as part of Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Pesic, Peter Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2009-10-30 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274. Polyphony Trinity Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24003673 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/004f7729cdec06b265fff02cd54e4566.pdf a488c86ca1ae76b539ad54db3feca46e PDF Text Text ���������������������������������� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 33 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The tragedy of Oedipus at Colonus Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on April 29, 1994 by Janet Dougherty as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dougherty, Janet Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1994-04-29 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Sophocles. Oedipus at Colonus. Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000294 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/7729a4622620a87e998ea05c35dd7001.pdf 433143d398a4d2e50d0298d161f4eb91 PDF Text Text #2577 On Reading Hegel before the Age of Eighty Lecture delivered by Janet Dougherty October 8,2004 When I was a sophomore in college one of my professors, to whom I owea great deal, told me he thoughtthat one ought to postponereadingHegel until aboutthe age of eighty, presumably accepting the consequence that one mightthereby entirely escapethe task. The breadth and power ofHegel's work, so difficult to assess or criticize, was certainly part ofthe reason for his opinion, and perhaps he thought Hegel's philosophy was wrong in important respects. For me, however, it was already too late. My freshman year another professor has assigned large portions of ThePhenomenology ofSpirit and I had, at jBrst dutifully, and then with great excitement spent many hours on it. I thought I could see then what must constitute my life's work. I must read the philosophical works Hegel read, study what he knew of history and science, and then return to Hegel's system to evaluate whether he had indeed articulated the truth. Would I have thought more freely and with greater clarity had I never been gripped by the possibility that Hegel may have known and articulated the truth? Later, in Prague in the spring of 1979,1 recognized a copy of one ofHegel's books next to several by Marx in a bookstore window as I was walking with a Czech friend. My friend, noticing my glance, instructed me "Don't look at that. That's trash." His error was understandable. The dialectical theory ofhistory, as expounded by Marx and adopted as the rhetoric of communism, had a great impact on his hfe and the life of his nation. It was taught as dogma and exploited as an excuse for a tyranny imposed by the Soviet Union. I felt deeply privileged that I had always been free to examinethese thinkers on Itc 0 (p 7 00 H 332Z. bt JoiiiTs Coileg-3 - lYea/n Librapy j �their own terms, but at the moment the freedoms I normally enjoyed were being highlighted by many contrasts. It was important for me to seeto what effect othershad exploitedthe theories with which I was familiar from books. Obviously no thinker should bejudged on the basis of the effects he hashad on his followers. Still, the political possibilities of liberalism and oftotalitarianism form part of thecontext inwhich weread philosophical works. Moreover, political freedom and the capacity to reoojTnize the truth are far from identical. Although this lecture isprimarily onThe Phenomenology ofSpirit, I will say a little here about Hegel's political wntings, inwhich he presents the modem state as thecontext oftheachievement ofhuman freedom. My reading ofHegel belongs primarily in the context ofthegoal of our education at St. John's College as I seeit,the goal of rendering ourminds freer and therefore less vulnerable to succumb to the domination of prejudices of any sort. Hegel's work directly challenges many contemporary prejudices while revealing the source of others. I intend to illuminate in what follows some ofwhat I mean by that claim. Hegel isvery difficult. It may even bethat finally the Phenomenology isumntelligible on itsown, without a prior understanding ofHegel's Science ofLogic. Buthow canwenot confront Hegel's claim to have putan end to philosophy aswe encounter it in our freshman readings as the love of (and striving for) wisdom? If Hegel's thought is correct. Wisdom is inprinciple available to us all (Preface, section 13). Hegel challenges one of the premises ofthe education we offer atSt. John's College (there are ofcourse a variety ofappropriate formulations): since none ofus, and perhaps no one at all, is inpossession �of the truth, we must strive to speak together in such a wayas to gain greater clarity both concerning our presuppositions and concerning thefundamental questions thatrecur in our collective thought, demanding answers. We musttry to discern thebarriers that hinder us intheattempt to attain a recognition ofwhat is. We must strive for such cl^ity because everything depends upon it, everything that matters. Forwewish to be responsible human beings, living inaccord with an honest understanding ofourselves and oftheproblematic character ofthe world wefind ourselves living in, and recognizing one another as similarly responsible human beings. For Hegel, these tasks are transformed by the availability oftruth and its conformity with what is realizable concretely in the ethical and political as well as the intellectual community ofhuman beings. The premise ofthe community of SJC is anti-Hegelian. This fact makes reading Hegel both crucial for us and deeply problematic, far beyond the difficulties ofnegotiating one's way through his prose. Allow me to cite a couple ofpassages that illustrate the grandiosity ofHegel's claims: The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itselfin its development. Ofthe Absolute itmust be said that it is essentially a result that only inthe end is what ittruly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz., tobeactual, subject, the spontaneous becoming ofitself. (Preface, 20) We cannot know this result, the Absolute, unless it has beenachieved. In the Introduction to the Phenomenology Hegel says: The experience ofitselfwhich consciousness goes through can, in accordance withitsNotion, comprehend nothing less than the entire system ofconsciousness, orthe entire realm ofthetruth ofSpirit... In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will arrive at a point at which it gets rid ofits semblance of being burdened with something �alien, with what is onlyfor it, and somesort of 'other', at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence, sothat its exposition will coincide at just this point withthe authentic Science of Spirit. Andfinally, when consciousness itselfgraspsthis its own essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge itself. (Intro., 89) Phenomenology ends with a section called Absolute Knowing. The passages I have cited do more thanillustrate Hegel's confidence that theTruth, the whole, Absolute Knowledge, can become available to the readers of his work. They also illustrate his conviction thatthewhole is achieved by the development of spirit over time to its completion. Inthis completion; thedistinction between subject and object, familiar especially to readers ofKant and to grammarians ofall sorts, collapses. Absolute Knowledge, Truth, simply is. The meaning ofthis claim isthe key to the movement of the Phenomenology ofSpirit and to each ofits parts, including the assigned reading for senior seminar. I will tryto cast some light onthose readings inthe course ofthis lecture. But first a digression on the role ofhistory inilluminating the truth for human beings, that is, on the development of consciousness overtime. 1. Background We encounter first in Rousseau an insistence that we mustunderstand human beingsin the light ofalterations that have occurred inour species over time. Inhis Discourse on Inequality Rousseau presents us with the paradoxical position ofman in society: the nature of man is obscured not only bygradual changes inour way ofbeing bu| also by laws and conventions that shape contemporary society. But itis only through Imowledge of nature that we can isolate the influence of law and evaluate its suitabilityto the beings it governs: 4 �But as long as we are ignorant of natural man, it is futile for us to attempt to determine the law he has received or what is best suited to his constitution. All that we can see very clearlyregarding this law is that for it to be law, not only mustthe will of himwho is obliged by it be capable of knowing submission to it, but also, for it to be natural, it must speak directly by the law ofnature. (Preface, Hackett, p. 35) The paradox leads Rousseau to develop a hypothetical history of man designed to render discernible a standard for just rule. Rousseau's Social Contract isa necessary sequel to hisDiscourse onInequality, which ends withthis scathing attack on contemporary inequality: ... ittbllows that moral inequality, authorized by private ri^t alone, is contrary to natural right whenever it is notcombined inthesame proportion with physical inequality: a distinction that is sufficient to determine what one should think in this regard about the sortof inequality that reigns among all civilized people, for it is obviously contrary tothe law ofnature, however it may bedefined, for a child to command an old man, for animbecile to lead a wise man, and for a handful ofpeople to gorge themselves on superfluities while the starving multitude lacks necessities, (p. 81) The Social Contract begins "Iwant to inquire whether there can be some legitimate and surerule of administration in the civil order, taking menas theyare and laws as they might be. I will always try in this inquiry tobring together what right penmts with what interest prescribes " There isno guarantee that such a solution can be fully achieved, butRousseau outlines inthis workwhat would be required. Rousseau ends Book I of Ow the Social Contract this way: ,.. instead ofdestroying natural equality, the fundamental compact, on the contrary, substitutes a moral and legitimate equality to whatever physical inequality nature may have been able to impose upon men, and that, however unequal in force or intelligence they may be, men all become equal by convention and by right. �No less than a complete transformation ofthe human subjects and the freedom that characterizes them must take place. Hegel too is concerned with what I have described as the paradoxical position ofmodem man. Unlike Rousseau, however, he sees theparadox dissolving through its spontaneous development in the unfolding ofconsciousness. Rousseau points to ihtpei^ectibility of natural man a term with a rather elusive meaning that refers both to theabsence ofa static limiting nature and to the possibility ofa variety ofdevelopments. There is no natural human whole. Hegel by contrast indicates that the course ofhuman history correlates with the development ofspirit and culminates in aperfected state in which human beings can combine without alienation or loss offreedom in an ordered, coherent whole. The beginnings ofthis development are visible in the Lordship and Bondage section ofthe Phenomenology, one ofthe most easily misunderstood passages in the assigned readings from that book. While Rousseau sees human society as requiring the development ofapolitical and moral freedom that completely supplants natural freedom, Hegel understands autonomy ofmind and the political freedom ofindividuals to coincide in principle in his time. The modem state is the concrete manifestation ofanecessary process ofthe development ofmind or spirit. The loss ofunselfconscious nature that for Rousseau precipitates the establishment oframpant injustice is for Hegel no loss. Freedom is nothing if it is not rational. The problem ofwhat itmeans to be free is more visible in Rousseau than in Hegel precisely in that Rousseau sees no satisfactory solution for modem man; natural freedom �is unattainable and moral or political freedom requires, to putit bluntly, submission to a lie. (See especially Bk. n, Ch.Vn of The SocialContract.) Both Kant and Hegel were powerfully affected by their readings ofRousseau. The solution offered byKant, to recognize both thepower ofnatural science and the limits to human reason, along with the moral freedom he claims any nine yearold knows by experience that she has, leaves our desire for a comprehensive account no more satisfied than Rousseau's. We must live intwo worlds, that defined by thelaws ofnature and that weenvision as governed bythe moral laws. Kant gives voice openly to his own imperfect acceptai^ ofthis split in his essays on history, inwhich he envisions a republic characterized by freedom as a culmination ofhuman development for which there is no guarantee. Hegel's work isa valiant attempt to unify the world as it isunderstood by modem natural science with the freedom that he understood to characterize human beings. His solution involves the dissolution of all paradox, all contradiction intheunity of absolute spirit. For uswho acknowledge great difficulties ingrasping things asthey are, Hegel's work isboth implausible and profoundly compelling. It would befoolhardy to dismiss out of ignorance Hegel's claim that he articulated a knowledge ofthe whole. As inSocrates' second sailing {Phaedo, 99d-100a), in considering Hegel's solution weembark onan inquiry into things through the words ofanother human being, inparticular one who has developed articulate speech to an extraordinary degree. We must examine Hegel's claim thattheproper meaning ofwords is revealed inthe whole as it is manifest inthe process represented inthe Phenomenology and that this process is a development ofthethings themselves. Hegel's claim is that hehas brought together inresponsible, coherent speech allthat characterizes modem, i.e., rational man. If this account founders, it is for usto �bear witness to its defects and to continueto strive for recognition ofthings as they are. Even more important, wemust pursue clarity about the desire for intellectual mastery that Hegel's system exemplifies and whether it is in some way at odds with a true understanding ofwhat is. n. Consciousness A. Sense-Certainty and Perception Obviously +be pmal] po'^ion ofHegei's-corpus thatweread allows only thatwebegin, to embark on the perhaps quixotic project I have outlined. But the beginning is crucial. Disdaining attempts to articulate a method for reason, to define his terms orto list a set of c criteria, Hegel begins with Sense-Certainty, theimmediate awareness ofall that our senses convey. One of themost important observations thereader will make is that Hegel's (inevitable) use of language here renders it impossible to grasp particulars immediately as particular: the words 'here' and 'now,' as he points out, have no single referent. "Here' isjust as much where I stand aswhere you sit, and the word 'now' is similarly ambiguous. Conscious awareness may have forms thatavoid theproblem. My son'sbearded dragon, for example, is not entirely lacking in consciousness but presumably makes no attempt to name things and so avoids the trap Hegel describes. When something outside him seems edible, he eats. ForHegel a merely functional sort of consciousness is not good enough. In sense-certainty the conscious subject presumes the existence of a substance outside itself something that one may failto grasp as it is. Knowledge may or may not beavailable, but it is crucial that there besomething outside of the potential knower that istrue. The universals we use illustrate the diifiiculty we �have in knowing that we graspthe truth: language is evidently inadequate to the experience. In recognizing this inadequacy we become aware of what it is to be a subject, while implicitly in our speech we acknowledge notthe individuals we thought we weretalking about, but Being in general. Hegel jokesthat this is just the divine character of language - to reverse the meaning ofwhat is said and make it into something else. Sense-certainty with the help of language utterly fails in the attempt to grasp individual particulars. There is notruth in sense-certainty on its own. In the effort to get back towhatever the potentially knowing subject attempts to grasp in sense-certainty, consciousness becomes the perceiving consciousness, and the object of its consciousness becomes the thing. We are familiar with the contrastbetweensensation and perception from Anstotle: one perceives an object through a kind ofcommon sense that relates sensations and identifies them with a thing. Hegel would welcome the association with Anstotle who, like Hegel, appears at least to consider the mind adequate to its object, but the language of motion that Hegel uses inthe section onperception differentiates his treatment from anything we read in De Anima: Perception takes what ispresent to it asuniversal. Just asumversality is its principle in general, the immediately self-differentiating moments within perception are universal... With theemergence ofthe principle, the two moments which in their appearing merely occur, also come into being: one being the act of perceiving, the other ... the object perceived. In essence the object is the same as the movement.... (Ill) Hegel goes on to discuss two different accounts of thinghood, i.e., as a collection or plurality of properties, and as the medium inwhich these properties inhere (Section 113). Thirdly, theproperties themselves can bethought of as independent ofthething observed �(section 115). Hegelpresentsthese not as a list ofpossibilities from whichwe can chooseas we endeavor to understand what it is to be a thing, but as aspects (moments) of a development: The sensuous universality, or the immediate unity ofbeingand the negative, is thus aproperty only whenthe Oneandthe pure umversality are developed from it and differentiated from each other, and when the sensuous universality unites them, it is this relation of theumversahty to thepure essential moments which at last completes theThing. (115) It is no accident, but rather the fundamental meaning of consciousness, that it moves from leRS iOrtnore adequate acrounts of its object, and it is fi.indamental to the object of perception thatwhat it is for consciousness results from thismovement. More important eventhanthe movement through various theoretical approaches to the thing, consciousness moves from a less to a morethorough grasp of its own role. Here, in perception as in sense-certainty, theobject is first of all considered primary. It is "the True and universal, the self-identical, while consciousness is alterable and unessential ..." (116). Consciousness can err. Each new account oftheobject is not merely a superior attempt to get atthe truth ofthe thing, to correct its previous errors, but also an opportunity for consciousness towitness its own movement (118). It comes to recognize that"The outcome and the truth of its perception is its dissolution, or its reflection outof the Truth into itself." This leads to the claim that "We are ... the universal medium in which such moments are kept apart and exist each onits own" (119). Awareness ofthe variety ofthings intheworld gives us anopportunity to be aware of therole of the perceiving consciousness, which itselfunites thevarious moments of perception. 10 �There is not only one Thing in the world. Thingsare understood in relation and in contrast to one another (123). The recognition of this fact could leadto a discussion of the various species ofthings that exist in the world. It could do so ifHegel had confidence in the significance ofthe names language givesus to differentiate things from one another or if he posited something Uke Nature as a whole, a unit that contains a variety of individual typesthat one canaccurately identify and name. Instead Hegel reflects uponthe relation between universals represented in the thing and the multiplicity ofindividuals that are supposedly one with that universality. Therejs no 'red' without a redthing, and there are many red things, but 'red' is none ofthem. Similarly, there is no 'dragon' simply, only a variety of individuals that fall under that category. Thegap between the word that refers to onething andthe multiplicity of individuals signals the problematic character of sensuous universality (130). "Sound common sense" is the faculty of mind that corresponds to the sensuous universality: it takes itself to bea solid realistic consciousness" (131), Hegel says, but it is in fact only the play of the abstractions of singleness and universality, essence and theunessential, for it goes back and forth between these pairs, never resting in anunambiguous account ofthebeings it encounters. Hegel is casting doubt onthe naive awareness of what is inthe world. There is no simple, reliable, unphilosophical grasp of things available to us, neither forthe naive, uneducated human being or, it turns out, forthe modem empirical scientific inquirer whopretends to impose nothing on whathe observes (for example. Bacon). Only philosophy "... recognizes [mental entities] as the pure essences, the absolute elementsand powers ... [and] in doing so, recognizes them in their specific determinateness as well, and is therefore master over them, whereas perceptual 11 �understanding [or sound common sense] takes them for the truth and is led on by them from one error to another*' (131). The section on perception ends with an attack upon the pretensions of common sensewhich leadsto the crudely inadequate distinction between what is essential and what is inessential. The fancy philosophical soundingterm "inert simple essence" turns out to correlate with so-called common sense, which cannot by itselfmake sense ofthe stability ofthings in the world along withtheir flux and variability. It attributes to things first one essence or ^straction, then another, and can never.escape-tb.eJpfinite series.ofabstr.^rtion*^ .Philosophy muRt bnngthem ^o^ether, somehow getting beyond mere abstractions to thethings themselves. The work ofthe next section ofthe Phenomenology, onForce and the Understanding, accomplishes this by bringing closer together the conscious subject with itsobject ofinquiry through what Hegel calls the Notion. B. Transition through Force and Understanding to Self-Consciousness Autonomy, the giving ofnomoi to and for oneself^ isthe fundamental characteristic of consciousness, despite the appearance that conscious thought must conform itselfto the way things are, discerning and articulating laws that underlie the flux ofperceived objects in theworld. Modem (Baconian) scientific inquiry exemplifies the systematic response to the fear thatthought imposes nonsense ontheworld if it does not restrict itselfto the articulation of observed relations. It radically distrusts human thought, presuming as superior the correlation of observable facts. It would freeze thedevelopment of consciousness before it could attain to tmth and therefore to its autonomous activity. However productive of useful tools formanipulating the environment, this radical self- 12 �restraintis ultimatelyquite wrong-headed, in Hegel's view. It is not thereforeworthless. Rather, it was an appropriate response to the tradition of scholasticism and an important stagein the development of self-conscious spirit. While a certain sortof (Cartesian) skepticism is at the root of the development of modem science, allowing the investigator of the world to put aside his presumptions and expectations, Hegel's work exhibits and recounts a deeper and more enduring sort of skepticism directed against each form of consciousness as it appears, including modem scientific methodology. The road ofthe development ofnatural consciousness can ... beregarded asthepathway of doubt or more precisely astheway of despair this path isthe conscious insight into the untmth ofphenomenal knowledge .... The skepticism that isdirected against the whole range of phenomenal consciousness ... renders the Spirit forthe first time competent to examine whattmth is. (78) In particular, inthe section onForce and theUnderstanding, consciousness must escape the domination ofNewtonian science with its emphasis on laws. The laws Newton articulates areinherent in the phenomena and consciousness, putting aside its own character, must acknowledge and articulate them. In general, modem scientific thought integrates awide range ofphenomena by means ofa limited set oflaws that articulate objective relationships graspable by thehuman understanding. Kant's categories ofthe understanding, which account for the possibility ofNewtonian science, are thrown into question and finally overcome insofar as force and law are superseded in Hegel's account. The section entitled Force andthe Understaaiding is, then, a challenge to Kant's system as a definitive statement ofwhat human beings can know. In it Hegel also challenges Kant's separation between natural science on the one hand and serious 13 �thought about ethics and politics on the other. Both take on a new appearance after the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness. The section on force and the understanding culminates in that transition. Before we can see how to move past the sort ofthought that characterizes modem science, we have first to grasp its character. "ForceandUnderstanding" is a section of the Phenomenology which we at St. John's havethe goodluckto be particularly well .„prepared.to .appreciate. Bythe. time we.read.Hegel we. have read and studied not only Kant but also Newton. Asa community we resist slavish obedience to any doctnne, and so wetend to becautiously skeptical of modem science with all itsinstmctions for the proper useofthe most important tool wehave, ourminds. Hegel would approve. He, more that any other thinker I know, disdains the sort of scientific inquiry that substitutes even the most thorough description ofthe stmcture ofa corpse, for example one ofour freshman lab specimens, for a living creature. Nevertheless, before consciousness can emerge as anappropriate interpreter oforganic substance, it must develop and through its own intemal motion supersede the limited understanding ofthe natural world that becomes available for criticism once common sense recognizes its failings. Force is theconcept thatallows fortheunderstanding oftherelation between dispersed, independent elements and theunity outofwhich they arise and into which they retum. This retum is simply the recognition that theforce (of attraction, for example), accounts for a variety of observed occurrences thatare unintelligible ontheir own terms (136, 137). Since there is no intelligible account of how force canactdirectly on anobject. 14 �force must be imderstood to solicit another force. Newton himself was concerned with the unintelligibility of action at a distance (see letters cited 'mPrincipia, Vol. D, pp 634 and 636, Motte translation). The force ofgravity, for example, cannot pull a ball towards the earth the way I can throw it with my hand. Rather, the force of attraction ofthe ball for the earth is met with the mutual attraction ofthe earth to the ball, and with the resistance to this attraction that results from the force with which it was thrown. The word 'force' has meaning here only in the context ofthe motion for which it accounts. These two Forces_ eidst asindependent essences; but their e^stence is a 'Ihdvement dfVacEto^^Hs lh^lffief," such Mat positednessor a beingthat isposited byanother, i.e.,their beinghas reallythe significance of a sheer vanishing. "Force" is in fact essential onlyto the account consciousness attempts to give of the motion. .. .the truth of Force remains only the thoughtof it; the moments of its actuality, their substance andtheir movement, collapse unresistingly into anundifferentiated unity, a unitywhich is notForce driven back into itself (...), but is its Notion qua Notion (Be^iffe). Thusthe realization of Force is at the same time the loss of reality; in that realization it has become something quite different, viz., this universality, which the Understanding knows at the outset, or immediately, to be its essence and which also proves itselfto be such in the supposed reality ofForce, in the actual substances. (141) Thesesubstances are evidently Kantian objects of experience. But that is not all they are. Part of the meaning of the term 'Notion' is that movement occurs suchthat earlier inadequate formulations givewayto something more adequate. Herethis means thatthe observed particulars fall away in favor of an account of force on its own terms, which is truer than any mere collectionof observed (conceptually elusive) phenomena, and the account of force in turn is taken as a description of concrete substances as they behave in 15 �the world. The Notion or Begriffe in general is something akin to a Platoniceidos endowed with life (see paragraph 55, Preface): far jfrom holding itself in reserve from the flux of nature and the world, it is one with it. It appears at first as characteristic ofthought in contrast to external reality, but that contrast is not definitive. "Consciousness ...is explicitly the Notion of itself. Hence it is something that goes beyond limits, and since theselimits are its own, it is something that goesbeyond itself (Intro toPhenomenology, 80). The notion ofForceprovides an alternative to the language of universal and Withinthis inner truth, as the absolute universal which has been purged ofthe antithesis between the universal and the individual and has become the object of the Understanding, therenow opens up above the sensuous world, whichis the world oiappearance, a supersensible worldwhich henceforth is the true world ... .(section 149) Within a few sections Hegel pronounces this supersensible world to be "appearance qua appearance.*' Bythis phrase Hegel does not mean to collapse the supersensible world into what is sensuously perceived, butto indicate thatthe supersensible world does not stand oilits own; in fact, the sensuous world (insofar as it is a world) turns out to be nothing butthethought world thatreflection upon the sensuous elicits. Just asthere is no world devoid of sensuous characteristics, there is no world available to sensealone. For there to be any trueunderstanding, neither world canclaim victory over the other. Rather, the two 'worlds' must be brought together and recognized as one. Similarly, law and that which it governs turn out to be inseparable. I started this section of my talk(IIB) with a discussion of law, and sofar theaccount of force has included no reference to law. Section 148 ends this way: 16 �... what there is in this universal flux is only difference as universal difference, This difference, as a universaldifference, is consequently the simple element in theplay ofForce itself, and whatis true in it. It is the law ofForce. Further on (149) he declares .. thesupersensible world is an inertrealm of laws .... Hegel is aware ofthe tendency ofthe mind to unify all laws into a single, comprehensive law (150). This tendency underlines and exacerbates the unsatisfying characteristic of law asindifferent to that which it governs. One powerful example ofthis indifference is the law of motion (153) which requires that time and space, ordistance and velocity, be understood as independent ofone another inorder that they may be quantified and related. This should remind some ofyou ofourdiscussions ofGalileo's treatment of motion in his Two New Sciences, the Third Day, in contrast withthe Aristotelian beginning point in which motion is something simple and immediately intelligible. Hegel's impatience with the claim that laws reveal necessary relations (153) stems from his criticism ofthe arbitrary distinction upon which the law is based, and anticipates later scientific developments ofspace-time (Einstein, Minkowski). But when I use the word * criticism' here I do notmean to suggest that Hegel thinks the abstraction ofthese terms a simple mistake, or even that itwas avoidable. Rather, the effort ofthe understanding to grasp things as they are produces a division which leads to further dialectical movement culminating, finally, infiill correspondence between knower and known. Consciousness grasps that there must be a deeper unity behind the law ofmotion that accounts for the relation oftheelements ofthelaw (155). It moves to a realm of its own, the supersensible, as it attempts tobridge the gap between what isoutside ofconsciousness and the thinking subject. 17 �The process by which the differences between subject and subsistence are overcome is articulatedthroughout the Phenomenology ofSpirit, but one can see its character very well here in the section on Force and the Understanding. The subject, in the form of understanding, ... learns that it is a lawofappearance itself thatdifferences arise which are no differences, or that what is self-same repels itselffrom itself.... And further that the differences thus created overcome themselves, ".. .what is not self same is self-attractive." Hegel goes on to say here that The Notion demands of the thoughtless thinkerthat he bring both laws together [i.e,, the law of force and the law ofappearance] and become aware of their antithesis. I will notgointo all the details ofthecomplex ensuing movement, though for Hegel each step is necessary and indispensable (not, I think, inevitable, but to argue that would require a long discussion). For us tonight itwill be enough to see that the development of the understanding produces first, a supersensible world, whose purpose isto explain the sensible world, second an inverted world, thesecond supersensible world inwhich the kingdom oflaws is shown to contain abstractions from a deeper unity. Hegel draws an analogy here (158) between physical and social science, orrather points out that the same sort ofreasoning finds its way into both: The punishment which under thelaw ofthefirst world disgraces and destroys a man istransformed in its inverted world into the pardon which preserves his essential being and brings himto honor. Ingeneral, this sort ofreasoning is first an attempt to identify causes (aitiai) or, inthe case ofcrime, guilt, then to deal with itthrough manipulation (pumshment). In thecase of crime one must also acknowledge theoriginally invisible intention (the second 18 �supersensible) ofthe criminal only to return to the act with the observation that "the truth of intention is only the act itself (159). The inverted world does not substitutefor the world of appearances but must be reconciled with it, just as a good intention does not cancel the heinousness of one's acts. The nature ofthe act is not fully visible until the intention is discerned, but the intention cannot subsist in a realm different and permanently separate from the act. Hegel's juxtaposition of human issues with objective natural laws imitates the general character of consciousness that moves between 'realms' it separates. Tobegin with, Hegel reasons by analogy about theforces thatgovern human acts. The understanding must recognize the differences it has noticed as inhering inthe thing itself aswell as intheunderstanding (160), and therefore fmally as united. Just as divine judgment must one day become manifest on earth, reconciling thedisparity between internal truth and outward appearance, human thought must finally unify the two. The supersensible world is "itselfand its opposite in one umty. (160)." Here Hegel makes a claim that may surprise the reader, namely that the understanding itself (160) and its differences are an infinity. Christianity provides away ofthinking that Hegel transforms by recognizing init a response to theunstable separations inherent inmodem scientific thought. Readers of Aristotle ought to find Hegel's use of theword 'infinity' recogmzably different from the actual infinity Aristotle repudiates, and different in important ways from the potential infinity Aristotle accepts as real (theinfinite divisibility of a magnitude, for example). Hegel offers a rather poetic (Dantesque?) description which I will cite and attempt to interpret. 19 �This simple infinity, or the absoluteNotion, may be called the simple essence of life, the soul ofthe world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neitherdisturbed nor interrupted by any difference, but rather is itself every difference, as also their supersession; it pulsates within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. It is selfidentical, for the differences are tautological; they are differences that are none. This self-identical essence is therefore related only to itself;.... (162). Simple infinity is self-absorption with no isolation: all relations have turned out to be relations within itself. Without dissolving differences, infinity is the deeper unityof these differences from which they differentiate themselves and then return. Wewould have no reason to think sucha thing is real except that it corresponds notonly to the history ofthought about thething, butto the nature ofthought ingeneral. In thinking about our experience oftheworld, we make abstractions and articulate distinctions which later we must reconcile, knowing thatwecan do so because the distinctions arose inthe first place from the singleness ofour minds. Hegel is more optimistic than many thinkers about the successful outcome of this activity: while we wish that in putting together that which we have analyzed in the attempt to understand it, we will return to the phenomenon or experience as it originally was, weoften believe wehave reason to wonderwhat effect our intervention has caused. HegeTs confidence takes the form not ofa happy coincidence ofour mental powers with our object ofinquiry, the world, but of the recognition that all this activity has been taking place within consciousness itself. The world that appears attimes to agree and attimes to disagree with our account of it is always theworld for consciousness, which inturnreflects upon their relation. Our thinking about "objective," nonhuman matters and about human things is akin but notyet unified. It cries out for a reconciliationthat can occur only in a consciousness that grasps 20 �more fully the origin ofthe differences. The end ofthe section on force and understanding is therefore the turn to self-consciousness. This curtain of [appearance] hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn away, and we have the inner being [the T*] gazing into the inner world - the vision ofthe undifferentiated selfsame being, which repels itself jBrom itself, posits itself as an inner being containing different moments, but for which equallythese momentsare immediately not different - self-consciousness. It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain which is supposed to conceal the inner world, there is nothing to be seenunless we go behindit ourselves, as much in orderthat we may see, as that theremay be something behind therewhich canbe seen. (165) This is hot ah~end to the discussion of howwe know, but a newbeginning. Before wego onto self-consciousness a briefrecapitulation is appropriate here. Hegel begins his quest for truth inthe Phenomenology with sense-certainty, a sort ofknowing that atfirst appears both rich and immediately accessible. But the consciousness of sensory experience turns outto yield no truth at all. Infact, it yields no more than an awareness of the distinction between the potential knower and what h6 would know. The elusive other ofsense-certainty must then bean independent thing that can begrasped through perception. But inperception consciousness confronts the problem of how to combine a plethora ofindividual things with theuniversal under which they must be thought. 'Force' isthe name wegive to thatwhich turns outto unify particulars. It cannot be perceived butcan be understood. The articulation of laws, ingeneral theLaw of Force, leadsto the establishment of a realmseparate from the world forces were originally intended to explain. The work ofreconciling law and force on the one hand with the world on the other leadsconsciousness to recognize that the differences to be reconciled arise out of its own activity. Kantian understanding transforms into an 21 �awareness of itself as the consciousness that has relied on the law of force and now must reconcile it with the world. This is a transformation that Kant did not endeavor to accomplish, for it requires that consciousness go beyond thedistinguishing ofthevarious faculties of the thinking mind to see how they inhere in self-consciousness. m Self-Consciousness The section ofthe Phenomenology Hegel calls 'Self-consciousness' begins with "The truth of a s^ibdivi?ion that inchid?.? the diseiission ofT -ordship and Bondage. The phrase that best characterizes Hegel's introductory remarks here is "certainty gives place totruth" (166). This phrase should call to mind Descartes' standard ofclarity and distinctness, a standard that does not require orinvolve the perfect Correspondence ofwhat is known to the object, and which Hegel unambiguously rejects. The influence ofDescartes is however, inescapable, and Hegel builds his anti-Cartesian epistemology, or account (logos) ofknowledge, on the even more fundamental Cartesian turn, toward the self. Here then'... the certainty isto itself its own object, and consciousness isto itselfthetruth" (166). Farther down inthe same paragraph Hegel says Opposed to an other, the T isits own self, and atthe same time it overarches this other which, for the T is onlythe T itself. With self-consciousness, then, we have therefore entered the realm of truth. (169) While conscious thought set itselfthe goal ofgrasping truth, to achieve this goal requires that the thinker get beyond the artificial distinction between knower and known. This is no leap offaith, but israther the honest awareness ofthe fact that one can distinguish and 22 �reconcile only what is already present in thought, i.e., that thought cannot step outside itselfto another realm external to itself. If this sounds like a call for a Kantian critique, distinguishing allthat we canknow and reason aboutfrom the inaccessible thing-in-itself, Hegel's response is that he hasgoneKantone better: since the recognition of the limits of reason and the positing of thething-in-itselfto which reason cannot reach arewithin, notoutside of consciousness, he argues that this distinction, like all others within thought, can be overcome. As Hegel points out (167), As self-consciousness, it is movement; but sincewhat it distinguishes from itselfis only itself itself, the difference, as an otherness, is immediately supersededfor it.... The significance of this step thatHegel makes is very great. Forone thing, it leads naturally to an account ofliving beings superior to any that the laws ofmatter inmotion canoffer. Such an account is to differing degrees elusive forBacon, Descartes and even ICant, who hesitate to attribute to the object about which one theorizes any tendencies that are not verifiable in accord with laws. Aristotle of course knew better: in observing the living being one must begin by trusting that one sees init impulses and tendencies akin to one's own purposiveness, for example. Like Hegel, Kant accepts (in the Critique of Judgment, Preface) that one cannot dispense with purposiveness inthe attempt to understand living beings, but theplace ofthis third critique inKant's system is problematic enough tohave justified the acceptance ofmany doctoral dissertations. 'Purposiveness' has no place inthe table ofcategories Kant presents in the First Critique inthe attempt to give a definitive account ofthe basis for scientific imderstanding ofthe world of experience. 23 �Just as Hegel offers no definitivelist ofthe categories, he denies that there is any need of a set of rules or techniques for self-consciousness in the attempt to understand life, for life is precisely the correlate of self-consciousness: Butfor us, or in itself, the objectwhichfor self-consciousness is the negative element has, on its side, returned intoitself, just as on the other side consciousness has done. Throughthis reflection into itselfthe object has become Life. (168) But the living being is not merely the object of naive or scientific inquiry; it is furthermore the object of desire (168). It is at the same timea whole independent of the desiring subject: Life consists rather in beingthe self-developing wholewhichdissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself. (171) Independent as it is, though, life also "...points to something other than itself, viz. to consciousness, for which life exists as this unity, or as genus (172)".The individual preconscious living being is, according to Hegel, radically incomplete. The discussion of life in the introductory paragraphs of Self-consciousness leads rather quickly to thefollowing pregnant and powerful claim: "Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness." (175). How does Hegel amveat this claim? The key to making sense ofthis transition is to see what it means thatthe living being is both dependent and independent. I have cited Hegefs claim that lifeis a 'selfdeveloping whole (171, end)'. Hehas already moved in his discussion to 'life as a living thing,' confusing life in general with a particular organism. Hegel is notbeing sloppy. Rather, he is acknowledging that life is intelligible only via the individual living thing. It is obvious that no single organism lives simply self-sufficiently. Equally important for 24 �Hegel, its character is to develop in accord with a process that characterizes not only itself but also many other individualsthat together comprisea genus or a species, a processthat is in fact determined by its species. There is no species existing on its own. The characteristic activity of a living being in general, namely to absorb otherness (for example, food) within it and make it one's own, is always of a particular sort. Consciousness alone canrecognize it for what it is. But further, the only consciousness capable of recognizing the living being for what it is is self-consciousness (cf. A on nous containing the forms). And the primary way the T' of self-consciousness relates to other living things is through desire. Like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Hegel knows that human beings want the goods of food, shelter, sexual satisfaction, etc., and therefore the power to acquire and possess them. Thedesire forfood is the easiest to grasp butit is not the most illustrative here, for one ordinarily eats only what is already dead, and is soon hungry again. Eating is nottherefore a model forthe satisfaction of self-consciousness. "Onaccount of the independence ofthe object, therefore, it canachieve satisfaction only when theobject itselfeffects thenegation within itself; and it must carry outthis negation of itselfin itself,... In the sphere of Life, which is the object ofDesire, negation is present in an other, viz in Desire, or as a determinateness opposed to another indifferent form, or as the inorganic universal nature ofLife. Butthis universal independent nature in whichnegation is present as absolute negation, is the genus as such, orthe genus asself-consciousness. Self-consciousness achieves its sati^action only in anotherself-consciousness. (175) Living among other independent living beings which onestrives to understand is a step forward, butto satisfy conscious desire requires that thedesiring subject recognize itself and that it be recognized by another. It requires thatcertainty become truth. "Butthe truth ofthis certainty is really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness." (176) Just as consuming food cannot be a genuine end{telos) for human beings andthe 25 �proper labeling of various beings is not by itself folly satisfying to the conscious mind, so for self-consciousness to be at all requires that its object retain its characterwhen it submits to the knowing subject, that i t . is equallyindependent in the negativity of itself; and thus it isfor itself a genus, a universal fluid element in the peculiarity of its own separate being ...Hegel rejects as a model ofknowledge mastery of natureby a creature alienatedfrom it and therefore barred from the deepest understanding of its meaning. Followers of Baconian science sellthemselves too short, according to Hegel. TriTth is availableto the human know-r^ bu^ only if he/she knows what to seek Hegel responds to anurging superficially similar to that which moves Socrates in the 'second sailing' he describes inthePhaedo. We cannot know theworld directly butonly through the speeches and the deeds of other self-consciousnesses. For Socrates this implies the need to engage in dialectic discourse with other men and examine the accounts they form in speech. It isunclear whether thisdialectic will produce adequate knowledge ofthe topic of discussion but it will at least illuminate something about the souls ofthe speakers. (See Gorgios). ForHegel the need to rely onother self-conscious beings takes a very different form. Since theknowing subject has no proper object than another self-consciousness, for which it is an object as well, two (and later, more) embodied consciousnesses must come to recognize themselves in one another. Truth requires foil reciprocity between 'subject' and 'object'. A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as muchI' as object. With this we already have before us the notion ofSpirit. 'What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience ofwhat Spirit is — absolute this substance which is the unity ofthe different, independent self- 26 �consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfectjfreedom and independence. (177). Modem science has destroyed the natural world in illuminating the relations that characterize it because the 'natural world' never was the realm oftmth; it was merely the realm the mind constmcted (seeKant) to account for observed appearances. Truth, or science inthefiill Hegelian sense, is spirit fully conscious ofitself. It must be shared in a community of conscious persons. (See Preface, section 69). Similarly, appropriate humanlaws cannot arise out of a detached scientific analysis of human need and passions (Hobbes), but only in a real community of persons. This is the insight that informs Hegel's discussion of lordship and bondage. I said earlier that the lordship and bondage section ofJiegQVsPhenomenology ofSpirit is frequently misunderstood. One ofthe most common misunderstandings arises from an assumption about Hegelian idealism that X would like to lay to rest first ofall. Where Hegel asserts "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational." (Preface, p. 10 of Philosophy ofRight), many readers take him to be saying that only what we spin out of ourown minds counts as real, thatthe apparently real world, insofar as it is anything at all, arises from the mind's own creative activity. Similarly, the reader bent on seeing Hegel asan idealist inthis sense views thelord and thebondsman asaspects ofthe mental activity of a single individual: thestruggle between them isthen nothing more than the mental anguish of a divided mind incapable of self-respect forthe straightforward reason that it lacks integrity. Hegel leaves such struggles for others to explore (there are many literary examples, ranging from Dmitri Karamazov to Gollum). 27 �Hegel, by contrast, in direct conversation withHobbes, Locke and Rousseau, is addressing the question of how two human beings independent of lawand society interact with one another. Having been educated bythose thinkers, especially Rousseau, Hegel does not claim that two men once confronted one another in preciselythe fashion he describes and followed precisely the steps he recounts in theapproach to mutual recognition. Similarly, no human being need ever imdertake precisely the transformation ofspirit the Phenomenology describes. Rather, following Hegel, one can recognize the progression from one st.age to another.as intelligible now that they have occurred m human experience. The lord and bondsman arearchetypes ofreal flesh and blood humans who confront one another in an effort to become what they must be if they are to be at all: autonomous beings who share a world with others akin to themselves. Self-consciousness exists in and for itself, when and by the fact that, it exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged. (178) The account ofhow this acknowledgement develops is clearly not a report of historical event: it isworked overand clarified by coherent thought. Hegel's description is a description ofhow "... the process ofthe pure Notion ofrecogmtion, ofthe duplicating ofself-consciousness inits oneness, appears to self-consciousness" (185).The process has already occurred inthe sense that real humans beings have recognized the authority ofa master, worked theland, discovered inthemselves abilities they were unaware of and that even render them superior to those they serve, etc. Even more importantly, this process has been seen (by Hegel at least) forwhat it is, an essential part ofthedevelopment of autonomous spirit. 28 �The distinction Hegel drew earlier (166) between certainly andtruth figures here again as crucial. The two consciousnesses that soon emerge as lord and bondmanat first appear to one another .. like ordinary objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being [orimmediacy] of Life .... Each is indeed certain ofits own self, but not of the other, andtherefore its own self-certainty still has no truth. (186) Such 'truth' is ".. .possible only when each is forthe other what theother is for it.. subject and object must correspond perfectly. In order forthetwo consciousnesses to achieve this correspondence, seif-consciOusness must stake its life, showing itself not to be attached to any specific existence. Hegel says explicitly "each seeks thedeath ofthe other" (187). In ourcomfortable community of learning, in which forthe most part we attempt to recognize one another asworthy participants through cooperative discourse, theclaim thatmutual recognition requires a fight to the death may seem absurd. We are fortunate in sharing theassumption that theoretical .inquiry can betheoccasion for creating a community and that no particular practical activity must precede that creation. But we arrive at the College asself-conscious beings. The question then remains: is Hegel correct indenying that a self-consciousness with integrity can emerge without a crisis inwhich the very being ofthat self-consciousness isinquestion? Once the first known fight to the death has occurred, Hegel thinks weneed not take up arms again as longas we cantruly grasp the meaning ofthe experience. (This is nota comment on international peace, merely on the relations of individuals capable of forming a particular community). Hegel's lord and bondsman display what it means for potential human beings entirely stripped of convention to strive to be human inthe fullest sense. We frequently repeat the Socratic dictum that "theunexamined life is not worth living." For 29 �Hegel, one'slife can only beworth living if one is recognizable and recognized as a selfconscious human being, and to be recognizable as such requires that one seek full selfconsciousness at all costs. To this goal, everything else must give way. The modem state as Hegel outlines it in The Philosophy ofRight presumably cushions its citizens against such dire conflicts while it facilitates thedevelopment offree selfconsciousness. How that is sowould require a lengthy discussion. Suffice itto say here thatHesel roundlv reiects Hobbes' account of the origin of civil society. The ground for this rejection is not that Hegel considers it impossible that humans would enter into a social contract out of fear and in order to avoid the danger of violent death. Rather, a society based upon the mere tendency to flee such a danger must be a society ofinferior, infact slavish, human beings. Hegel rejects Hobbes' argument for the foundation of political right. He is moved, as no doubt Hobbes was, by the real terrors ofwar. For Hegel, theoretical inquiry into the basis ofpolitical life must follow the e^qperience of war, at least vicarious experience; the theoretical understanding ofpolitics follows from the previous stage of conscious existence. I noted above that Hegel asserts that the two individuals who will become lord and bondsman seek each other's death. Clearly a trial that indeed issues in death is no wayto begin a mutually satisfying relationship between any two human beings (188). The interesting case occurs when one ofthe two individuals confronting the other brings him to the brink ofviolent death and that other "... leams that life is essential to it as pure self-consciousness" (189). This learning process so far has a good deal incommon with 30 �Hobbesian fear. Everything for thebondsman has 'beenshaken to thefoundations' in his experience ofthefear ofviolent death and hehas therefore been put intouch with the "... simple, essential nature of consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, which consequently is implicit in consciousness." Fear ofviolent death and the aggressive attempt to conquer nature constitute a good beginning, but they are not sufficient for developing self-consciousness: "...although the fear ofthe lord isindeed the begmnmg of wisdom, consciousness is not therein aware that it is a being-for-self' (195). Having learned that he mustlive if he is to be conscious, the unlucky participant in the life and death struggle submits to his conqueror and becomes his slave, an apparently thankless life of subordination that eventually reverses itself into a kind ofvictory. The reversal is hardly inevitable, butwhen it occurs it constitutes thedevelopment ofreal selfconsciousness. According to Hegel it reveals a greater truth than is visible through the eyes ofthe brute ofa master who has access to the world only through the labor ofhis slave, and who experiences the other only as the instrument of hisdesires. The picture Hegel presents ofthe life oflord and bondsman is straightforward: the bondsman works to satisfy the needs and desires ofthe lord, who never sullies his hands. Thelord seems to have allthe advantages of lifewithout its disadvantages: he enjoys things without ever having to experience their resistance and he is honored. The arrangement is unequal, to be sure, but from thepoint ofview ofthe master not obviously defective. Butthere have been tyrants who remained permanently dissatisfied, no matter how easily their desires are satisfied. Hegel makes sense ofthis phenomenon with the observation thatthe lord receives homage only from a dependent, notanindependent 31 �consciousness akin to himself. This does not suffice probably because the tyrant somehow realizes that there is or can be something better. Thebondsman by contrasthas the independent consciousness of the master as his * essential reality,' Hegel says, or at least in his purview. He need not invent the moment of 'pure being-for-self: it is there before his eyes in the form of another human being. Similarly, he neednot strain his faculties to imagine what it is for everything in natureto dissolve (194); but he accomplishes thisdissolution. "Through his service he rids himself of hisattachment to natural existence in ever\'detail, and gets rid ofit b}^ working on it" (194). He is intimately aware of the possibility of destroying and reforming natural objects in order to make them serve human needs. The bondsman then has a great deal in common withthe modem scientist even in a free state inhis attempt to conquer and manipulate nature. More importantly, work is the means by which the bondsman develops the awareness of who he is.By working to reshape natural objects hebecomes concretely aware oftheindependence notonly of those objects but also ofhimself:"... thebondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only analienated existence thathe acquires a mind of his own" (195 and 196). While to have a mind of one's own is only a nascent form of freedom, it constitutes a superiority of the bondsman overhis master, who recognizes nothing intheworld capable ofresisting his will, which is therefore not even really his ownas opposed to another's. (Children share some of the constraint ofthe bondsman's life and therefore the need to make claims of mastery. My son's response at 31/2 or 4 wasto assert hisconquest of nature thisway, after tolerating undoubtedly excessive 32 �expressions of maternal concern: "I never get thirsty; I never get cold; and I never have to go pee.") The dialectic between master and bondsman continues through Stoicism, Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness (one level ofHegel's interpretation of Christianity) until within self-conscious spirit develops what Hegel calls Reason "... the certainty that, in its particular individuality, it has being absolutely in itself, or is all reality" (230). This isthe implicit identification ofsubject and substance ofwhich Hegel proceeds to articulate the development inthe section ofthe Phenomenology entitled 'Absolute Spirit.' Conclusion I will nottry to analyze here in detail the movement fi'om thebondsman's willfulness to Reason. For all the refined grandeur ofHegelian Reason and ofhis emphasis on Spirit in its fiilly developed form as the goal ofeven the most ordinary human activity, firiendship provides the best analogy for the goal ultimately sought by participants in the dialectic of lord and bondsman. While it is quite clear thatthese two particular human beings will never be fiiends, the autonomy of mind that can be secured only through such a struggle astheirs isthecondition for fiiendship, or atleast forthekind of political community Hegel envisions. The insight that no constitutional provisions can create political fi*eedom ifthe proper habits are not first established, ifthepeople do not know how to be jfree members of a political community, is nowhere sodeeply acknowledged than in Hegel's political thought. But even ifit istrue that theright understanding ofwhat it is for a hiiman being to befi"ee has developed inthecourse ofthe history ofhuman thought, will political fi"eedom arise and maintain itself inthe modem state once humans are in 33 �principle capable of governing themselves? Doesthe ability for self-governance emerge once thetruth of absolute spirit has taken shape and appeared in an articulated form? The end and thegoal ofthePhenomenology ofSpirit is Absolute Knowing, thought complete in itselfand untainted with any externality. I have elucidated how the early sections ofthePhenomenology that we read participate inthe movement towards this goal. Absolute Knowing is not mere freedom tothink for oneself in a world ridden with Oinly perfect clarity and thorough comprehension ofthe tn.ith would mind to be at rest with itself and this is only achievable if substance and subject areone, if mind (or spirit, Geist) finally isall. It is no accident that Hegel's writing inthe Phenomenology integrates the rational working through ofphilosophical quandaries with reference to practical experience, for both the theoretical and the practical are the activity ofSpirit. But while Hegel sees autonomous thought as the goal ofacollective lifetime of inquiry and self-examination, until we ourselves attain such knowledge we must doubt that such a goal can ever be won. We atthe College are well trained both to appreciate the greatness ofHegel's work and to assess it soberly. The familiarity we share with the work ofgreat thinkers who encourage us to doubt fiiat knowledge ofthe whole is available must help to protect us against Hegel's perhaps seductive charm. Can the autonomy of Absolute Knowledge beall that humans strive for, all that isgood? The tense relationship between the good ofthe individual and the good ofthe city which Plato illustrates inthe city in speech, the deliberate absurdity of Socrates' request that the city ofAthens commit funds to support him so that he can continue to be a gadfly to his 34 �fellow citizens, are notobviously anachronistic in our age, despite Hegel's accomplishment on the one hand and our treasured citizen freedoms on the other. To discern what it takes for human beings to be free requires calmreflection on what is knowable independently of practical considerations. It requires that the thinkerbe wary of succumbing to the oppressive powerofprejudice. It requires no lessthat one resist the temptationsto disdain politics and to turn political life into a visible aspect of reason alone. I dare to wonder whether Hegel, for all his greatness, allowed the latter tendency tpjnar his political ^ well as Ms pMJospphicdjhpu^t 35 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 35 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource On reading Hegel before the age of eighty Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on October 8, 2004 by Janet Dougherty as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dougherty, Janet Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2004-10-08 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. Phänomenologie des Geistes. 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Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 29 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Cartesian certainty, or awakening from the dreams of a slave Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on September 15, 2006 by Janet Dougherty as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dougherty, Janet Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2006-09-15 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Descartes, René, 1596-1650. Plato. Meno. 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Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 33 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Aristotle's Politics : common good and forgotten excellence Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on April 2, 2010 by Janet Dougherty as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dougherty, Janet Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2010-04-02 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Aristotle. Politics. 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Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 26 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The nobility of Sophocles' Antigone Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on October 31, 1986 by Janet Dougherty as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dougherty, Janet Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1986-10-31 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Sophocles. Antigone. 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Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dougherty, Janet Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2011-09-16 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Plato. Statesman. 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Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. 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Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dougherty, Janet Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013-11-22 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Plato. Statesman. Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24004217 Friday night lecture