30 20 5655 https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/39e5ee0676f500c7701fc059b9ba509a.pdf 3e6156dd9d306544cda9affe8684cb16 PDF Text Text �and has a sense of the You can t behind write for them .. candidate like- vice contribute The essay �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 12 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol I Issue 14 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-04-23 Description An account of the resource Volume I, Issue 14 of The Gadfly. Published April 23, 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 01 #14 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/7306e11bdf12cb01e906995a8a94764d.pdf 16c177f1e1d0cd2822f711c08b0d7a31 PDF Text Text ��assistance �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 8 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol I Issue 15 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-04-30 Description An account of the resource Volume I, Issue 15 of The Gadfly. Published April 30, 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 01 #15 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/16fb232c1965f251d9a14f903030453f.pdf 5727fdbe1a93ca51e0917c7087078802 PDF Text Text in 6 parts The famous St. John's ad- to cut year. Be There Aloha �was in the lines of with all the characters married or but all the scenes to Certain individuals were -Abe Schoener for Silvius Rhum for learned their lines and more onto than their bodies which made for their success as latecomers to the cast.. In my case it was I was transformed oe~ri:o:rman.ce. In the end under if a few her doublet hose failed to hide the Eleanor we all know .and love ..• well it was a Kudos to the Lords .. The scene with the song about horns went from· , to out of with the Lords blood on each other bare bodkins at the version was a last ALL•~Au.~~ Pete Gilbert nervous breakdown. true Fool seventh cause?" was a scream and upstage. Given free to blow where he no what . a Southern rock'n'rol version s Crown"? The latter Peter and teen idol David He ��for three years Druids were are back at the year ago in THE COLLEGIAN I Prediction Watch a Successful STANDINGS Lost reenwayes ,uardians 1ruids partans' 5 Points 24 16 14 14 12 Carey a Furies - 18 Coffee second Furies for another course the Furies led the Amazons had some Too many walks and the field were 'uses Maenads - Mrs Maistrellis - 11 Kiss ��--------------~--------------------~- been scattered The power of his books temper, the wild bellows of the treeless hills contrast to several Celtic and Southern prose drawn-out conclusions of his �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 8 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol. I, Issue 16 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-05-08 Description An account of the resource Volume I, Issue 16 of The Gadfly. Published May 08, 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 01 #16 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/6bc134deb963f589a0d99fe613225d7c.pdf f4233218d82b23e3bb26f2c33f236729 PDF Text Text ��8 ��I THIS COMMENCEMENT EVENTS 1980 SATURDAY, MAY 3 10:00 p.m. Spring Cotillion - Great Hall FRIDAY, MAY 16 7:00 p .m. President's Dinner for the Senior Class - College Dining Hall SATURDAY, MAY 17 11 :00 a.m . Class Day Exercises - - Creut Hull 3:00 p.m. Faculty-Senior Softball Came --Back Campus rs · IT - THE LAST ISSUEI We would like to thank all those who have written articles and reviews. The open editorial policy does not preclude solicited writing and we hope to continue it next year. Special thanks to Mr Jacobsen for being the most regular wri t_er, and to Mr Hammel for his column, his ad,ice, and his criticism. THE GADFLY would not have been possible without the generous support of our subscribers, in particular those who donated over and above the subscription rate you we give our blessing to. 5:30 p.m. Picnic - - Back Campus 9:00 p .m. Swing Party Key Memorial Lobby Franrn Scutt Thank you~ THE GADFLY STAFF SUNDAY MAY 18 11 00 a m . Baccalaureate Service: Sermon bv The Reverend Charles Edward Berger. Rector Emeritus. Chevy Chase Parish - Great Hall 3:00 p m. Commencement Exercises -Address by Richard D. Weigle. President. St. John 's College Under the Liberty Tree A REAL REVIEW· I tried to write a review of this year's Reality weekend events, with special attention to the Saturday night musical performed by the tutors. I decided that instead of rehashing, I would simply say that if you missed Saturqay night, vou missed genius in action. You missed a special insight into the creative energv sense of humor, and professionalism of the tutors of St. John's College. Thanky oB, one and all.---Holly Johnson 4 30 p . m . Reception for Seniors, Parents, Faculty, Alumni and guests -The President's House . 212 Noro. 1 ood Road Annapolis, MD 21404 PAID Managing Editor Rick Campbell Kurt Schuler Lay-out a Design Terry Polk Subscription St John's College ,.,,-Profit Org. IUll( RATE U.S. POSTAGE Copy Editor Al:J i Columnist THE GADFLY Hazen Hammel Scott c. Boyd '9."AIT NO. 120 AN-IAPOUS. MD. Reporter Y amam ur a STAFF Pratt Will Warner Charlotte Barham THE GADFLY is printed by the St John's College print shop Pa~ti • Printer Aaaiatant Chris Colby Chri• Mark � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 12 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol. I, Issue 17 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-05-14 Description An account of the resource Volume I, Issue 17 of The Gadfly. Published May 14, 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 01 #17 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/8202621ad90ac15cbbd2f8a208de1e51.pdf 4251f5c10e97d4485a2d811837c74571 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 8 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol II Issue 1 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-09-05 Description An account of the resource Volume II, Issue 1 of The Gadfly. Published September 05, 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 02 #1 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/818fdc9333c0731f6b0b8dea349e0571.pdf d830ce35e2b7a445e8608bbb38eb44e5 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 8 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol II Issue 2 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-09-15 Description An account of the resource Volume 2, Issue 2 of The Gadfly. Published September 15, 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 02 #2 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/d174b5a784d8db6003b49f1e043afbaa.pdf 97b3e9a41857eb21f2897efec19d4c22 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 12 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol II Issue 3 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-09-22 Description An account of the resource Volume II, Issue 3 of The Gadfly. Published September 22, 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 02 #3 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/4afb8f4ddc454c01fe1feea34316dd45.pdf 19702259c4b8e106fa864c7eb5c194ec PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 12 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol II Issue 4 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-09-22 Description An account of the resource Volume II, Issue 4 of The Gadfly. Published September 22, 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 02 #4 Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/7ba3f8f8deae49f6631418356e59e96a.pdf 032c48caf13b9b501adc0d420b412e6e PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 12 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Vol II Issue 5 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-10-06 Description An account of the resource Volume II, Issue 5 of The Gadfly. Published October 06, 1980. (Misnumbered as Vol. II, Issue 4) Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 02 #4 (2) Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/b3aa29ce6368113224efd97285cc62c1.pdf b3f5eebad7c362aa5e3bd5054aab138e PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly Description An account of the resource Founded in 1980, The Gadfly is a weekly student publication distributed to over 600 students, faculty, and staff of the Annapolis campus. Click on <a title="The Gadfly" href="https://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=16&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the The Gadfly Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context thegadfly Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 8 pages Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Rick (Managing Editor) Title A name given to the resource The Gadfly, Special 'Lovers' Edition Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1980-10-13 Description An account of the resource Special Edition of The Gadfly for the Friday night lecture on Plato's 'Lovers'. Published in 1980. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Vol. 02 #special edition Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Language A language of the resource English Type The nature or genre of the resource text Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Gadfly Student publication https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/cf9891901e274d40bdb4ec83be226309.pdf 1c6edf5513d5c82ab904835e5ae66a7f PDF Text Text �·. �Dedicated to the Spirit of the College and the Tradition of the Liberal Arts ��St. John's College year b 0 0 k Annapolis, Md. 1944 Table of Contents The War ....... ................ ............ ....... ................... ..... ............ page The Curriculum .... .............. .. ....... ...... .......... ........ ............ . page The Freshman Plan ...... ......... .. ........ ........ _. ........................ page The Fine Arts .................................................................... page Hemisemidemiquavers .................................................... page Social Activities ........................................ .... .................. .. page Athletics .............................................................................. page Service Photographs ........................ ........... ............. .. .... .. page Commencement ............. ............................. ...................... page Senior Photographs ..................... .... ... .............................. page Faculty Photographs ........ .. ......... ...................... .. .......... ... page Student Photographs ..................... ......... .'.......... .... ....... .. . page This Yearbook ............................................. ,...................... page 6 11 14 17 24 26 28 30 34 36 38 40 45 Editor: Robert Campbell; Art Editor: Jack Landau; Business Manager: Verne Schwab; Professional Photographers: Meade Studios, Hayman Studios, Mrs. George Jones; Amateur Photographer: Dick Van Der Voort; Faculty Advisor: Mr. Lewis Hammond. �The War ... has introduced chaos into all the aspects of our student life. The pattern of its effects upon us has changed considerably during the past few years. It is not an easy task to determine the effects which the war has had on this community during the past year, nor is it a simple matter to bring to light the principal means by which these have been produced. One thing, however, seems evident and this is that the current influence of the war upon us, and our corresponding reaction t() it, are quite different from that of a year ago. In order to make this clear we must divide the · College's war history into three periods and examine each: (1) from Pearl Harbor to the calling of the Army Reserve in March, 1943, (2) from this time to the summer vacation, and, (3) from the opening of the school session of 1943-44, on July 7th, 1943, to the present. During the first period the nation was at war, although the student body had not, as yet, suffered materially. Even during this time, however, a few of the seeds of discord were sewn. We had lost a number of our best faculty members by the spring of 1943. Mr. Kelly had been at M. I. T. for a year, Mr. Comenetz had left the previous June, Mr. Taliaferro during the summer and Mr. Neustadt in January. During the second we suffered our serious material decrease by the successive calling of the reserve groups on the campus. Finally, except for the Sophomore Class, we once again achieved a state of equilibrium under the new Freshman Plan. This annual covers temporarily the third period, but in order to discover and illuminate the complex form of our relations to the war during the days with which we are concerned we must first go back and look briefly at our life during the preceding intervals. Period I We felt that we were aware of the magnitude of the war, its causes, its issues, its implications and especially the possibilities involved in its outcome. We held our War Meetings and concerned ourselves with what we determined quite rightly to be the most important problem-a lasting peace. We participated well in what seemed to be the best course of action open to us at the time and felt our thinking to be sound, our proposals necessary. It was not difficult to approach the problems presented for they appeared before us as speculative objects which we regarded with aloofness and emotional detachment. This mode of consideration was familiar to us since we employed it daily upon other objects, similarly distant, which we were likewise commensurate with the mode. We read and discussed the news as we read and discussed Thucydides. Gradually, however, we became aware of our insecurity as spectators; it became increasingly evident that we were being drawn into the position of active participants. We enlisted in reserve groups and remained in college in this capacity, judging soundly that we could be of most value to the nation as students; but we soon realized that this �/ choice, although the best, was only a postponement of the inevitable, that one way or another the result would be the same. It was merely a question of time. The last of the reserve groups had been called and it appeared that the Junior and Senior classes, at least would remain relatively stable ·until their respective graduations. The war potential of these groups had been almost completely exhausted. The Sophomores, on the other hand, found themselves in much the same position this year as that of the other two classes last Spring; they were destined to suffer gradual and continual loss of members throughout the year. As a consequence the chaos of last Spring continued but remained confined to this group, and its reaction was much the same as that of the two classes above it had been. This effect of that disease which is war was intelligible to us; we had expected it, reacted badly when it carne and understood, upon reflection, the injustice of our actions. We had experienced fully the insecurity necessarily felt by any community during war time and those of us who remained were desirous of a better course of action and seemed willing to take it. It appeared that we succeeded; beneath this appearance were concealed essential failures. We went to classes, worked hard and learned, but in spite of this the spirit of the college became immersed in an appalling gloom. Intellectual excitement had vanished. Individually we were working better; as a community we failed. As a community we no longer existed. The Juniors and Seniors, decimated, retired to Randall Hall and formed a number of small communities of their own, each with its implied constitution determining its peculiar mode of action wth respect to its end, this end being identified by each diminutive group with that of the highly nebulous body known as the College Community. Any such multiplicity of constitutions, all directive to the same end, leads inevitably to warfare within the whole, since any group, in order to justify its existence, must believe that its mode of action is the best, its understanding the true one. The Sophomore Class suffered by itself the chaos produced by continual diminution while the Freshmen, abandoned by the Period II When the first of the reserve groups was called we believed that the war had hit us with its full force. We were mistaken; the real impact carne much later and its appearance was much more subtle, illusory and diabolical. The loss of a large portion of our student body to the armed services in the spring of 1943 introduced chaos into all the aspects of our student life. We watched our friends disappear one by one; we held farewell parties and indulged in the miseries of drunkenness in our futile attempts at self-deception and we reached a point, finally, where we becarne utterly confused, even about the ends of these occasions-the loss of friends was secondary, indulgence and escape primary. We lost sight of the communal end and consequently were unable to follow the means with the necessary discipline. We neglected our studies and sought diversion, and, although we knew on the one hand that such a quest could lead to nothing but an increase in misery, yet, on the other, we felt ourselves unable to escape. We became adept and ingenious at excusing our own vices and our facility in this respect usually manifested itself in criticism, not of the Program itself, (for we knew too well its necessity, goodness and consequences), but of the way in which it was being applied. Students criticised the Faculty, classes and one another, all as being inadequate, and the Faculty reacted to some extent in the same way. Although our criticism was made in the spirit of self-indulgence, and consequently was not good in intention, (this intention being the justification of vice), there was, nevertheless, much truth in it. We had lost a large and irreplaceable part of our Faculty, irreplaceable because of the nature of a faculty member adequate to the Program. Many of our best students had been called. But instead of taking the better course of action-doing what we could with what we had, we chose the worseinertial lamentation. Period III During the summer vacation we were able to recognize to some degree the unhappiness of our past action and resolved to attempt the better. The Upper-classmen, returning in July, found their number pitifully small, discovered that only a handful remained of what had been, the year before, three large classes. Contrary to past experience, they found themselves to be a tiny part of a community dominated, numerically at least, by a mob of youngsters admitted under the new Freshman Plan. 7 .. . ' \ l '\\~\ .._;,.., �upper classes, who guarded jealously their communal secrets, struggled vainly to determine what that social form was into which they were ostensibly being initiated. The upper classes refused the information and were indignant at the result. The Coffee Shop, which in our experience had been the informal center of the intellectual life of the community, had become, oddly enough, a refreshment counter. We remember it as a place in which discussion was always to be found, where tutors and students continued their seminars until two and three in the morning. Someone always had a problem and many were available to contribute eagerly to its discussion. Now we found that few were interested. This year, for the first time in its history, the Coffee Shop made a profit. No one rejoiced. A number of factors seemed contributive to this decline of intellectual interest. For five years we had struggled to build up the Program, Faculty and student body, overcoming almost insurmountable obstacles in doing so. Imperfections remained, it is true, but the Program, in generaL was established on a sound basis. The majority of the faculty members, although lacking knowledge and experience in many parts of the Program, possessed requirements more essential to success than either of these: (1) the firm conviction of the necessity and goodness of the plan, (2) the personal excitement in undertaking the Program both as teachers and as students, and, (3) the capabilities of becoming good faculty members of the true Liberal Arts College. The student body, given the current state of secondary education, was probably as good as could be expected. The advent of the war, although unable to affect the Program, certainly introduced deficiencies into the teaching of it. A good Faculty is absolutely essential to good participation in the Program by the student body. It may be argued that the books are, after alL the teachers, and that the student learns from them rather than from the Faculty, the latter being only the means leading the students to the end, but from this it would be difficult to con- 8 �elude that the quality of the means is unimportant. It is, rather, all important, for in general a student's predisposition to learning is not sufficient to insure that it occurs and this is especially true during the initial stages of the learning process, before knowledge and good habits of study are acquired. Here the quality of the means may make all the difference. Later the means may become less important, but still they will never be entirely irrelevant. A faculty member, as mediator, must lead the student to the books and this is achievable only in so far as he is able to impart his own knowledge, conviction and excitement. The majority of the pre-war Faculty possessed these necessary qualifications and where knowledge was lacking other factors substituted themselves and the consequences were manifested in the student body. The war took from us a great number of these men that we had so carefully and painstakingly acquired and the whole community suffered accordingly. We tried to make up this loss with replacements but in many respects this was little more than a numerical achievement. Such a loss, corning after five years of struggle, corning just at the moment at which success seemed imminent, might well have proven disastrous. Minimally speaking it was disheartening and depressing. It meant that after the war we must again set our house in order. And indeed we must, ·for if we fail in this struggle there will certainly be little left to fight for. As the Faculty suffered, so did the student body. It lost the majority of that group which had experienced the infusion of intellectual excitement and devotion, which had created for itself habits, customs and myths, producing an established relation to the Program. Because of the quality of the Faculty and the minuteness of the body of Upper-classmen, the incoming Freshmen found little in their experience to indicate that one mode of behavior in respect to the Program might be more desirable than another. Tradition was confined to the few who remembered; the majority was left to create its own. The war confronted us on all sides with vast, swirling seas of human activity, and the very immensity of the spectacle of this fundamentally physical action, its inescapable presence and inevitable, permeating influence, dwarfed by comparison, that appearance which was our own intellectual activity. We were deceived by this, thinking, or, more properly, being forced to think that the relative magnitudes of the outward manifestations of these two kinds of human endeavor were consequences of their importance and relevance to the life of man, and because of this error we were led to feel, generally without being aware of it, that deliberation and discussion by us as a community were insignificant, trivial, perhaps even unjustifiable, certainly pitifully ineffectual in a world which, in appearance, was dominated almost completely by action in another order. The dictates of reason had become irrelevant to action. Our existence as an intellectual community was chaotic; we seemed continually on the verge of �dissolution. We were passive and impatient with any group discussion of war and peace, the necessities of law and liberal education. The propositions which, a year ago, we had accepted with enthusiasm had become routine and obvious. The period of communal deliberation seemed no longer useful historically; communal action was imperative. We failed to realize that, for us, the two should be synonymous. In spite of our failure as a community we achieved, individually, certain notable successes. The war confronted us, as individuals, wiih the necessity of justifying our own particular course of action and this necessary self-justification produced, in many cases, an application and mode of operation in respect to the Program which otherwise might not have been achieved. Individual working habits improved and if, as a community, success was not possible, nevertheless it was imperative individually and personally. The desire for d iscussion and argument was at least present among some of the Upper-classmen and to some extent this was fulfilled, although the satisfaction was personal rather than communal. The first formal lecture by an undergraduate was given. Several Upper-classmen originated, for them at least, a school of philosophy, concerned quite seriously with the formulation and explication of its Platonic doctrine of the relation of knowledge to reality. We knew the factors which were necessary to determine a durable peace and we were aware of the necessity of federation, sacrifice and legislation in order to insure this end. But as the war progressed we recognized two things, intrinsically related, which made this end seem hopelessly chimericaL its pursuit pathetically quixotic. The first was the highly complex and massive form which modern society had attained and the second was the incredibly great motive force necessary to overcome the inertia of this mass. If true peace was to be achieved then this leviathan had to be moved, stirred throughout its being. Force was necessary for the motion, but where was such a force to be found? As our perception of the war grew it became increas- ingly evident that the answer was-nowhere. We had created a machine of such a complex nature that it had become self-moving, and paralysed. The only hope seemed to be that it would reveal the seeds of its own impossibility, its essential contradiction, and dissolve by self-destruction. By forcing upon us this realization, then, the war dealt our community its most powerful devastating and diabolical blow. If government was to be good, peace established and happiness insured, then liberal education would have to exist as an institution for all. We, and those who saw the truth with us, would have to bring this about and such a thing was achievable only by political action. But through our continued contact with the war the political scene revealed itself in its almost unimaginable complexity and with this revelation brought to us the realization that our efforts would be pitifully ineffectuaL that the fight which we must undertake might well be hopeless-hence tragic. 10 �The Curricul urn ... has apparently suffered only slightly, in spite of the war. The effects of a few of the changes, however, have been somewhat serious. Lectures With a few notable exceptions the lectures this year were disappointing to all of us excepting, perhaps, the Freshmen. In fact the majority seemed to be Freshman lectures, either by accident or intention. There were eight lectures on the Liberal Arts; Mr. Adler devoted his three lectures to the Freshmen specifically. We do not wish to imply by this that we are either above or removed from lectures on the Freshman level; we were, and still are, intimately concerned with the problems of their year. The Administration, if it was responsible, may have had reasons for devoting so much of the lecture time to this class. Perhaps it did so because this was the predominant group on the campus or possibly because it felt that their intellectual status needed it. Whatever the reason, we cannot concur with that judgment and do not feel happy at the result. The former procedure of letting the Freshmen grow into the lectures rather than the opposite seems to us a better solution, for it entailed much more excitement and considerable anticipation. We remember fondly the first few lectures which we experienced as Freshmen. The wiser Upper-classmen informed us that we would not understand them at all and it is certain that we didn't. This was more or less insured, since the Dean customarily gave the first lecture. But we were excited rather than repelled by this and knew that we would have to listen carefully and follow as closely as we could and looked forward eagerly to the time when we would comprehend. Neither of our two perennial visiting lecturers, Mortimer Adler and Mark Van Doren, achieved that standard of excellence which they, by example, had set for us in previous years. . No lecturer do we anticipate more fondly than Mr. Van Doren. More than any one else he has always succeeded in captivating us, in persuading us to feel his own sympathy and sincerity for his subject matter, almost regardless of what it may be. He is a poet, and as such he almost invariably succeeds in moving us to share his own poetic perception and delight. His artistic analysis seems unfailingly good. However, he lacks to some degree the gift of philosophic analysis. Consequently we were disappointed by his lecture on rhetoric. The subject did not seem appropriate to his talents. :Again, in the case of the Confessions, we were moved by his perceptions of Augustine as poet but not as philosopher and Christian. We are closest to Mark Van Doren when he asks us to share with him the poetic understanding and sympathy for Homer, or Virgil, or Shakespeare. The question period of Mr. Adler's first lecture, Man's Essence, brought out in full regalia those two Freshman prejudices which have unfailingly appeared with each class and which have generally been abandoned soon enough, until they are raised once more in the Senior year. As a consequence Mr. Adler decided to settle the problem once and for all by devoting his next two lectures to them; accordingly his second lecture was Materialism and his third Evolution. Such attention to the Freshmen seems unwarranted. Two of the most significant lectures of the year were both first appearances for the lecturers. The first lecture by an undergraduate was given by Peter Wolff on Astronomy. Although those with strong affiliations elsewhere could not share Mr. Wolff's provacative affinity for Newton, the lecture was notably comprehensive and was received with well deserved enthusiasm. The Reverend Winfree Smith likewise made his debut on the platform this year and, with a remarkable degree of clarity and understanding, stated his objections to the theologians' reduction of God to Theology. The Language Tutorial In no other department of the Program has the failure of secondary education been felt more keenly than in the Language Tutorial. Here, for a number of years, we have been struggling with two tasks only one of which is properly our own. The first is the acquirement of adequate familiarity with the ·languages in which were written the majority of the books of the Program: Greek, Latin, French and German. The second is the employment of the knowledge of these languages in translating and close reading. This tutorial is essential to the Program. As the Mathematics Tutorial is devoted to the arts of the Quadrivium, so is the Language Tutorial related to the Trivium; but whereas the language of the ll �former is almost unique and universal in its vocabulary that of the latter is diverse and can only be brought to the universality of the Trivial Arts of all languages by a familiarity with a number of specific ones. This familiarity, recognized as participating in the universal Grammar, Rhetoric and Logic, gives mastery of the particular, leads one to the highest and fullest usage of one's native tongue. Such mastery is not possible without first a familiarity with other languages. Only after this has instill a certain amount of familiarity, some feeling, for instance, for the subtlety of Greek or the eloquence of Latin. This achievement in itself is not inconsiderable and has proven conducive to that perception of universality which we desire. The war took from us a number of our language teachers and the Freshman Plan increased the number of necessary Language Tutorials. As a consequence it was no longer possible to continue the four languages this year. Instead, the Administra- been attained can the universal Trivial Arts be acquired. The mastery of languages should not confront a college as a problem. Extreme youth is the time during which this type of learning is most readily and easily achieved. By the time the student reaches college age the problem has become acutely difficult. Such a task at this stage is dull and routine and consequently not easily faced. Current secondary education, in failing to teach languages, (especially the two most fundamental ones, Greek and Latin), forces us to assume its responsibility as well as our own. It is obvious, of course, that we can not pretend to teach four languages in four years but we can tion decided to devote all of the Freshman and half of the Sophomore years to Greek and the remaining time to the close reading of English translations. In considering the prospects for the Freshmen under this plan we were, of course, envious of the time that they had to devote to Greek. On the other hand we regretted deeply that they would not be able to undertake Latin. The language of Virgil would be an irreplaceable loss to them. We felt that such a loss should not occur unless absolutely necessary, that perhaps it would have been possible for them, even under the present conditions, to have had a year of Latin after their year and a half of Greek. As it turned out it became possible for us to rein12 �state the four languages in December. Consequently the Freshmen who were doing Greek did not suffer from the change. The three upperclasses did, however, for each lost a year of that language which it would have had ordinarily. Vacations Despite the fact that we accepted high school juniors this year it was necessary, in order that they be graduated by draft age, to eliminate the summer by the end of the year with considerable regret how essential vacations were to us if we were to work well. The year began in July and ended in March. By the end of the summer term all of us were exhausted from our continuous effort to overcome the enervating influence of an Annapolis summer in order to work. The heat was terrific. For forty days there was no rain. We cheered ourselves by imagining that we were Foreign Office representa- vacation. By instituting a summer term we were able to telescope to three years our four year program. This policy had been adopted by almost all other colleges in the country long before we decided that it was necessary but we had been highly critical of such a move and had withstood it as long as possible. Our reasons for this abstinence followed from our belief in the essentiality of vacations to good participation in the Program. The Program was difficult; the work concentrated. We referred, perhaps lightly, to the summer vacation as a period of digestion. We professed, paradoxically enough, to do most of our learning during this time. Although most of us did not regard these statements with complete seriousness, we realized tives in some forgotten tropical outpost. We waited restlessly for the mail boat to come. The quinine ran low. The brief vacation which we had before the beginning of the fall term was not sufficient to restore our lost energy. The story was the same at Christmas. As a result we passed the whole year under a sort of unnatural nervous tension and we were never sufficiently relaxed to work well. After such an experience we realized all too well how desirable a full summer vacation was. We hoped that, with the end of the war, it could be reinstated; we felt that the present plan would prove increasingly harmful to the community if it were continued. 13 �The Freshman Plan ... for admitting younger students to the College has not conformed to our expectations. We, as well as they, have been responsible for the failure. The Freshman Plan During the Summer Term, for the first time in its history, the Administration put into effect a plan which, ideally, it had always considered desirable: the admittance of a Freshman Class whose secondary education requirement was the completion of two rather than four years of high school, as is the case generally. Thus the College sai.d , in effect, that the last two years of high school, given the present state of secondary education, were relatively useless to the program of Liberal Education and hence, by the implication of its own principles of the desirability and necessary universality of its Program, useless almost without qualification. This condition of secondary education presents three possible courses of action; it seems to us that only the first is a cure, the remaining two merely narcotics: (l) Revising secondary education so that its program becomes of use to Liberal Education, (2) Accepting students, provided they have certain necessary qualifications, before high school graduation, and, (3) Insisting that students fulfill the secondary educational requirements as they stand, hoping for three possible results: (a) That during the last two years of high school they will increase in maturity, thus facilitating their subsequent Liberal Education, (b) That, given certain possible choices, they will elect a few studies relevant to a liberal program, and, (c) That, at a minimum, they do not suffer from common errors and falsehoods, (such as the proposition-Science cures all). Deliberation led us to choose the second of the three possibilities, the first being impossible at present and the third undesirable. There were two principal reasons for not continuing the third course of action, as we had been doing up to now; one was our uncertainty of its value in terms of maturity and the quality of curriculum, and on the other hand there was, in opposition to this plan, our experience of a number of ill effects suffered rather generally during these years; the other was the draft which, if we continued on the old plan, would prevent the graduation of the majority of our students. Consequently we accepted a Freshman class in July whose qualifications were twofold: the completion of two years of high school and the passing of an entrance examination. We awaited their arrival with a few misgivings which only experience could substantiate or annul. Three principal questions had to be answered before we could determine either the success or failure of the plan: (l) Would they have sufficient intellectual maturity for the Program? (2) Would they be mature socially? and (3) Would they acquire the necessary habits of study, given the lack of enforced discipline by the Administration? Although a judgment is possible, we cannot answer with finality the second of these questions; we can answer the other two without too many qualifications. �became aware of this at all that awareness was of highly unreal character. If this younger group of students continues in its state of intellectual immaturity, regarding the whole as a task to be performed, and failing to perceive its personal relation to them, then, in so doing, they must fail the Program. It may be argued that they will grow into it, (sometime during the Sophomore Year, say), but such an argument is truly unfair to a Liberal Arts student. The intellectual content of the Freshman and Sophomore years is far superior to that of the latter two, and how shall it profit a student if, in order to complete the four years, he neglect essentially the first two? It would be better for him if he waited until he was prepared to undertake the Program even though, as a consequence, it were necessary for him to leave before he had completed it. Although these are, so to speak, the dictates of reason in the matter, a college, unfortunately, cannot follow these alone, for if it did it might find itself non-existent. In all fairness, then, although the foregoing might suggest that we should refuse to accept high school juniors, such a choice might prove fatal to the College. How many high school students, upon being graduated and faced with the likelihood of being drafted within a year or a year and a half, would elect to go to college for that length of time? Very few, seems to be a fair guess. It is easy enough for us to say that we would grasp willingly whatever we could get of Liberal Education in that time, hoping to return afterward, but we would make this judgment after experiencing the value of the Program, even in part, and it would be highly unrealistic of us to assume this judgment on the part of a high school graduate who, in all probability, would be only vaguely aware of the content of the Program. On the other hand, the same student, given the prospect of finishing college before induction, might well be interested, to say the least. And although he be immature, and miss much because of this, he wilL in time, grow and will The new Freshmen had adequate habits of study. Our doubts, which had seemed justified, had led us to fear that the opposite would be the case: that they would take advantage of the possession, too soon, of almost boundless freedom and would run rampant. We imagined the necessity of a continual flow of administrative restrictions to keep them in check. Experience proved this particular fear to be unwarranted, for they did the work asked specifically of them and, in some cases, their habits in this respect proved to be more firmly rooted than those of many Upper-classmen. Our fears for the intellectual maturity of a freshman class considerably lower in age were well grounded. They worked well but the quality of their intellectual life was of high school rather than college goodness. Perhaps the best statement of · the case would be, (although this must be amplified), that they did what they were asked to do yet failed to perceive the wealth of toil not required of them and that the latter was the most important part of the Program. Another way of stating this would be to say that what they did seemed to be unrelated to what they were. They read the Republic and the Ethics because they were assigned and they discussed them because they had read them, but they failed to perceive the personal consequences involved. If they were aware at all of the problem of the assurance of happiness both in the part and in the whole it was in the light of a task, not of an intimate and personal concern. They were not able to perceive the great problems in the works they were studying and, if confronted with them, seemed incapable of retaining and examining them in any substantial way. The Platonic proposition-Virtue is Knowledge, has serious educational and personal consequences but if they 15 �also understand and profit and doubtless, even under these conditions, be really much more of a college graduate than those who imag i ne, after they are graduated, that they have finished. Ideally speaking, however , neither our current plan for the Freshmen nor the one in effect previous to the war can be called truly satisfactory. Until such a time as secondary education can be cured of its many ills, college liberal education must necessarily suffer. Students should enter college knowing how to read and write; they should have had previous training in Greek, Latin and Mathematics, specifically, Euclid. The problem of the Language Tutorial has been discussed elsewhere, but the very fact that we have such a problem is a reflection on the inadequacy of current high school education. It should not be the burden of a college to teach its students the fundamentals of these languages. Extreme youth is the time for learning languages, just as it is the time for learning the multiplication table; these are the years in which this kind of training takes place with the most facility. By the time one reaches college age the difficulty is increased tenfold. The task by then appears dulL systematic, routine; it is not easily faced. The principal difficulty that confronts us in judging the social maturity of the Freshmen is the fact that we have not experienced them in any communal form of society. A number of people, on entering a community, would probably expect to find certain beliefs, customs and laws; they might imagine that they would be informed of these and would be expected to follow them as members of the community. To the new Freshmen, at least, there appeared to be no beliefs, no customs, no laws, but if the sacred fire did exist, then it was buried in the inaccessible sanctity of Randall Hall and it appeared that it would have been presumptuous of Freshmen to go there in search of it. Hence, rather than be invited to become part of a community, they were forced to form one. They entered expecting to comprehend and then to lead what they vaguely anticipated to be a form of college life, but they discovered, to their bewilderment and confusion, that before this could be done they themselves, rather than others, would have to determine what this form was. It was a long time before they became aware of the necessity that was imposed upon them and it is still doubtful that, as a group, they are fully conscious of it. They remained in a state of chaotic suspension, anticipating the imposition of the communal form upon them but growing more and more doubtfuL as time passed without action, that this would ever occur. Had they been informed at the outset that they would have to determine for themselves what form their communal life would have to take the result might have been less chaotic, although even under these conditions it is doubtful that this form would have been good. The common end which leads people to form any particular community must determine the communal form of action with respect to that end; and presumably those of good judgment who see the end most clearly should be determinative of that form. In a college this is don e by the Upper-classmen with administrative cooperation. Since we cannot grant the Freshmen the intellectual maturity necessary to an adequate perception of the end, it is doubtful that, in any case, a communal form constituted by them would have been sound. 16 �The Fine Arts ... have never found a satisfactory place at St. John's chiefly because we have failed to reach an agreement in the understanding of their relation to the Program. Introduction come involved in a paradox and are unsuccessful as a consequence. Almost any proposal for the presentation of some function of the Fine Arts to the community reveals within itself the necessary but tacit assumption that this is a formal activity and that consequently we have available that constant and adequate group of trained people necessary to success. When we recognize that this is not the case then we must either acknowlege failure, (as was necessary in the case of the Chorus this year), or slacken the communal ties to the Program to make possible a kind of professional adequacy, (which we managed for The Tempest). It is evident that any such attempt must entail a kind of failure, either with respect to the Arts or to the Program, that the excellence necessary to the success of the former can be had only if they are formally recognized. Although our aspirations to study and to present the Fine Arts at St. John's have been, and, of necessity, shall be defeated, there is still open to us a third course of action which has been successful. This is the presentation of the works of other artists to ourselves as spectators. By the means of records and the concert series we have heard the greatest music and through the Film Club we have seen the finest drama that the cinema has to offer. These enterprises have been successful chiefly because they are of the kind most commensurate with our present position on the Arts. Moreover (except for the local Durkee Enterprises, which are somewhat antithetical to our desires), we are rather fortunately situated with respect to the offerings of Baltimore and Washington. However great has been our critical success with our seminars, lectures, concerts and films, we have been, and shall continue to be, unsuccessful in our attempts at learning and creating in the field of the Fine Arts. Our reaction to this failure is not trivial, for the poetic desires lie deep and we shall feel deeply this privation as long as the Program necessitates it. Here at St. John's we have never had what could be called, by any stretch of the imagination, a sound and comprehensive relationship to the Fine Arts. Many have lamented eloquently this deficiency and urged the Administration to recognize and rectify it. Others have viewed with alarm the consequences of such a rectification to the curriculum. Some maintain that because the Fine Arts are essential to man we must acknowledge this necessity and include them in the Program. Others admit their essentiality but insist that we cannot maintain them without an expense to the Program which must not be incurred. Any attempt to establish formally a sound relationship to the Arts would, if it did not make serious inroads into the curriculum, at least set up a kind of extra-curricular elective system. The Program demands of the student all of the study time that he is able to devote to it. Were the Administration to acknowledge as necessary a formal study of the Fine Arts it could do so only at the expense of its own Program; were it to set up a group of elective courses in the Arts it would be entering into competition with itself. It has acknowledged music and poetry as desirable to the Program to some degree by scheduling lectures and a concert series each year and by including the great poets among the authors. Indeed, poetry, critically speaking, receives a surprisingly great amount of attention from us. But formally, at least, we have not felt able to go beyond this point and the problem remains, with the arguments on both sides unresolved. Although formal recognition of the Fine Arts by the Administration has been impossible, their recreational value has been emphasized and encouraged. They have been considered, together with athletics, as the most desirable activity in which the student body can engage by way of relaxation. The Administration has adopted a policy of aid and encouragement to any group activity which might prove valuable to the community. Under this policy, however, the majority of our attempts be17 �and , with a quaint device Admired Miranda Which was to please. the baseless fabric of this vision [Solemn music] 18 �Music As is usual with us, we had our difficulties with amateur music. Our attempts to bring together a chorus and orchestra produced little that was perceivable to the community as public. Mr. Nabokov's efforts in this respect were laudable but this year, even more than last, communal cooperation and effort were lacking. Last year our amateur success was achieved through these groups; the orchestra gave several concerts and the chorus an excellent performance of the Missa Brevis. This year we failed here but succeeded with individuals and with small groups. On September 12th Mordecai Sheinkman and Allen Goldstein gave a piano and flute recital and again, on January 22nd, Mr. Sheinkman performed a full program of piano works. His selections were representative and imposing and the program was one which even a highly trained professional musician would consider thoughtfully before presenting to his audience. Although the pianist as yet lacks understanding and sympathy for certain composers and moods, chiefly the modern neurotic, the very attempt on the part of an undergraduate at a full length recital is deserving of commendation. And if one adds to -this Mr. Sheinkman's not inconsiderable ability and familiarity with the classical tradition, then the effort was certainly laudable. The final amateur program of the year was the concert given on March 12th for the Seniors by Mr. Nabokov's flute and string ensemble and by Mr. William Harper. Mr. Harper, accompanied by Mordecai Sheinkman, sang two Schubert songs and Franz's Widmung. We were surprised and pleased by the richness of this voice, hitherto silent before the community, the excellence of the phrasing, the sympathetic understanding of the phonetic possibilities of the German language. Mrs. Benac, to whom we are quite indebted both because she is an accomplished violinist and because she has supported, as first violin, so many of our orchestral endeavors, played a Handel sonata, accompanied by Steve Benedict. The flute and string ensemble opened the program with the Tellman Concertante for Strings and Flute and closed it with the excellent but seldom heard Bach Suite in B Minor. This was the only public appearance of this group but the performance, although it deserves praise, was, for amateur music, not nearly so important as the ensemble's existence. This music exists for its own sake; the performers are primarily concerned With the pleasure they derive from working together and All _the world 's a stage Drama On Friday, August 20th, the King William Players presented The Tempest. It must be confessed that this did not come as a surprise to the community. Since it was staged and rehearsed on McDowell Plaza, we all had at least a partial pre-view of it in its formative stages. We observed Messrs. Nabokov and Abrahamson directing the actors, Landau sketching scenery and costumes, Chenoweth, Sharp and Gilbert building scenery and hanging lights, Goldstein and Mr. Standen, off in a corner, experimenting with pyrotechnical effects. Once on our way to the Coffee Shop, we heard Peter Weiss declare with solemnity to a group of stage hands that "our revels now are ended". On another occasion we happened upon a tender love scene between Tris Campbell and Laetitia Dickinson. We even glimpsed Novak, muttering something about being "plagued", as he disappeared into the bushes pursued by Killorin and Williams. When Friday evening came, however, and we took our seats in the darkness just in time for the first spot light and the alarmed cries of the mariners, all that we had seen and heard during the previous days was forgotten. A magic spell was cast over us and we were transported quietly and convincingly to that mystical and enchanted isle where the arts of Prospera prevailed even over the evil of Caliban and where the breezes sparkled with the jewel-like songs of Ariel. We hovered above the island like ethereal spectators as we watched with intensity the unfolding of the drama. We followed the intricate workings of Prospera's arts as they tested and brought Ferdinand and Miranda together, as they restored the dukedom and finally freed Ariel. At last, with Prospera, we relinquished reluctantly the arts that had held us, as well as the actors, under their spell. 19~ �although they may appear publicly this is a secondary consideration. It is unfortunate that amateur music receives so little active support from the St. John's community. Perhaps it is because we are so self-critical that our musical talents seem absurdly inadequate; perhaps it is because we are lazy. In any case we, as a community, by our failure to bring ourselves to the position of more active participation in amateur music, have done ourselves an injustice, have confined to a few interested persons a pleasure that should pe had by many more. It would be possible for us to institute this as a significant activity but this would require a critical abandon to which we have never been friendly. During the past few years the Book Store has become the center of a wide variety of diverse activities, some leading a mushroom-like life, arising one day and disappearing the next. and others achieving a state of stability and permanence. This condition is obviously due to the approachability, interest and cooperativeness of Mrs. Lathrop, who is generally a willing pushover for even a somewhat wild scheme for an activity which might, if one is a bit imaginative, be connected with her own enterprise. Of the latter kind the most valuable has been the recorded concert. The top floor of Humphreys had by no means been an ideal place to listen to records. It was isolated, gloomy, formal and associated with all kinds of laboratory unpleasantness and it was a fortunate day for the college record library when units of it began to be heard on the phonograph established in the Book Store for the Poetry Club's Linguaphone recordings. Here, (as opposed to the third floor of the laboratory, which one tended to disassociate from music-excepting the sonometers), one was always reminded that the College had a record collection and, since all paths lead eventually through the Book Store, one was constantly tempted to stop and listen. Besides these concerts we continued with success the practice of previous years of holding outdoor concerts on McDowell Plaza when the weather was warm. On September 5th Ertegun and Campbell presented, by this means, the only jazz concert in the history of the College, (excepting those impromptu affairs which used to occur during dance intermissions, when Davis borrowed a trumpet, Terry played the drums and Goldsmith put on a song and dance routine, or when McKay accompanied Charlie Van Doren's clarinet on the piano). Such things, however, as Joe Oliver's cornet seemed incongruous in this classic setting. The three professional concerts scheduled by Mr. Nabokov this year were excellent in all ways. They were as representative as three such events could be, the programs were well chosen and one of the performances, at least, can safely be called unforgettable, even by those of us who will be closely associated with music in the Joseph S:z:igeti I . • 20 �future. This was the opening concert of the year by Joseph Szigeti on November 26th. Mr. Szigeti is a fine violinist but perhaps the most significant thing that can be said of him is that he is a great musician. Not infrequently is one able to hear a good soloist but it is, unfortunately, a rare experience to hear one who, besides being technically proficient, is truly understanding and sympathetic to the music that he is playing and who, moreover, possesses the power of conveying that intelligence and feeling to his audience. The latter qualities distinguish the musician from the mere performer and Josef Szigeti's recital made us aware more than ever of this distinction. We heard the Bach Chaconne played with an almost incredible degree of warmth and sensitivity, with a fullness we are still not quite willing to concede with complete credence to the possibilities of a solo violin. Mr. Szigeti's performance of the modern works on the program is open to criticism, but so is any understanding which one, without satisfactory conviction, assumes for them. We listened without restlessness to the encores we demanded and left the concert whistling melodies from the Schubert Sonatina. Even now, from time to time, one hears snatches of them. The brief lectures, the anecdotes of John Jacob Niles seemed out of place and failed to move us. The presentation was too elaborate; one felt that even here, where one had hoped to find the purity of folk music, (as Henry Adams the purity of architecture, the unity of purpose), the professional mechanism had penetrated, and sullied. Yet one could not fail to perceive the purity and the childlike simplicity, hence the penetrating depth, of these songs. We shall not forget the beauty and loveliness of Barbara Allen or of Black is the Color of my True Love's Hair. John Jacob Niles The Budapest String Quartet The Budapest String Quartet began the Seniors' graduation week on March 3rd. The performance was equal to the expectations that one would have for this group. The most significant work on the program was the perennial favorite of this community, the moody, elaborate, 21 �and sermons of Blake and Donne. The selections were carefully chosen as representative of the various aspects of the thought of these two poets and the reading was handled quite well by both. The third program, on October 13th, was composed of selections from two modern poets in whom this community has shown perennial interest -Joyce and Eliot. Ahmed Ertegun read a group of Joyce sonnets and Jack Landau three of Eliot's poems-The Love Song of]. Alfred Prufrock, Gerontion and Portrait of a Lady. Following the program there was a discussion by the audience of the two poets precipitated and guided by the readers. During this time two of our most prized Linguaphone recordings were played, one of Joyce reading Annalivia Pleurabelle and the other of Eliot reading The Hollow Men and Gerontion. In many ways the most interesting, certainly, as might be expected, the most scholarly was the Chaucer program by Mr. Scofield on October 24th. Generally we are aware of Mr. Scofield's unique knowledge and experience in the field of English literature in only a secondary way. On this occasion, however, both were primary, for he read the selections in the original dialect with remarkable and impressive ease and familiarity. Although each of these programs was received by the community with enthusiasm, that enthusiasm alone, in Mrs. Lathrop's absence, was not sufficient to perpetuate the meetings and the project was abandoned. Th~ interest, however, still lingers and we hope that soon this activity will be reinstituted. mysterious and great C Sharp Minor Quartet of Beethoven. We have always exalted this work as a masterpiece, felt as keenly about it as about the Mozart operas, and yet it has defied our analysis and left us inarticulate about its greatness. Hearing it performed added significance to an already unanimous opinion. Poetry One of the most influential and short-lived of this year's enterprises in the Fine Arts was the Poetry Club. We call it influential because, after four meetings, it unde rwent a metamorphosis and, after a period of imperceptible transition, emerged as a recorded concert series. The fault , (if, the result being good, there can properly be one), lies with us, as usual. Mrs. Lathrop went to the West Coast after the fourth meeting, leaving behind the record player and a number of people energetic enough to play music but not to read poetry. As is not uncommon in many such things, the origin of the club is somewhat hazy, although one might guess with some certainty that Killorin and Bird were at least partially responsible for the idea, that Mrs. Lathrop provided its mobility and that there was additional support from many others. Whatever the case, on Friday afternoon, September 3rd, Mr. Killorin gave a reading of Murder in the Cathedral to a large audience which gathered in the Book Store for the occasion and unquestionably the venture was a success. The reader showed dramatic talent to a degree remarkable and unique in this community. His interpretation of the characters was perceptive and consistent. The audience was quite enthusiastic and suggested the possibility of more occasions of the same sort. Thus began the Poetry Club. On the following Wednesday night Peter Weiss and Robert Campbell read a number of the poems The Cinema The Film Club is in the enviable position of being able to meet with comparative ease the highest critical standards of the cinema audience. Aside from the necessary familiarity with the classic films and a sound critical judgment of them, it is faced with no particularly difficult problems. This by no means implies that knowledge and aesthetical judgment are either frequently found or easily acquired. The reverse is, of course, true; but whereas in the case of successful drama, for instance, at St. John's this is quite insufficient, (since the requirements of time, talent and finances are imposing obstacles), in the case of film judgment alone is alrriost sufficient. It costs no more to show a good film than a bad one. This being the case the Film Club, during its three year history at the College, has been able to show the best that the cinema has to offer. Outstanding among its presentations this year were: Birth of a lecture review 22 �Carnival in Flanders, Alexander Nevsky, Grand Illusion, A Nous La Liberte and Harvest. It has proven itself one of the most valuable and consistent of our artistic organizations as well as one whose type is most adequate to our means. The St. John's Collegian It has been said, truthfully enough, that we are not a writing community. Our failure to acknowledge the literary arts i:p this respect has had its· consequences, a number of which are quite evident to us. This condition is always noticeable in our theses and it must be admitted that even Seniors have been guilty of incompetence on the grammatical level. Secondary education, rather than we, must acknowledge most of the responsibility for this misfortune, but we must admit that here, as elsewhere in the Fine Arts, the Program has not permitted us to function well. We have always had on the campus a number of people who have insisted on and fought for more writing, have asked that more time be devoted to it, but here too the result has been little more than a stalemate. Most patient and long suffering of the activities which have faced this problem has been the Collegian. It could be an excellent paper if enough people had the time to write for it; as it is, it barely manages to come forth with its regular features. Now and then there have been responses . to the pleas of its editors for additional contributions but the result has never been sustained and of sufficient quantity to warrant the formulation of any real policy on original material, except possibly the one of printing what it can get. This is hardly a policy. Especially in the field of poetry, however, it was able to make some headway this year. Two of our former students, now in the Navy, submitted poems which they had written since leaving College. Warren Zeik sent us Anchors Aweigh and Gene Thornton On Intimations of Mortality. Both were expressive of the reactions of the majority of St. Johnnies to the services. The Quadrivium, (Hyman, Wolff, Ertegun, Landau and Campbell), specialists in esoteric humor, made three contributions, only two of which need be mentioned. The first was an observation of the The Quadrivium Senior Table and was entitled A Neo-Hegelian Looks at the Salad Bowel and the second a poetic review of Mr. Klein's lecture on Geometry called The Ghost Goes West. Two Faculty wives, Mrs. Peebles and Mrs. Scofield, permitted us to publish two of their poems, the former a translation of a passage of the Agamemnon entitled The Sacrifice of lphigenia and the latter a unique work of phantasy, Tree Design. For the last issue of the paper Robert Campbell submitted two portraits, To Beethoven and Aeneas. The Arts Column, written weekly by Jack Landau, proved to be an excellent and entertaining additional feature again this year. Written in New Yorker style, with opinions which were at least provocative, if not acceptable to all, it was a review of theatre offerings in Annapolis, Baltimore and Washington. Interlude 23 �Hemisemidemiquavers As is usual in the writing of a Year book there are left over several dozen notes and comments which either can not or should not be catalogued. We were on the point of throwing them in the waste basket but changed our minds and, against our better judgment, decided to print the lot. Do you remember: The Locs & Bengel Club-its Friday night meetings in Sheinkman's rooms; its unique Jewish, Christian, Jewish-Christian .and Mohammedan membership ... The Bridge Club-the insatiable desire and incredible bidding of Schwab; the pensiveness of Mr. Gorman and Campbell; the psychic debacles of Mr. Klein and, occasionally, Ertegun; the absenteeism of Mr. Smith ... Randall politicsthe Terrible Trio's resounding conferences in the john; the Quadrivium and its friends versus the natural law, culminating in the Landau slipper episode and the lacrosse stick revenge; the great battle between the second and third floors and Landau's utter failure in the guarding of the prisoners; the Sasscer soirees; Cochran and the Dormitory Committee ... the many visits of friends in the Services-Ned Lathrop, Jack Neustadt arriving in the middle of the War and Peace seminar, Davis, Terry, Gallup, Jimmy and Joe Hollywood, Donald Kellogg-Smith, Mike Keene with new songs, Goldsmith arriving at midnight on his way to or from the Army, Navy or Marines, Mason, Kramer, Slafkosky and Poppiti ... the Quadrivium's continual Variety Show which was never presented-Garis and Sonny Boy, Campbell & Landau and Mr. Presi- The Bridge Club dent & Mr. Dean, Ertegun and Tin Roof Blues . the two rival Randall night spots-Jimmy's Place and Jack's Place, Goodman versus Oliver & Arm- · strong; the night Jack's Place was barricaded and Mr. Pucket, the watchman, brought to the rescue by Snake Rag; Campbell's Unfinished, the Five Pats Rag; the choruses of The Third floor of Randall .. . the impromptu Senior Party in Jack's Place-Raki; Sasscer and the brandy inhaler; the speeches and Huber's objections from the top bunk overruled by Campbell, as M.C.; serenading the Freshmen and the parade in caps and gowns; the lectures in the Great Hall interrupted by Ertegun's "few announcements"; Hyman, in his office of Dorm Manager, evicting Cochran from Campbell's room . . . the night at Carvel when we scouted, from the bar, Jascha's Faculty party . . . the Atwood Garis Memorial Society ... the Senior Table, which brought together the Quadrivium and resulted in its first effort, A Neo-Hegelian Looks at the .Salad Bowel . .. the singing of Happy Birthday in the dining hall to Atwood . . . The War and Peace seminar at the Dean's house-Landau's birthday present; Sasscer's egg-nog ... The Senior paper writing month-Hyman's weekly change of thesis; Cochran and the Laws; Landau and Croce; Hyman's Thurberisms; Ertegun's plan to write in Washington . . . nonbirthday parties, dinner and music at the Germans' . . . Cochran, Eleanor Lynd and Middletown .. . Ertegun's collar bone and new math course .. . The Waste Land ... vetch and rye ... the Harvard lecturers ... Mr. Kieffer and the housing situation ... the new Faculty members-Messrs. Reis, William Harper, Ralph Harper and Max Dehn .. . the rise of the Dialectical Realists . .. Winkie's cut rate coats and pants ... Mr. Standen, Joe Smith and the rope tricks . . . Brittanica's presentation of Great Books of the Western World ... Hegel, Spinoza and the Dean for two weeks in Senior Language . . . shipwrecks on the Eastern Shore .. .. Mr. Klein, Mr. W. K. Smith, the war and five spots ... Air Raids and wardens . . . the Freshmen bootleggers . . . Brandy ... serials at the Republic . .. Garis, Randall and the bed bugs . . . Mr. Gorman and Wolff ver- �sus Newton and Schwab . . . the Apostles Peter and Paul and the arrival of Ed ward . . . the interpretation of Mr . Bingley's dream and Mr . Bing ley's in terpretation of Brahms .. . the epidemic at the old swimmin' hole which almost vanquished the Tempest cast . . . Sasscer, foremost L authority on anti-St. Inseperables John's literature . . . the blast on the back page of P.M. . Huber's urinal broad jump record, broken by Campbell . . . Ertegun's Wednesday until Tuesday weekends . . . Mr. Harper's opulent rooms .. . Roeder, Pumphrey, Marshall and the French records . . . Bill Harris and St. John's society . .. the Senior Tea, with the Dean's -reluctant samovar, to which no Freshmen came .. . the incredible debacle of Groton's Mr. Pick-Gerard Manley Hopkins .. .-Mr. Bingley's Washington debut . . . Elfenbein, Van Doren and the search for a bridge game . . . Wensel and Van Gogh . .. Nussbaum smoking a cigarette .. . the Dean, the Evans equipment and Mrs. Kelly's sewing machine ... Junior chemistry . . . English 4F ... the Collegian deadline ... wine at the College banquets ... the Coffee Shop's discovery of the hot dog . . . one A.M. and no place to eat . . . this just-nascent Year Book .. . Das Ding an Sich ... bacon and eggs after the Christmas Cotillion . . . Perry's kimono and ties . . . two cards face down; Why not, Ben; why not? " .. . the transcendental dice ... Cochran sub-letting to the Navy ... the all-night packing of various Seniors in order to escape being locked in Randall. Be fruitful and multiply End Of A Decade Mr. Buser Solstice 25 �Social Activities ... this year have revealed the necessity of formalization and cooperation. Perhaps the final result will be constituted student government. and built a fire in the fire place and engaged a fivepiece colored band. The band proved to be of interest to some of us for the pianist turned out to be, ostensibly at least, Teddy Wilson's uncle and the trombone player, in spite of grey hair and few teeth, managed from time to time a style which could have been const.r ued as New Orleans tailgate. Almost everyone appeared on the scene and the number of girls present was sufficient to make the affair a success. On November 27th, to tide us over until the Christmas Cotillion, we held another movie dance in the gym, this time accompanied by Secret Agent. By now we had become well aware that this type of affair was bound to fail. Almost invariably too few couples came. Those that did were swallowed up in the cavernous darkness of the gym. The stags played bridge. Everyone planned for the Christmas Cotillion for days in advance. Small scouting parties found their way to Baltimore and Washington in search of brandy, that being the only available alcohol on the market at the time. Pre-dance, intermission and post-dance parties were arranged. Girls came. If we are not mistaken there were even a few late dates. Charlie Gibney's band played its farewell performance at St. John's and the only long faces were those that- appeared for Sunday morning breakfast Wensel evicted them from the dining hall and the College settled down for a quiet morning's rest. The Cotillion Board was reorganized at the beginning of the winter term and Frank Pumphrey was elected Chairman. The new board scheduled three dances for the term, the first an informal and the others formal Cotillions. McDowell basement had proved superior to the gym as a place for informals and accordingly the first of this term's dances was held there on January 29th. Unfortunately there were not as many girls present as would have been desirable and the affair suffered from this. Perhaps the most re- Dances The Cotillion had more than its usual amount of troubles this year. With a considerably younger student body, lacking that initiative and ingenuity which had made dances a somewhat dubious success in past years, it became necessary to plan these affairs more carefully and to inveigle the community to attend. The Freshmen were reticent to date and the Board tried, sometimes with, sometimes without success to bring groups of girls from the town to the College. However, with additional pressure and hard work on the part of a few, many were able to enjoy a number of successful dances. It seemed undesirable to attempt a formal during the summer term, but Charlie Van Doren's Board arranged two movie dances on the old Greenwich Village pattern. The first was The Scarlet Pimpernel on August 21st and the second My Little Chickadee on September ll th. With the coming of the fall term and Hallowe'en the Board felt that something new and more ambitious was in order. Accordingly they cleared the Coffee Shop and the Junior Common Room of most of their tables and chairs, opened the Book Store Gavotte 26 �markable spectacle of the evening was the colored band. It was made up of students from the local high school and was dominated, to say the least, by saxes. In fact, we cannot recall any other instrument at all save, perhaps, a piano. On February 19th the gymnasium blackout restrictions were lifted for the first time in our remembrance and the result was indeed marvelous. The occasion was the Valentine Cotillion. We had the delightful experience of seeing more than the band lights and the limited number of couple s which could or would appear under that ghastly red spot light that we recall being hung in one of the corners, facing the wall, on previous occasions. One could even glimpse a few familiar faces in the chaperone corner. It was reported that Mrs. Scofield abandoned her request for a reading lamp as a result. Much embarrassment was eliminated since now it was possible to identify one's date, or anyone else's, for that matter. The eight Seniors, unforgivably insulted because they had been asked to pay' the regular admission fee, turned out en masse and a bit tight, (having first attended Mr. Bingley's afternoon party and then the President's d inner), for their Ball on March llth. The music was offered by the Navy band, which had played its first engagement here at the Valentine Cotillion, and was much superior to any that we can recall during the past few years. Again there were lights and we observed suspended from the gym ceiling a canopy of streamers with several branching clusters which reached column-like to the floor. Since this was the last dance of the year the number of dates, the number of guests and the number of private parties were greater than usual. At least one of the highlights of the even;ng was th e energetic gavotte executed with aband on by Lad y Mayer and Mr. Nabokov to One O'clock lump. The aff air was fittingly climactical. The Senior Ball Board of Directors, composed of Robert Campbell, Thomas Fulton, Thomas Cosgrove, Robert Novak and Chao Li Chi, was elected for the year and it chose as its managers Peter Weiss and Harry Pfeiffer. The organization proved efficient throughout the year and by being a successful example served to suggest that other activities might well be organized cooperatively. House Masters and Dormitory Committees With the younger group of Freshmen occupying most of the dormitories this year the Administration felt it advisable to introduce House Masters into all except Randall Hall. As the year progressed however, and disorder in the dormitories became increasingly disrupting to the community, the Dean proposed that the House Masters and the Administration select Dormitory Committees. These were groups of students, chosen from each dorm, having qualifications which made it evident that these, at least, seemed to be aware of the kind of dormitory life that was desirable in this community. They received authority from the Administration to take or suggest whatever action they judged possible and desirable to make the dormitory function more sahsfactorily. Their power was not unlimited since if administrative action was proposed by them it necessitated approval. It appeared doubtful, however, that suggestions would be overruled. Although steps have not been taken as yet, here, as with the Employment Cooperative, a number of possibilities for student organization and government suggest themselves. The Committees, if built into a single organization, could lead us to a sound form of Student Government which might result in the establishment of that desirable communal form which we have been seeking for a number of years. Cooperatives In the early part of August the Student Employment Bureau was organized on a cooperative basis. The Dean had announced previously in College Meeting that the Administration was willing to grant charters to such organizations and that cooperatives might prove the solution to a number of our social problems, such as the dances. A meeting of the Bureau membership was called, the proposal to organize cooperatively was made, discussed and approved, a board was chosen to draw up and present for ratification a constitution and at the next meeting the constitution was approved. A 27 �Athletics ... have continued as our most successful form of recreation. The Freshmen, however, brought with them more high school spirit than we could absorb and the result was a mild confusion of the status of Gymnastic at St. John's. Here are the year's results: . Soccer Standings l. East Pinkney ... .. .............................. ... 2. Randall ... ...... .............. ...... ................... 3. Chase-Stone ........... .................. ........... 4. Paca-Carroll ..................... ........... .. ...... 5. West Pinkney ... .................... ............. Individual honors .................. ....... ...... ........... Chenoweth Winning team ........... ...... ......................... West Pinkney 100 yard dash ... ...... ..... .... .. ll.8 seconds, winning time Won by .... ...... ...... ... ... ....... .. ... .... R. Harris (Chase-Stone) 220 yard dash ............. ... .... .. 28 seconds, winning time Won by ............ .................. .. Wakefie1d (West Pinkney) 440 yard dash ...... .. ...... .. ...... ..... .1 minute, winning time Won by ... ...... .. .... ...... .. ..... .... Wakefield (West Pinkney) 440 yard relay .. .................... 55 seconds, winning time Won by ............... ... .... ........... .. ... ..... ... ........ West Pinkney 12 pound shot put.. ...... ..27 ft. 8 in., winning distance Won by ... .......... ... ... .. ....... .. Van Doren (West Pinkney) Singles-won by ...... ........... ..... ... ........ ................... Maury Doubles-won by ..... ..................... Maury and R. Harris Javelin throw ...... .. .. .............. .. llO ft ., winning distance Won by ... ...... ....... ..... ... .. ............ Harvey (West Pinkney) l. 2. 3. 4. Chase-Stone tied Paca-Carroll Randall ················································ 3 East Pinkney ··· ········ ········ ············ ······· 2 West Pinkney ······················· ············· 1 L. 0 2 4 6 8 Tennis Tournament Finals Softball throw .............. Won by Maury (Chase-Stone) L. T. 0 0 0 0 0 Championship won by ... .... .. .... .......... .. ... West Pinkney Discus throw ..... ..... ...... .. .. 70 ft. 3 in., winning distance w. W. 3 2 2 0 0 Softball Won by .. ........ .. .................. Chenoweth (West Pinkney) Football Standings L. 1 0 1 3 2 Basketball Standings W. l. East Pinkney ....... ............ ............................. 8 2. Chase-Stone .................... ... ........ ................... 6 3. Paca-Carroll ... ..... ...... ... .... .... .... .. .. ... .... .......... 4 4. West Pinkney .............................................. 2 5. Randall ... ......... .. ....... .. ... ............. ................... 0 Track and Field Meet Badminton T. Won by ......................... ........ ...... ... ... .. .. ... ..... ....... Benedict 3 4 7 2 2 0 Squash Won by ........................ ................... ... .......... Marchowsky · Boxing Finals Equity 121 pound class .......... .. ......... ............... won by Newton 135 pound class ..... .................... .. ... won by Hoffenberg 145 pound class ... ......................... .... ..... .won by Powder 165 pound class .. ... .. .. .. ............ ....... .. ... .won by Durning Unlimited class ....................... ......... ..won by W. Harris Wrestling Finals 128 pound class .................................... won by Clogher 145 pound class .... ....... ......................... won by Putnam 165 pound class ........ .. ........ ...................... .. won by Jones Unlimited class ......................... .... ............ .won by Smith 28 �A dull moment The boat house Jimmy takes a cut The navigators The play-off Dick Harris around end The diamond �MEMBERS OF THE l1tWL COMMUNITY NOW SE RVING IN THE ARMED SERVICES .ti ~-{ lin& r ~ ~l~ u• · ._....._ . . ! t .• 4 cr d~ �;"-~. .-~, : !~ ]..,! i I j i l . ' I,. ' Pvt. R. Snower, USA . �,\ �,/ I ,1 ' ·,. ·.... -~· ~~4 -· �Commencement "The College, as it were, releases you now into this world. What more could I do than warn you-if this be necessary at all-that you are facing a difficult task?" ~ -·· -- -----~ ·------------ -------------· ------------~ "We, the President, the Dean, and the Professors of St. John's College in Maryland, bear witness that these youths, tried and true, have happily applied themselves among us to humane letters, philosophy, and eloquence; that they have passed the period of their course in our halls; that they have been called to examination in the presence of the trustees and many other worthy citizens; that they have abundantly proved themselves well versed in all these studies; and finally that, . n accordance i with the order of the trustees, in this public session on the fourteenth day of March in the year of our Lord 1944, they have reached the degree of Bachelor of Arts. In witness of this we have on this aforesaid day and year subscribed our names to these letters, which have been confirmed by the great seal of the College. By command of the visitors and governors of Saint John's College, I admit you to the degree of Bachelor of Arts." With these words, in The Speakers the funereal atmosphere of Iglehart HalL the seven remaining members of the Class of 1944 were graduated. This spectacle was the finest and most fittingly timed mirror image of the College's war history that was presented to us during the whole year. Somehow all the factors which contributed to make this year a unique The Graduates entity were apparent. The Class of 1944, which had been the largest ever to enter St. John's, had, by the time proper to its commencement, been reduced to only a bare handful. The gloom which enveloped both participants and witnesses of the ceremony was ample evidence that almost all present were well aware that St. John's was not graduating the traditional knights-errant who would slay with facility the dragons born of social vice. The war had long since destroyed such illusions. Rather, we were graduating men of understanding who s.aw, perhaps too clearly, that the possibilities for just action and the good life were, because of the complex form which modern society had attained, relatively few. The recognition, that the knowledge of what should be, would not, in all probability, become manifested in experience as the evident result of action, could lead but to sadness. One wondered, at times, whether knowledge and misery were preferable to ignorance and bliss. Mr. Klein, in his address to the Graduates, set the mood of the occasion by admitting that he found it easier to speak of vice than of virtue. There are at least seven intellectual vices and, corresponding to them, seven temptations. Among the latter there are the temptations of lucidity, detachment, conviction, system, vagueness, limitation and incompleteness. Man's intellect is constantly subject to them and continually converts them into virtues. He cannot escape the sensation of having a panorama of problems appear as ~oluble with clarity and lucidity. He cannot avoid feeling that he is absolutely certain about the truth of his opinions. He confuses vague apprehension with absolute certainty. He inevitably stumbles over these precipices but it is possible for him to be aware, rather than ignorant, of this failure. In fact he must know this if he is to lead a life which is significant. "The College, as it were, releases you now into this world. What more could I do than warn you-if this be necessary at all-that you are facing a difficult task? What more could I wish than that you might know how to use �your skills-acquired or yet to be acquired-in sailing through all the cliffs you are bound to meet? You might fail. Never mind. In failing you learn most." The graduates of the Class of 1944 are: BACHELOR OF ARTS Rite Edward Born Cochran Ahmed Munir Ertegun James G. Huber Commencement Afternoon Cum Laude Norman Atwood Garis (Class of 1941) Jack Landau Henry Harrison Sasscer, IV Magna cum Laude Arthur Hyman Peter Christian Wolff As of the Class of 1932 Rite Alfred Dowd Departure Honors and Prizes To the member of the Freshmen, Sophomore, or Junior Class who has written the best annual essay, the John Martin Green Prize of $25.00 PETER WEISS Honorable Mention ROBERT LUTHER CAMPBELL, JR. To the member of the Senior Class who has written the best final essay, a prize of $30.00. Offered under the will of the late Judge Walter I. Dawkins .. ....................................... .... .ARTHUR HYMAN To the Senior who has the highest standing, a gold medal. Offered by the Board of Visitors and Governors .. .... ... ... .... ...... .. PETER CHRISTIAN WOLFF Awaiting the Procession The Faculty �THE SENIORS -. ·r .. / ·-:'" . ~ l , "'~ ' . . Arthur Hyman Peter Christian Wolff Jack Landau Henry Harrison Sasscer, IV 36 �THE SENIORS Edward Born Cochran Ahmed Mi.inir ErtegUn James G. Huber Norman Atwood Garis 37 �THE FACULTY • ~"'.t........... . ·~· -~ ~~ HAMMON D ' . .. . -~ W. K. SMITH Assistant to the President Assistant Dean .. BUCHANAN and BARR Dean and President --·------ GORMAN SCOFIELD KIEFFER 38 KLEIN �THE FACULTY i --r----- AHA MSON AB R --- •. I- ---- DAR KEY -- -l -------!: J ---·- -- .... ... ESL ICK. y t_ _ -------·• ___ ·~--- t. ~.HARPER l-; ------ - r·-...---· -·-'·-· - -~ R. HARPER I · : ~- ,_ ..... -~-- REIS -- -l- STANDEN .· 39 ~ - __J:___ SMITH W. �THE STUDENT BODY Randall Hall FOURTH YEAR-CLASS OF 1944 Edward Born Cochran ....... .. .. ............... ............ .. .... .. .. ... .......... ... ........ ....... ... ...... 316 Puritan Road, Birmingham, Michigan Ahmed Miinir Ertegiin ................ .. .... ................................................ l606 Tw enty-third Street, N.W ., Washington , D. C. Norman Atwood Garis ........ ..... .. ...... .. .................................. ... ............................ 28 Oakland Place , Summit, New Jersey James G . Huber ......... ..... .. .. ... ..... ... ... .. ..... ... ....... .. ..... ............. .. ...... .. ....... .... ........ 330 Ruby Street, Lancaster, Pennsylvania Arthur Hyman .... .. ..... .... .. ..... .. .... .. ... .... .... ..... .. ...... ... ... .. ... ... .. .... ....... ....... .................... 705 South Boulevard, Tampa, Florida Jack L3.ndau ........ .. ............................ .. .. ..... .. ... .. ........... .. .. .... ...... ......... 5532 Wellesley Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Henry Harrison Sasscer, IV .. .... ................ .. .. .... ............ .. .... 4856 Chevy Chase Boulevard, Chevy Chase 15, Maryland Peter Christian Wolf£.. .......... ... ............................... .. ...... ... ....................... 103 University Avenue , Glen Echo, Maryland THIRD YEAR-CLASS OF 1945 Stephen Windsor Bergen .. .. ..... ...... .... ..... .. .......... l89-20 One Hundred and Sixteenth Avenue, St. Albans, New York George Brunn ........................................ .. .................. 20 West One Hundred and First Street, New York 25, New York Robert Luther Campbell, Jr.. ............ .. .. ... .. ........ ... .... .. ................. l20 West Washington Street, Hagerstown, Maryland Solomon Kadis .... .. .. .......... .. .......... .. ..... ... .. .. ...... ........ ...... ..... ...... .29 North Patterson Park Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland Donald Stewart Kaplan ............ .. ...... ........ ... .................... .. ............ .. .. .. .. .... .. ... 6l Brandigee Avenue, Groton, Connecticut Frank B. Marshall, Jr. ............. .. ...... .. ........ .. .... .. ..... .... .. .. .. ... .... ........ .... .......... . l522 Round Hill Road, Baltimore, Erich Nussbaum .. ... ................................................ ... ..... .. ........... .. ...................... St. John's College, Annapolis, Benton Bloch Perry ....................... .............................. ...... .. ................... .. ........ 910 Whitelock Street, Baltimore, Harry Fletcher Pfeiffer, Jr ....... .. .... .... ...... ... ..... ............ .. .. ... ..... .. ...... .. ........ 4024 Cranston Avenue, Baltimore, Benjamin Franklin Pumphrey, Jr ...... ... ... ... .. ... ...... .. ... .............. .. ............. ..................... ..... .... .. .. ...... ........ ... Severn, Verne Schwab .. ....................... .... .. ............. ... .... ... .... .... ..... ... .............. ... ....... .......... ll-S Ridge Road , Greenbelt, Maryland Maryland Maryland Maryland Maryland Maryland SECOND YEAR-CLASS OF 1946 . Gerald Atterbury ... ... ........................... ..... ......... .... ..... ..... ... ... ..... .......... ... ... ..... ... ... .Maidstone Farm, Annapolis, Maryland William George Chenoweth ..... ... .... .. .............. ........... .. ..... ....... .. ...... ... ..... .. ...... .... ............. Box 355, Loch Raven, Maryland Thomas James Cosgrove .............. ................. .. ...... .. .... ...... ...... .............. ..... 88 West Fourth Street, Bayonne, New Jersey Laurece Elfenbein .. .. .. .. .. .......... ............. .. .. .. ........ .. ............. .... ...................... l46 Bowers Street, Jersey City, New Jersey 40 �Sidney Hugh Fitch ......... ..... ......... ................. .. .... ......... .... .... .. .. ........................... ....... ...................... ...... ...Glenelg. Maryland · Alvin Fross ............... .. ................ .. .. .... ... ... .......... .... .... ............ .. ............ .. .................... .429 Broadway. Bayonne, New Jersey Thomas Irwin Fulton, Jr ................ .......... .. .. ...... ................................................. 607 Eighth Avenue , Irwin, Pennsylvania John Parker Gilbert .. .. ....................... .. .... ........ ......................... .. .. .... ...... .. ........ .. ........ c/0 Putney School. Putney. Vermont Samuel Milby Harrington, Jr ............................................... Quarters 2001 , Camp Lejeune, New River, North Carolina Allen Zimmerman Harvey .. ........ ... ........... .......................................................... .. .... .... 62 Broadway, Frostburg. Maryland Leon David Israel. ..... ....... ... ........... ..... ...... ....... ...... ........ ...... .. .... ...... .. ..... .... ..... ..... .. ... .... .. ....... ........ Union Bridge, Maryland William Kenneth Kline .................... .. ....................................................... .200 · Cabrini Boulevard, New York. New York Vincent Wood McKay ...... .. ...................... .............................................. 320 Fifth Avenue, Montgomery. West Virginia Ellis Wooster Manning, Jr.. ........ ...... ...... ..................................... ........ .......... ...... ... .... ..... Springdale, Brinklow, Maryland Robert Wilson Mueller.. ......................................... .. ................ ..... 2667 North Summit Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Robert F. Novak .......... .......... ............... ............. ....... .... .. ............... BOl North Patterson Park Ave ., Baltimore 5, Maryland Harry Charles Rockey .. ............ .... .... .. .. .. .. .. ........ :................ ........ .......... .7023 Lincoln Drive, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania James Willard Sharp ........ .. ....... .. ......... ....... ............ .. ......... ............ ................ .. 719 Front Street. Freeland, Pennsylvania Samuel Sheinkman .. ................ .. ...... .. .. ........ ............ ....... .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .... .... ..... 87 Hamilton Street, New York 31. New York Charles Lincoln Van Doren .. ...................................................................... 393 Bleecker Street, New York 14. New York John Campbell Wakefield .... .... .... .. .......... ....................... .............. .... ..... 2840 Sixteenth Street, N.W. , Washington, D. C. Peter Weiss .................................................................... .. ...... .. ........................ 344 West 87th Street, New York, New York Henry Theodore Wensel. Jr .. ........ .............. .. .. ................................................. ll4 Trevose Lane, Oak Ridge, Tennessee FIRST YEAR-CLASS OF 1947 (Admitted in July) Daniel Brown Barber.. ......................................... .... ...... .. ........ ............ .S430 Virginia Avenue, Charleston, West Virginia Victor Ewing Barton ............ .................. .. .... .... ........ .... .................... ................ Sll Cameron Street. Alexandria, Virginia Samuel Bancroft Bird, Jr ...... .............. .. ............................. c/o Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., Wilmington 99, Delaware Carl Henry Bruggmann .......... ... .... ...... .... ... .......................... .......................... 2920 Cathedral Avenue , Washington, D. C. John Brunn .... .. .. .................. .... .... .. .. ...... ...... .. .... .... .. .... 20 West One Hundred and First Street. New York 25, New York Peter Frederick Buri .................... .. ..... .. ............................................................. 2ll0 State Street, Eau Claire, Wisconsin Tristram Joseph Campbell, Jr .... ..................... .. .. .... .. .. ........ ...... ...... .. ...... l49 Avondale Road, Ridgewood, New Jersey West Pinkney 41 �East Pinkney Jerome Herbert Cantor .... ............ ...... ... ........ ............... ....... .... .... ......... .... .... lSl Crawford Street, Boston, M3.ssachusetts Ch'ao-Li Chi. ........ .. ............. ....... ..... ......... .... ... ...... ... ..... ...... ... .......... .... ........... 255 East Tenth Street. New York, New York Peter Clogher .... ..... ... ..... .... .. ... ..... ............... ........ ....... .... .. ... ...... ............ ... .. ... 359 Hillcrest Road, Englewood, New Jersey Robert Mitchell Courtrigh\... .......... .... ...... ... .. ........... .... .. ... ....... ........ .406 West Calhoun Street, Sumter, South Carolina John Scott Desjardins .. ..... ... ........ ...... ..... ............ ........ .........................R.R. l, Drake Road , Indian Hill, Cincinnati, Ohio Salvatore Carmela DiGrande ...... ... ...... ..... ... ..... ..... .... .. .. ..... ... ... .... ........ S Minerva Place, Box 58, New York. New York Alvin Hamilton Durning .. .... ...... ........ ................. .. ......... ...... .. ....... ...... ....... 306 Claremont Avenue, Louisville, Kentucky Klaus Werner Epstein .......... ...... .... ... ....... ... .. .... ..... ... .... .... ...... ............. ..910 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts Allen Abbey Goldstein .. ......... ..... .... ...... ....... .... ..... ... ......... .... .... ..... ........ ..... ..4015 Barrington Road, Baltimore, Maryland Charles Davis Haines ............. .. ..... ... ... .. ..... ....... .... ...... ....... ..... .... ... .. ... ...... ........ .... 2136 R Street, N.W ., Washington, D. C. Bernet George Hammel... .. .... ..... ..... .. ...... .... .......... .. .... ........ ... ..... ... ............ 89 North Essex Avenue, Orange, New Jersey H. Anthony Hammond ......... ..... .... ...... ... ...... .... ....... ... .. ............ ....... ..... .. ..... .. .. 243 Palmer Court, Ridgewood, New Jersey Richard Scott Harris .. ..... ... ..... .......... ...... ....... .. ............... ..... ... ..... .... .... ... .28 W . Hannum Boulevard, Saginaw, Michigan William Edwin Harris ............ ..... ... .. .. .... .... .... .. ...... .. ... .. ........ ......... ......... .28 W . Hannum Boulevard, Saginaw, Michigan Courtenay Jenifer Harrison .... ....... .. ... .... .. .. ........ ... ..... ... ..... .. .. .. .... ......... ..... ..... .... .. ......... .... ..... ... .... .....".Riverside, Maryland Harry Gerald Hoxby ... .... ...... .... ... .... ....... .......... ...... .... .. .... .......... .. ... .... ........ 3827 Indian View Avenue, Mariemont, Ohio Richard Eagleston Jameson ................. ....... ........... ........ ................. ... .. .... ... ....... .... .... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... .. .... ..... Fallston, Maryland John Milne Janney .................... ..... ... .... ... ...... ... .... ...... ........ ....... .... ........... ... ...... ... Maidstone Farm, Annapolis, Maryland Thomas Gillis Jewell ... .... ... .. ... .. .. ..... ....... .... .... .......... ... ............... .... ..... .. ........ .......... ........ ... ......... ...... Grasonville, Maryland Archer Jones ..... ............ ... ....... ..... ........ ..... .......... .... .......... ... .. ... ... .. .. ... ...... .. ...900 W. Franklin S treet, Richmond, Virginia Joseph Ignatius Killorin , Jr. .... ...... .... .. .... ... ... ... ...... .. .. ... .. ... .... .. ..... .. 305 East Thirty-Seventh Street, Savannah, Georgia Paul David Malchenson ........... ........ .............. ........ .. ..... ... ........... ... . ll3 W . Washington Street, Hagerstown, Maryland Ira Wendell Marine .......... ... ......... ......... ....... .... .. ...... .... .. .. .. ..... .. ...... ....... ......... .3219 Sixth Street, S.E., Washington, D. C. William Rankin Mathews, Jr. ............. ........ ... ... ............ ... ...... .... ... .... .. ......... 725 North Norris Avenue, Tucson, Arizona Richard Fontaine Maury ..... ....... ... .. .. ....... ... .............. ....... .. ......... .. .2812 Connecticut Avenue, N.W ., Washington, D. C. Charles Hugh Messick. .............. .... ..... .... ..... ..... .... ... .. ...... ...... .... ... ........ ... ....... ..... .. ....... ... .Main Street, Hebron, Maryland Alanson David Morehouse, II ........................ .......... ....... .... .. ...... ... ....... .... .... .. .. .l526 0 Street, N.W. , Washington, D. C . John Mathew Morgan .. ... .... .... ..... ..... .... .. ...... ..... ...... ............. ..... ......... .......... ..... ..2ll8 Robinwood Avenue, Toledo, Ohio Robert Florian Nayden ..... ..... ... .... ....... ..... ..... ... .... ......... .. ..... ......... ..... ...... ..... ...... l46 Charles Street, Annapolis, Maryland Brewer Norwood Newton ............ ........... .. .... ... ........ ... .... ..... .... ..... ...... ... .. .. 3502 Fairview Avenue , Baltimore, Maryland James Richard Powder .... .......... .. .... .... ....... ......... ..... .... .......... ..... ........... .... ............. Morris Avenue, Lutherville, Maryland 42 �Peter Bradley Price ........ ..... ...... .. ... .. ... ...... ...... .... .............. .......... .... ... ............ ........ ............ R.F.D. #2. New City, New York James W . Ray ...................... ...... ..... .......... ...... .............. ............................ .4 Forestdale Road, Worcester, Massachusetts Philip Stevens Richardson, Jr ... ....... .. ............. .. ............. ... ........... ........ .... ..... ... .... ............... ........... ........ ... Hurlock. Maryland Ian Leonard Robertson .................. .. .... .. ................ .. ............ ....... .......... .. ....... 87 Hobart Avenue, Short Hills, New Jersey Thomas Evans Robertson ........................................................ ................ .. .................... .. 835 Ivy Avenue , Glendale, Ohio Larry Winter Roeder ........................................... .......................... .. .. .. ... ... ......... St. John's College. Annapolis, Maryland William Warfield Ross ..................... ....... ...................... ..... .. ............................ 5407 Hampden Lane, Bethesda, Maryland Rowell Anton vM. Schleicher.. .. ............ ............................. .. ......... ....... .... .... .7 Archway Place, Forest Hills, New York Mordecai Sheinkman .... .. .................. .. ......................... .. ................................... 87 Hamilton Place, New York. New York George Faison Smith .................... .. ............................................. .... .. .... ........... Route l. Box 15, Greenwood, Mississippi William Kyle Smith, }r .......................................................... ~.... .... .. .............. 68 Shipwright Street, Annapolis. Maryland Eugene Victor Thau ......................... .. ........................................................... 900 Grand Concourse, New York. New York Richard Van der Voort.. .................. .. .... .. ...... .. .............................. .... .......... R.D . #7. Bellevue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania George Montgomery VanSant.. ...... .. .............. .. .... .... ...................... .. .. 5808 Forty-fourth Avenue, Hyattsville, Maryland Robert Russell Weiss ........ ... ............... ....... ..... .. ........................................ 210 Academy Street, Federalsburg, Maryland George Patrick Welch, Jr .... .. ................... .... .................... ...... ...... .............. .. 387 Angell Street, Providence, Rhode Island William Ogden White .. .... ...... .... .......... Mount Royal Hotel, Mt. Royal Ave. and St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Maryland Justin Cadwalader Williams .............. ........ ................... ..... ...... ........................ Pinehurst Lane, Moorestown, New Jersey FIRST YEAR-CLASS OF 1947 (Admitted in September) Irving Victor Abb ................................ .. ................................. .. ..... .. ....... .. ............... 239 Dill Avenue, Frederick. Maryland Ted Barber .............. ............................. ........................... .. .... .. .. ..... ....................... 616 Thirty-second Street, Bellaire, Ohio Roberto Beascoechea .. .. ................. ... ... ........ ............. ..... ...... .. .... ....... .. .. .. ............ ...... 50 Park Street, Santurce, Puerto Rico Stephen Gordon Benedict... ...................................................... .... ..................... .. ......... .... ............... Scarborough, New York Louis Leon Brin ..................................... .. .... ....................... ... .............. .. .. ..... 99 Welland Road, Brookline, Massachusetts Asa Neal Chandler.. ........ ........................... ........... .. .... .... .......................... l08 Choptank Avenue, Cambridge, Maryland Edmund Anthony Connor.. ... .. .. ................... ... .............................. ........ .. ... 665 Oak Hill Avenue, Hagerstown, Maryland Arthur Oudry Davis, Jr. .......... ......... .......................... ...... .................. .. ... .. ........ 315 South Fourth Street, Coshocton, Ohio Paca-Carroll 43 �Chase-Stone Douglas East Dawson ....................... ...... ...... ..... ..... ...... ..... .... .............. .. ... .. ... ...................... Mountain Lake Park. Maryland Julian Abbott Dor£... .. ....... ........ .......... ....... ..... .............. ....................................... . 106 High Street, Chestertown, Maryland Arthur Eugene Dunsmore , Jr. ........ ....... ............... .. ................. .. ................. 4614 Hunt Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland Nathaniel Isaac Durlach ....................... .. .... ... ........ .... .... .. ..... .. ............................. 875 Park Avenue, New York. New York Edward Henry Eissler.. .......................... .. ....................... ..... ............ l009 Weller Avenue, Upper Darby, Pennsylvania William Paul Elliott... ......... ......... .. ........... .. .. ........ .. ... .... .... .............. ... ..... ..... ............. ... 449 Spruce Street, Aurora, Illinois Theodore David Ernst... ............. ............................... .. ....... ....... .. ... ... .. ...... .................. ..... ........ .. ..Box 67, Cordova, Maryland Paul Carlyle Evans .......... ........ ...... .. .................................. ...... ............ .. .......... .. .. 403 Marshall Street, Syracuse, New York John David Farnham, Jr. ............. .. ....... .. ..... .. ..................................... .. .. l07 West Eleventh Street , New York, New York William Henry Gordon, Jr. ............. .... ... ........ .... ...... .. ................. ...... .. ........... l944 Edison Boulevard, Detroit 6, Michigan John Gormly .... .. ... ............. .. .. ....... .. .......................................... .. ........ .. .... ... 707 Hopkins Street, Sewickley, Pennsylvania William Joseph Harris .............. ... .... ............................... .......... .. .. ...... ..... ... ................. ................... ............ Preston, Maryland Marvin James Hoffenberg .... ...... .... .. ...... .. ......... .. .. .... .................. .. .. .... ............ .. .2202 Park Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland Walter Lindsay Jacob ...... ...... .. .. ....... ..... .. .. ... ..................... ...... .. ...... ll59 Murrayhill Avenue , Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania John Leonard Jarboe .................................... .. ... ........ ........ .. .................................. ....... ................... .Leonardtown, Maryland Ralph Lincoln Klein ............... .. .............. .. ............ .. ................................ .. ............... ... .. .... .... .. .. ...... .. ...... ... .. Fallston, Maryland Harry Marchosky ............... .... ... .... ................. .............. .. .......... ... 8049 Eighth and G Streets, Colon, Republic of Panama Ruben Marchosky ............ ...... ........ .. ................... .. .. .... ...... ...... ... 8049 Eighth and G Streets, Colon, Republic of Panama David Arthur Ogden .................................. ...... .. ......... .... ........... ..... ..... ................ 3308 Oriole Drive, Louisville, Kentucky John Newton Opie, Jr. .... .. ........ ...... .. .. .. .................. .. ............. .. ... .... ..... .. ....... .... 624 Palmer Turn Road, Norfolk S, Virginia Albert FitzRandolph Peters, Jr ............... .. ....... .... .... .. .. .. .... ... .................................... The Westchester, Washington, D. C. Royal Pollokof£ ............ ............................. ... .. .......... .. ............ .. .... .... .... 3407 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore , Maryland Charles Pickering Putnam ....... .......... ........ ... .. .... ................... .. ............... 3200 Highland Place , N.W ., Washington, D. C. Henry Page Robinson ............. .............. .. .......... .. ....... ................... .. .. ..................... ... .. .. .. ................... Barstow P.O., Maryland Paul Ginsburg Sifton ................... .. .................... .. ......... .. .... .. ... .............. .31SO Highland Place, N.W ., Washington 8, D. C. Warren LeRoy Skidmore ................ .. ................................................. ...... ..... .-.. .. ............... 806 Avon Street, Akron 10, Ohio Lowell Stanley ...................... .......... ... ............ .. ....... .. ..... .. ....................... 3410 Quebec Street, N.W ., Washington 16, D. C. Austin Stevens ...... .......... ....... ..... ..... .. ......... .. .. ....... .. ...... ....... ...... .......... ......... ......... Goodhill Road, Wes tport , Connecticu t Roger Clark Stone ....... .. ..... .. ... .... ........ ... ...... .......... .. ... ..... .. ...... ................ ..... ........ ....... ..... ................... Conowingo, Maryland James Howard Taylor. ....... .. ................ .. ...... .. ............................. ......... ............ .... .. ll02 Ninth Street, Seattle, Washington John Van Doren ........................................................................ ... ................. 393 Bleecker Street, New York 14, New York Eugene Francis Young ........................... .. ............................................... ll02 Market Street, Pocomoke City, Maryland 44 �This Yearbook Any Yearbook should be, as its name implies, a representation of the period with which it deals. If its scope exceeds this it is superfluous; if it falls short it is inadequate. Obviously the poesis involved in its presentation may follow from a number of different concepts of representative form. The result may be simply a chronological narration of events. If so, the reader must impose order and intelligibility upon such a chaos. It may be a statement of departmental occurrences. If this be the case the concept of the department as ideal is again required of the reader in order that the occurrences herein be significant and understood critically. Finally an Annual may be a critical comparjson of the ideal and the actual, of a College Year as it should be and as it appeared. This last seems to us the best. A Year book is written primarily for those who experienced the year . which it records. To remember the concept of the College as ideal with enough clarity to make possible a critical relation of this to the actual seems to us too much of a demand to make upon our audience, especially those who are leaving the community. The good historian is also a poet and as such must meet the poetic obligation of revealing with clarity the form manifested in the particular. This has been our intention. To our readers we owe several apologies. The war made impossible the repair and purchase of some of the desirable photographic equipment. As a result we could do very little indoor photography. Also, this effort of a staff depleted in all departments must necessarily lack a certain degree of comprehensiveness. Due to limitations of time, space and materials, only a limited number of pictures of St. Johnnies in the armed forces could be included in the pages of service photographs. We would like to thank the business personnel of the College for its assistance in the preparation of the book and a number of the members of the Faculty for suggestions regarding the manuscript. We wish especially to acknowledge our gratitude to Mr. and Mrs. William Gorman to whom we are indebted for much valuable criticism and a number of our best ideas. This Yearbook is published by the Junior Class of St. John's College; Stringfellow Barr, President; Scott Buchanan, Dean; Lewis M. Hammond, Assistant to President; William Kyle Smith, .Assistant Dean; James S. Martin, Treasurer; Miriam Strange, Registrar; Lulu Viola Ebaugh, Librarian; Olga Law Plunder, Director of Adult Education; Marian E. Alexander, Dietitian; J. Oliver Purvis, College Physician; Archibald McCourt, Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds; Steward and Monde, Auditors. BOARD OF VISITORS AND GOVERNORS Chairman, Dr. Thomas Farran, Jr., Surgeon General U. S. Public Health Service; Vice-Chairman, Francis Pickens Miller; Secretary, Richard F. Cleveland; Dr. Amos F. Hutchins, Mr. Edwin Warfield, Jr., Mr. Paul L. Banfield, Mr. Robert 0 . Bonnell, Dr. Robert M. Hutchins, Mr. Stringfellow Barr, Mr. Clarence W. Stryker, Lt. Comdr. Harold F. Linder, U.S.N.R., Dr. Scott Buchanan, Mr. Hervey Allen, Dr. William J. French, Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn, Dr. Mark Van Doren, Mr. Richard Scofield, Mr. John Spangler Kiefer. 45 �THE ST. JOHN'S BOOK STORE IN ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND Headquarters for the Purchase of THE GREAT BOOKS CARRIED REGULA RLY IN STOCK THROUGHOUT THE YEAR - - -*- - Sole distributors for books published by ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE ___ *___ A Price List of the Great Books can be Obtained Free of C harge by Writing ST. JOHN'S BOOK STORE McDOWELL HALL St. John's College Annapolis, 11aryland 46 �PASTEURIZED MILK Of Laboratory Controlled Quality Produced, Bottl.ed and Distributed UNDER RIGID SUPERVISION The Annapolis · Dairy Products Company Visitors Always Welcome PHONE 2345 Make Full Use of Our Complete Service Compliments of Checking Accounts- Safe Deposit Boxes Savings Accounts · Loans Southern Dairies Foreign Exchange - Travellers' Cheques Christmas Club ICE CREAM Collections and Member of The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation FROSTED FOODS THE ANNAPOLIS BANKING & TRUST COMPANY Annapolis, Maryland Main Street at Church Circle Phones, 2688-2689 Annapolis, Md. 47 �KENNETH G. DAVIS , Proprietor COUNTY TRUST CO. Established 1901 OF MARYLAND DIAL 3712 Meade Studios Davis' Stationery * 43 Maryland Avenue Resources Exceeding 76 Maryland Avenue $34,000,000.00 Annapolis, Md. Annapolis, Md. Greeting Cards for All Occasions * Phone 4013 Fountain Pens Repaired MEMBER: The Federal Reserve System The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation HUTZLEK BRJTHERS € General Depository- United States Government Funds * greets all its friends at St. John's College Appreciative of Your Business and congratulates * CHURCH CIRCLE and Gloucester St. ANNAPOLIS MARYLAND THE MEMBERS OF THE CLASS OF 1944 MAKE H. K. & CO. * Your Headquarters for * * The Arundel Corporation Fine Quality Sportswear BALTIMORE, MD. Men's Furnishings, First Mezzanine 'Dredging HOCHSCHILD, KOHN & CO. Sadler's Hardware Store Paints engineering AND You Will Find Good Food And Good Service Oils Feed Electrical Supplies Plumbing· Supplies Construction Distributors of AT THE SAND - GRAVEL - STONE and COMMERCIAL SLAG G and J GRILL House Furnishings 67 Maryland Avenue 122-128 Dock St . Phone 4604 Y:l block from State House * Annapolis, Maryland 48 * * �(omplinzents of . Annapolis Utilities, Inc. ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND Telephone 2345 89 West Street CONGRATULATIONS Congratulations and Best Wishes AND to SINCERE BEST WISHES TO THE The Class of 1944 CLASS OF '44 THE MAY COMPANY SAMUEL KIRK & SON I N C. STEWART & CO. Congratulations and Best Wzshes Schreiber &Jones, Inc. 210 W ; SARATOGA ST. 421 N. CHARLES STREET to the Class of I944 BALTIMORE, MD . BALTIMORE Engagement Rings Men's Gold Jewelry Fine Wrist Watches ESTABLISHED 1815 Sears, Roebuck & Co. 8 West St. Annapolis, Md. 49 Phone 2396 SPORTING GOODS ATHLETIC EQUIPMENT �The Music You Want When You Want It B ui ld You r R ecord L ibra ry wi th Albu ms from Strange & White Albright's Sound Service 155-157 Main St. Annapolis, Maryland ~nnapolis' 78 Maryland Avenue Annapolis, M d. ,(3.rgest Radio Repair and Finest Hotel Henry Albert Jr. &Co. Smart Haberdashery * Mechanical Engineers Official St. John's Blazers The choice of those who appreciate true hospitality, quiet comfor t and exceptional fo od. and Contractors 6 Church Lane Pikesville 8, Maryland * Day Phone Pikesville 81 Fores t 1029 Opposite U.S . Na ual Academy Nl~h t Compliments of On King George Street P h o n e- T u x. 3883 * * * Ryan Fuel Corporation THE HoRN-SHAFER Co. 2701 Falls Road of Baltimore Baltimore, Maryland is privileged to have produced The 1944 YEARBOOK Compliments of The J. F. Johnson Lumber Co. Annapolis, Md . Compliments of for Economy Hardware Co. ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE * * * 38 West Street Annapolis, Maryland 50 �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Yearbooks Description An account of the resource This collection contains yearbooks from St. John's College in Annapolis, MD. Yearbooks are sometimes referred to as the "Rat Tat", "Cicerone", or "Canvas". This collection includes all published yearbooks since 1896. Please note that yearbooks were not published every year. Holdings: 1896 v. 1 1898 v. 2 - 1899 v. 3 1901 v. 4 – 1912 v. 15 1914 v. 17 – 1918 v. 21 1920 v. 22 – 1945/1946 1947 – 1951/1953 1957 1982 1986 – 1990/1991 1992 – 2001/2002 2015/2016 – 2017/2018 2021/2022 - 2024/2025 Click on <a title="Yearbooks" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=21">Items in the Yearbooks Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context yearbooks Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 51 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Nineteen Forty-Four Yearbook Description An account of the resource St. John's College yearbook for the year 1944. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Campbell, Robert (Editor) Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Annapolis, MD Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1944 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource St. John's College owns the rights to this publication. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 1944 https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/969f511357f6c27aaf15939ba427e60d.mp3 968555c0d7443b0083e5bff181da8414 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Recordings—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Sound A resource primarily intended to be heard. Examples include a music playback file format, an audio compact disc, and recorded speech or sounds. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data mp3 Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 00:46:19 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Einstein between war and fiction Description An account of the resource Audio recording of a lecture given on September 30, 2016 by Jimena Canales as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Canales, Jimena Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2016-09-30 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource sound Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource mp3 Subject The topic of the resource Einstein, Albert, 1879-1955. Relativity (Physics) Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 20014322 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/4aa39fb6e3c79f1963dc22d1ccd980c8.mp3 8df74c1cdf9f704ff9e167d559e9372d Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Recordings—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Sound A resource primarily intended to be heard. Examples include a music playback file format, an audio compact disc, and recorded speech or sounds. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data CD Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 01:01:43 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource An introduction to Duns Scotus's modal argument for the existence of God Description An account of the resource Audio recording of a lecture given on November 13, 2015 by James Carey as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carey, James Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2015-11-13 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource sound Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource mp3 Subject The topic of the resource Duns Scotus, John, ca. 1266-1308. Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 20014245 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/ae09b2be30907e29f0eabd439f6cf2fa.pdf 1ae06bc4227ea8f393c2e75a4407f90c PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Speeches, presentations, and other lectures Description An account of the resource Speeches, presentations, and other lectures given at St. John's College. These include convocation addresses delivered in both Annapolis, MD and Santa Fe, NM. Click on <a title="Speeches, presentations, and other lectures" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=15">Items in the Speeches, presentations, and other lectures Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context speechespresentationsotherlectures Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 5 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Santa Fe Baccalaureate Address, Spring 1991 Description An account of the resource Transcript of a the address given on May 19, 1991 by James Carey as part of the Baccalaureate service in Santa Fe, NM. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carey, James Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1991-05-19 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24000381 Baccalaureate service https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/475a5de4178fb2c9309d44665ca6027b.pdf 97d9d38e9b2898d2883d61346623d325 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Speeches, presentations, and other lectures Description An account of the resource Speeches, presentations, and other lectures given at St. John's College. These include convocation addresses delivered in both Annapolis, MD and Santa Fe, NM. Click on <a title="Speeches, presentations, and other lectures" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=15">Items in the Speeches, presentations, and other lectures Collection</a> to view and sort all items in the collection. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Greenfield Library Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context speechespresentationsotherlectures Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 8 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Freedom, letters, and leisure : west and east Description An account of the resource Transcript of the Graduate Institute commencement address given on August 15, 2008 by James Carey in Santa Fe, NM. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carey, James Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2008-08-15 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Subject The topic of the resource Language Leisure Psycholinguistics Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 24003569 https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/702954c48a3a805538c3bbec3caec69e.mp3 4bca00508eb4a792837d2381f7166f2c Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Recordings—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Sound A resource primarily intended to be heard. Examples include a music playback file format, an audio compact disc, and recorded speech or sounds. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data CD Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 01:01:40 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The privilege of reason : evolution and history Description An account of the resource Audio recording of a lecture given on November 17, 2006 by James Carey as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carey, James Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2006-11-17 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource sound Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource mp3 Subject The topic of the resource Reason Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context 20012118 Friday night lecture https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/d109731cec9e3786809f86729f817fa9.mp3 ab2a571ea3a246ed5de0322dfd1ee6c4 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Recordings—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Sound A resource primarily intended to be heard. Examples include a music playback file format, an audio compact disc, and recorded speech or sounds. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data CD Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 00:59:19 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The privilege of reason : identity and eternity Description An account of the resource Audio recording of a lecture given on July 20, 2016 by James Carey as part of the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carey, James Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2016-07-20 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource sound Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource mp3 Subject The topic of the resource Reason Language A language of the resource English Graduate Institute https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/36bd9bb3f40d2f5c8aa89c1c1df3b371.pdf 4b9d5a444b0ec23556aece25a82e6e60 PDF Text Text Kant’s Grounding of a Dual Metaphysics1 James Carey – 03 07 2017 1. Metaphysics reinterpreted Prior to Kant, metaphysics was understood as the enquiry into being, into the different kinds of beings, and into how these beings are, as distinct from how they merely appear. Kant redefines metaphysics as a priori synthetic knowledge of objects. It is characterized by universality and necessity. Metaphysics is not derived from experience, which for him is always bound up with sensation. And yet metaphysics consists of more than mere definitions and what can be analytically or logically deduced from them. With this redefinition of metaphysics as a priori synthetic knowledge of objects there comes a new division. Metaphysics is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical employment of pure reason, and is therefore either metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of morals.2 Kant grounds this dual metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Critique of Practical Reason, which attempt to show that we have a priori synthetic knowledge pertaining to both natural science and morality respectively. And Kant develops this dual metaphysics in the 1 A rewritten and expanded version of a lecture first given at St. John’s College, Santa Fe, in 1994, and again in 2017. 2 Critique of Pure Reason A 841, B 869 (emphasis in the original). Passages from this work are cited according to the first (A) and second (B) edition, the pagination of which is included in the margins of English translations. When A and B are both cited, the text appears in both editions, When A alone is cited, the text is found only in the first edition; and when B alone is cited, the text is found only in the second edition. I have made ample of use of Norman Kemp Smith’s translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, though altering it with some frequency in the interest of greater literalness. Unless otherwise noted, translations of passages from other works are my own. Passages quoted or translated directly from the German text are taken from Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1956. Passages from other texts by Kant are taken from Werke in Zehn Banden (edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, Darmstadt: Wissenchaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981 – Sonderausgabe), hereafter Werke. 1 �Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science and the Metaphysics of Morals.3 In what follows I shall attempt to identify the ultimate ground of Kant’s dual metaphysics. Kant’s task is to give a solution to the problem of how man can have ends, or telē, while nonetheless dwelling within nature, which according to modern natural science is devoid of ends. It is by virtue of his reason that man is oriented toward theoretical and practical ends. Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has the ability to act according to the notion of laws, i.e., according to principles, or a will.4 Man is not just pushed and pulled through life by irresistible forces, or even instincts. He has immediate and incontestable awareness of himself as an agent. The evidence we have that we act, that we do things for the sake of ends, that is, with purposes in mind, and that we are not just acted upon by other things, is immediate, incontestable, and irrefutable by any theory, scientific or otherwise. No theory of natural science, however much it may contribute to our understanding of non-human nature, carries, or could carry, as much evidence in its favor as does our immediate awareness of acting for the sake of ends. We even think—as distinct from freely associating—for the sake of an end, minimally for subjective clarity and consistency, maximally for objective knowledge. And we are aware that we have to make some effort to achieve clarity, consistency, and knowledge. This effort, which we all experience, is immediate evidence of our teleological constitution. We can speculate or refrain from speculating about the origin of our 3 The Metaphysics of Morals should not be confused with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Section 2, 412: “Ein jedes Ding der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen. Nur ein vernünftiges Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze d.i. nach Prinzipien zu handeln, oder einen Willen.” (Emphasis in the original.) Werke, Band 6, 41. 4 2 �teleological constitution, as we wish. But we cannot explain it away.5 Our orientation toward ends is the genuine “first for us.” According to Aristotle and his followers, man is at home within a world, within a cosmos that is itself teleological. Not only plants and animals, but simple bodies at one extreme and stars at the other, all seem to exhibit teleology, as does the very topology of the cosmos: things have their proper places, and when displaced from them by force, they return to them by nature. Enforced motion is virtually defined by Aristotle as motion contrary to nature.6 With the scientific revolution of early modernity, the Aristotelian perspective got seriously called into question. The distinction between celestial and terrestrial bodies collapsed, as did the distinction between natural and enforced motion. Modern natural science attempted to demonstrate that, in the case of inanimate beings, motion can be explained by mechanical or push-pull, causality alone. And the hope was held open that the motion of animate beings, man included, could be explained the same way. Natural ends came to be regarded as superfluous principles. Kant is in general agreement with modern science in its non-teleological account of non-human human nature. But Kant is in general agreement with Aristotle in his teleological account of human nature, though the specifics of his account of human nature differ in important ways from Aristotle’s. Kant’s metaphysics of nature consists of a body of interrelated a priori synthetic propositions or judgments. The architectonic propositions pertaining to the metaphysics of nature are the concern of roughly the first half of the Critique of Pure Reason. I shall focus on only one 5 It is as self-evident as any law of logic that we act for the sake of ends, for pleasure and knowledge among other things. If modern science cannot make sense of this fact, then modern science needs to restrict the scope of its claims or revisit its presuppositions, or both. 6 Physics 215a1-4. 3 �of these: “Every event has a cause,” or as Kant also puts it, “All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect.” Kant agrees with Hume that the proposition, “Every event has a cause,” cannot be strictly inferred from experience. We see an event, A, followed by another event, B. But we do not see A cause B. We see one event happen after another, to be sure. We see temporal consecution all the time and in recurring patterns. But we never see temporal connection, no matter how many times we see B followed by A. The regularity with which B follows A does not permit us to infer, by any known rule of logic, that A causes B. (And it is for that reason that we sometimes make mistakes in predicting that B will follow A.) Moreover, even if we could see in a given case that A causes B, we would not be able to logically infer, given our spatially and temporally limited experience, that whenever A occurs again it will cause B again, or even be followed by B. We cannot logically infer even that every time B occurs it must have a cause, much less that everything that has ever happened, is happening now, or ever will happen, must have a cause. Such a so-called inference is only an empirical generalization. It lacks any claim to apodicticity inasmuch as it is always colored by some tincture, however slight, of dubitability. Because I can think of an event without having to think of its having a cause, I can think without logical contradiction of its not having a cause at all. And the same is true of an act, whether construed as event within time or as an act of some other kind.7 I can think, without logical contradiction, of an act’s not having any cause at all. And so I can also think, without contradiction, of an event or an act’s being its own cause. There is nothing logically contradictory about a free act. The stakes, it should be obvious, are rather high regarding what we can and cannot know about causality. 7 The possibility of an act that does not occur within time, and hence is not an event in the ordinary sense of the word, will be considered in Section 8, below. 4 �The judgment, “Every event must have a cause,” cannot then be known from experience, or as Kant says, a posteriori. If it can be known at all, it can be known only a priori, that is, without relying on experience. But if the judgment, “Every event must have a cause,” is an a priori judgment, it is not an analytic judgment. There is nothing in the mere concept of an event, of something that happens, that enables me to logically infer that it must, or even does, have a cause. (And if I say that to be an event means to have cause, then I am simply begging the question.) The judgment, “Every event must have cause,” if it is to be a knowable truth, must be both a priori and synthetic. It can be validated only by a new kind of argument, one that is neither empirical nor analytic-semantic. Kant calls this new kind of argument “transcendental,” because it transcends, or prescinds from, all particular content of experience—of sense experience—relying on none of it, and attempts to exhibit what makes experience possible in the first place.8 Kant’s well known formulation of the question—“How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?”—is somewhat misleading. For it could seem to suggest that Kant first assumes the existence of a priori synthetic judgments, and then tries to show how the mind would have to be constituted for there to be such judgments.9 But, as the best readers of Kant have pointed out, this style of argument cannot lead to the conclusion that every event must have a cause, but only to the conclusion that, if every event must have a cause, and if this proposition is knowable, then the mind must possess certain cognitive faculties (or cognitive abilities—Erkenntnisvermögen) 8 A 11, B 25; Cf. A 295-296, B 351-353. In the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that there are a priori synthetic judgments in mathematics. His argument there serves chiefly as an incentive for seeking such judgments elsewhere. Even if, as many twentieth century logicians have argued, all judgments of mathematics are analytic and not synthetic, that fact, by itself, would not undermine Kant’s argument for a priori synthetic judgments functioning as architectonic propositions for knowledge of nature. 9 5 �whereby it is able to know this.10 Such a procedure would prove neither that every event must have a cause nor that the mind really does possess faculties enabling it to know this.11 Such a way of arguing is not fruitless, however. It is in fact the sole procedure of Kant’s Prolegomena. In that comparatively short and introductory book, Kant says that he “proceeds from that which is sought, as if it were given, and ascends to the conditions under which alone it is possible.”12 Kant calls this way of proceeding, “analytic” or “regressive.” The way of proceeding in the Critique of Pure Reason, however, he calls “synthetic or progressive.” Rather than assuming that every event must have a cause, Kant establishes, or attempts to establish, solely by considering how the human mind operates, that it really does possess faculties whereby it can know, indeed constitute, objects and events. He attempts to show that that one of the ways in which the mind constitutes objects and events is in accordance with the category of cause and effect—with the result that every event must have a cause. There is a problem, however. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant employs both analytic and synthetic procedures.13 And that leads some to say, understandably but falsely, that the Critique of Pure Reason presupposes modern mathematical physics as a body of truth, in order to validate modern mathematical physics as a body of truth—which is, of course, a fallacy. The deepest stratum of Kant’s argument in the Critique of Pure Reason does not commit this fallacy. The difficulty is in identifying the deepest stratum of his argument. 10 In Beyond Good and Evil, § 11 “On the Prejudices of the Philosophers,” Nietzsche has a merry time making fun of Kant’s use of the word “faculty” (Vermögen).” But Nietzsche’s criticism, such as it is, is not particularly penetrating. According to Kant, the human mind has the ability (another, less technical sounding, translation of Vermögen) to be affected; and it also has a quite different ability, namely the ability to think, in particular to judge. If Kant is right about this, then nothing of importance turns on his naming the former the “faculty of sensibility and the latter the “faculty of understanding.” 11 See Robert Paul Wolf, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), pp. 44-56. 12 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Preamble § 5 fn. 13 Kant employs both ways of arguing in the Critique of Pure Reason for the sake of thoroughness. The synthetic procedure only heuristically presupposes the analytic procedure. It does not logically presuppose the analytic procedure. That is to say, the synthetic procedure does not employ its hypothetically-conditioned result of the analytic procedure as an actual premise. 6 �This difficulty is greatly augmented by the rugged contours of Kant’s text. The first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1781, was put together in a relatively short period of time. But Kant developed his main theses over the course of the preceding twelve years or so. According the prevailing though not universally accepted hypothesis, which has both soft and hard versions, the Critique of Pure Reason is something of a “patchwork,” including sentences and paragraphs written at different times during the decade prior to its publication. It is not hard to find inconsistencies and obscurities in his presentation.14 Moreover, Kant can be imprecise in his terminology. The word “knowledge” (or “cognition”—Erkenntnis) usually means the conceptual grasping of a synthesized intuition in a judgment proper, but it sometimes means only the synthesized intuition itself. In spite of making a rather sharp distinction between “transcendent” and “transcendental,” Kant occasionally uses the latter when he means the former. He makes a major distinction between a mere “form of intuition” and a “formal intuition,” but often uses the one word “intuition” for both. He distinguishes between two kinds of “synthesis,” but one has to determine from the context which synthesis he has in mind when he uses this word. Kant also uses the important word “unity” in more than one way. Most problematically, as we shall see, he sometimes speaks of “the understanding” in distinction from “the imagination,” but sometimes as including it. The reader who does want to dismiss Kant is inclined to blame himself for his confusion. But Kant is largely responsible for the confusion. If he were not saying something of immense significance, the reader would be justified in refusing to follow him through the “thorny paths of the Critique of Pure Reason.”15 And there is a further problem. Kant made major revisions for the second edition, published in 1787; and up until his death he continued to refine his thoughts on questions and 14 15 Kant himself acknowledges this. See the Preface to the second edition, B xxxvii-xliv, B xliii. 7 �problems dealt with Critique of Pure Reason in notes and in other publications, culminating in the unfinished but rich and wide-ranging Opus Postumum. One cannot call the Critique of Pure Reason a “snapshot” of Kant’s thinking. It is more like a scrapbook containing photographs taken over a period of about fifteen years, and not always arranged in chronological order. But what Kant is getting at has to be considered, if only because of his influence, which is greater than that of any philosopher since Aristotle. If Kant’s general argument of the Critique of Pure Reason is sound, he has answered Hume, validating the conception of science as a truly objective enterprise, while at the same exploding its pretentions to disclose the deepest foundation of things; and he has destroyed metaphysics as classically conceived. His speculations stimulated the work of his greatest successors, both when they attempt to develop his thoughts further and when they react against him.16 Kant is the central figure in modern philosophy. The contemporary distinction between “analytic philosophy” and “continental philosophy” can be understood as a distinction between two ways of philosophizing, both motored in almost opposite directions, by Kantian discoveries or, as the case may be, inventions. Whether and to what extent Kant is breaking new ground or making things up in the Critique of Pure Reason can be determined only by attempting to enter into his way of thinking and suspending judgment on the value of his project until the whole of it is brought as clearly into 16 See Eckart Förster, The Twenty Five Years of Philosophy (translated by Brady Bowman, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). Förster treats the revolution in metaphysical thinking that Kant effected in the Critique of Pure Reason, and the remarkable developments in philosophy that occurred in the aftermath of its publication. In the opening pages of his book, Förster makes amply clear what Kant meant in his startling claim that “prior to the development of critical philosophy there had been no philosophy at all.” Förster’s book can be understood as a kind of justification of the word “The” in its title. One does not have to agree with Kant’s opinion of the prior history of metaphysical speculation to recognize the massive import of the Critique of Pure Reason and the necessity of coming to terms with this work for those who take a serious interest in philosophy. 8 �view as possible. Needless to say, what follows is only introductory exposition of the basic principles of his critical philosophy. 17 2. The two sources of human knowledge Kant’s distinctive interpretation of the human mind turns on his account of, and his sharp distinction between, intuitions and judgments. Kant tells us that it is by means intuition that the mind is in an immediate relation to objects (Gegenstande).18 He thinks that there are only two ways a mind could be in immediate relation to objects: it could immediately create them or it could be immediately affected by them. The former is how an infinite, or divine, mind (if there is such a thing), immediately relates itself to objects. The latter is how our finite, human mind is immediately related to objects. We are affected by them; and all we know of them immediately is that we are affected them. A divine mind (should one exist) would have an intellectual intuition, such that in actively creating things it would know them fully for what they are, not just as they 17 I have reservations of my own about various aspects of Kant’s project. Because it is not possible to take issue with Kant intelligently without understanding him first, I refrain from expressing my reservations in this introductory exposition. 18 When Kant speaks of being affected by objects (Gegenstande), at A 19, B34, he is not yet distinguishing between things-in-themselves and appearances. Sometimes Kant uses “object” (Gegenstand) as equivalent to “thing” (Ding). And in this sense he will speak both of “things-in-themselves” (e.g., A 26, B 42) and of “objects-in-themselves” (e.g., A 36, B 52). Kant also uses the word Objekt, which, like Gegenstand, is naturally translated into English as “object.” For a brief but clear summary of how Kant uses the words Gegenstand and Objekt, see the entry, “object,” in A Kant Dictionary. Caygill, Howard (ed). Blackwell Publishing, 1995 ( Blackwell Reference Online. 21 July 2007). Compare Kant’s use of Gegenstand and Objekt in the sentence at A 89, B 121 beginning, “Denn da nur vermittlest….,” with the use of Gegenstand in the sentence that immediately follows and with the definition of Objekt at B 137. On the basis of these two passages, we can say that when Kant is speaking carefully he uses the word Gegenstand broadly to name what (unlike a thing-in-itself) is within and present to the mind, though exclusive of the mind’s own acts (cf. infra, fn. 28.); and that he uses Objekt narrowly to name a Gegenstand that is conceptually unified. Objekt and Gegenstand are not exactly opposed. For every Objekt is a Gegenstand, though the reverse is not the case. Kemp Smith translates Gegenstand and Objekt both as “object,” which is an infelicitous solution to be sure, but one that is not so easy to improve on in an extended translation. In what follows I shall frequently place an “(o)” or a “(g)” after “object” and its derivatives, when I think something important turns, or could be thought to turn, on the distinction between Objekt and Gegenstand. 9 �appear but as they are “in themselves.”19 Our intuition, however, is not intellectual but sensible only. It gives us no access to things as they are “in themselves,” but only to things as they appear to us. Early in the Critique of Pure Reason, in the section titled the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that space and time are merely subjective conditions of receptivity. They are two indefinitely extended intra-mental vestibules in which we receive sense data entering from without. In space, the data are simultaneously given; in time, they are successively given. These data are not things. In fact, considered by themselves, they are not even appearances. They are only the matter of appearances. Appearances owe their unity and interconnection to something other than bare given-ness. If we abstract from the sensible filling, from the empirical data received within space and time, two forms of intuition remain; and they are precisely space and time. As forms of our sensible intuition, they do not pertain to things as they are in themselves. The human mind does not get space and time from experience because, Kant argues, we would have to receive them as empirical data—our intuition being, again, only sensible and not intellectual. But if the human mind received space and time from experience, it would need mental receptacles into which space and time could be received. Space and time, however, are themselves these very mental receptacles. And they are nothing more than this—or so Kant argues. Though we can imagine away all the empirical filling of space and time, such as shapes, colors, and events, we cannot imagine away space and time themselves. Kant regards this fact as evidence that space and time belong intrinsically to the human mind, that they are part of its a priori endowment. They are no 19 B 72. Kant speaks both of God’s possessing an intellectual intuition and of his possessing an intuitive understanding. B 145; cf. B 135. Eckart Förster makes a strong case that, contrary to the common assumption, Kant did not understand these two to be simply identical. The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, 144-152. 10 �more properties of things-in-themselves than the act of judging is. Perhaps things-in-themselves do exist in some kind spatio-temporal order “in-itself.” Since we cannot know exactly what things-in- themselves are, we cannot definitively rule this possibility out. But there is no reason, according to Kant, to think of things-in-themselves as spatially and temporally ordered in any sense. These and other arguments go to make up the Metaphysical Exposition of the concepts of space and time. In the Transcendental Exposition of these concepts he attempts to show that only as he has interprets them in the Metaphysical Exposition is it possible to have an a priori science of space and time.20 We understand geometry to be an a priori science of space, inasmuch as it does not rely on the particular content of experience—we do not need a laboratory and special equipment, nor do we need to engage in field research, to prove geometrical propositions.21 To be sure, we do proofs at a blackboard. But these proofs are not experiments. We all “see,” somehow, that takes it only one proof, illustrated with any isosceles triangle you like, to establishes that the base angles are equal in all isosceles triangles.22 We “see,” so to speak, that we do not have to repeat the proof with n number of isosceles triangles, breaking off arbitrarily when we are more or less satisfied that the evidence thus far is in favor isosceles triangles’ having their base angles equals. This “seeing” on the basis of one example is possible, Kant argues, because we recognize that space is homogenous in its character, that we shall never find out anything about any part of space, no matter how far away, no matter how small or large, that 20 Kant does not, as some have thought, infer the a priori character of space from the a priori character of geometry. Rather, it is only because space is an a priori endowment of the mind that there can be a priori science of it, i.e., geometry. See Rolf Peter Horstmann, “Transcendental Idealism and Space,” in Reading Kant—New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy, edited by Eva Schaper and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 21 The possibility of an a priori science of time is more complicated. What Kant says in the Transcendental Exposition of Time (B 48-49) is developed at much greater length in the chapter entitled “Analogies of Experience.” 22 Euclid, Elements Bk. 1 Prop..5. 11 �is different from the space that is close by.23 If geometry is an a priori science, then space “as a whole” is present to, by virtue of being an intrinsic feature of, the human mind. So Kant argues; and he would challenge anyone who disagrees to show how we can be more confident about the findings of geometry than about the findings of a manifestly empirical science, such as physics which, unlike geometry, relies on repeated observations and experiments, arbitrarily broken off at some point and their findings empirically generalized into putatively necessary and universal laws of nature. The innate cognitive faculty that we have been considering Kant calls “sensibility.” It yields intuitions. The other innate cognitive faculty, which Kant calls the “understanding,” yields concepts (Begriffe) and judgments (which employ concepts). Sensibility puts us in an immediate but passive relation to objects (g); the understanding puts us in a mediate but active relation to objects.24 We have a faculty of understanding because, and only because, our intuition is sensible and affected by its object. If our intuition were intellectual and creative of its object (as God’s intellect is, if he exists), we would not need concepts. By means of sensibility, the human mind is 23 It is frequently said that non-Euclidean geometry poses a problem for Kant’s understanding of space, which is surely Euclidean. Lobachevsky and Riemann develop alternate geometries by denying, in opposite ways, Playfair’s axiom, which can be construed as a restatement of Euclid’s Fifth Postulate. If Kant had known of Lobachevsky and Riemann, he would likely have argued that these new geometries, like Euclid’s, also contain a priori synthetic propositions. For this is all Kant needs to support his claim, in the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason (and well in advance of the chapter titled “System of All Principles of Pure Understanding”) that a priori synthetic judgments are possible, more precisely, that they are actual, in the case of geometrical constructions most obviously. If certain appearances, met with in the empirical investigation of nature, turn out to be better accounted for by Lobachevskian or Riemannian geometry than by Euclidean geometry, that would be of very great interest to Kant, to be sure. And, in that he case, he would definitely have to modify some of his statements about the relation of geometry to experience. (Consider B 206- 207.) But he would likely deny that such findings require him to abandon his brief argument, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that geometry per se consists of a priori synthetic (and demonstrable) propositions, whatever (non-refutable) postulates it may adopt, or that such findings require him to abandon his extended argument, in the Second Analogy, that all alterations take place in the conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect. The burden would be on Kant’s critics to show otherwise. 24 See Gerhardt Krüger, Philosophie und Moral in der Kantischen Kritik (Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr, 1931), 16-21, on the “pre-critical” limitation of discursive thinking, or judgment, as such. 12 �affected; by means of the understanding, the human mind acts.25 Sensibility is merely open to what is given to it; it is the business of the understanding to connect and grasp (or comprehend— begreifen) what is given to sensibility. 26 And as the counterpart of the passivity of sensibility is the activity of the understanding, so the counterpart of the receptivity of sensibility is the spontaneity of the understanding—about which, more later. We judge by means of concepts. We predicate one concept of another in a categorical judgment, and we connect two or more judgments, consisting of concepts, with each other in hypothetical and disjunctive judgments. In the Metaphysical Deduction,27 Kant presents a table of judgments, from which he derives a table of categories. Categories are concepts, but they are not empirical concepts. The concept of a dog, for example, is empirical; it is gotten from experience. Not so, as we have seen, with the concept of cause and effect. This is a nonempirical, or pure, concept. And since we cannot get this concept from experience, or a posteriori, it is either a spurious concept, as Hume had suggested, or a concept that we possess a priori, a concept intrinsic to the operation of the human mind necessarily functions. Kant argues for the latter. 25 And so, according to Kant, though we do not know by creating things, as presumably God (if he exists) does, we do know by constituting objects (via concepts). In both cases, different as they surely are, knowing is active. It is not just passively “taking in.” 26 A concept (Begriff) is a kind of grasp (Griff—the English words, “conceive” and “comprehend,” have similar etymologies.) Kant regards a concept as placing its own imprint on what it grasps, so that what one knows through concepts is, in part, a product of the mind’s own operation. This is particularly true of pure concepts, i.e., categories. Kant’s claim that we cannot have knowledge without concepts, and that a concept contributes to knowledge only by unifying something that would otherwise lack unity, rules out metaphysics as classically conceived, that is, as knowledge of what is, in itself and independently of the unifying operations of the human mind. Any attempt to substantively rehabilitate classical metaphysics in the face of Kant’s critique requires developing a clear and consistent alternative to his account of what a concept is. 27 In the second edition version of the Transcendental Deduction, at B 159, Kant refers to the “Metaphysical Deduction,” in which he has attempted to prove the a priori origin of the categories. He does not use this expression as the title of any section of the Critique of Pure Reason, but it is generally agreed that he is referring to Chapter 1 of the Analytic of Concepts, especially to Sections 2 and 3 of that chapter. 13 �A judgment is not just a string of concepts. It has a coherence, actually a unity. According to Kant, judgments can be brought under four “heads” (Titel): quantity, quality, relation, and modality; and each of these is subdivided into three “moments.” There are then twelve forms of judgment. Each has its own unique unifying function. This unifying function Kant calls a category.28 Categories are concepts, but they are not empirical concepts. They are pure concepts that “apply (or extend—gehen) a priori to objects (o).”29 The twelve forms of judgment are not gotten from experience. They are, rather, intrinsic to the very way we think. Since the categories are unifying functions in these forms of judgement, the twelve categories are, like the forms of intuition—space and time—part of the original endowment of the human mind. A common criticism of Kant’s table of the categories—more precisely, of his table of judgments, from which the table of categories is derived—is that he has not demonstrated the table’s “completeness.” There are two different questions here that are not always kept distinct. (1) Does the table include too many forms of judgment? And (2) does the table include too few forms of judgment? 28 A 68, B 93: “By a ‘function’ I mean the unity of the act of ordering different representations under one common representation.” The German word translated here and elsewhere as “representation” is Vorstellung, literally a “placing-before.” A more accurate translation would be “presentation.” Kant uses Vorstellung broadly to name something that is simply present to the mind, which may or may not “represent” something outside the mind. Kant calls the apperceptive act, “I think,” a Vorstellung (e.g., at B 132; cf. B 157), and it certainly represents nothing outside the mind. Consider also the distinctively Kantian claim at beginning of § 14 that a certain kind of Vorstellung, namely a pure concept of the understanding, i.e., a category, is a priori determinate of its object (g) and not vice versa—something that would be impossible if Vorstellung always meant “representation” in the ordinary sense the word. (Kant could seem to confuse things at A 320, B 376. But the primary sense of the Latin repraesentatio, just like praesentatio, is simply a “placing before”, i.e., a “presentation.”) The German word Vorstellung does not carry with it the sense re-presenting, i.e., presenting again, a sense that in some contexts can be squeezed out of the English word “representation.” I translate Vorstellung as “representation” with misgivings. But this is how the word is typically rendered in English translations of Kant’s works (and also in English commentaries on his works). I am following suit so that passages that I quote can be located without confusion in the text. But the reader should keep in mind that the word “representation” here and in English translations of Kant’s works is a broad term that can stand for anything that is present to the mind, however much certain kinds of representations differ from each other. 29 A 79, B 105. 14 �To show that the table of judgments does not contain too many forms of judgment one need point to only a single judgment that expresses a quantity, a quality, and relation, and a modality. Take the judgment, “All dogs are animals.” This judgment has a quantity: universal (and not, say, particular). It has a quality: affirmative (and not, say, negative). It has a relation: categorical (and not, say, hypothetical). And it has a modality: necessary. Unlike the quantity, quality, and relation expressed in the judgment, “All dogs are animals,” the modality is unexpressed. But it is easy to add it in: “All dogs are necessarily animals.” This is an analytic judgment. Even though the concepts, dog and animal, derive from experience, they are so closely connected that being an animal pertains to the very meaning of being a dog: if it is not an animal, then it is not a dog. This particular judgment and countless others like it contain a quantity, a quality, a relation, and a modality (even if unexpressed). All four of these characteristics are embedded in these judgments. Hence the table does not contain too many forms of judgment. No less than four distinct forms of judgment are identifiable in judgments of the type that we have just considered.30 Kant’s table of judgments is not excessive.31 Is it, however, deficient? Does it contain too few forms of judgment? This is quite a different question: and it concerns the “completeness” of the table in the precise sense of the 30 That each of the four general characteristics of judgment exhibits three subtypes (amounting to a total of twelve forms of judgment) is, I think, easy to see. The only ambiguous case is quality. Kant thinks that the infinite judgment “A is non-B” is distinct from the negative judgment, “A is not B.” The infinite judgment (unlike the negative judgment) says that “A” is something, but (unlike the affirmative judgment) it names this “something” only negatively. And yet, “only negatively,” is somewhat misleading, inasmuch as the whole indefinitely extended class of “non-B” is predicated of “A.” So the form of “A is non-B” is distinguishable, in transcendental (vs. general) logic), from both of the other two forms, “A is B” and “A is not B.” Cf. A 71-73, B 97-98. 31 A judgment that might appear to lack one of these characteristics can easily be shown, on reformulation, to possess it implicitly. The judgment, “John drinks beer,” can be reformulated, somewhat awkwardly but without essential modification of its sense, as “John is a beer drinker.” This judgment is singular in quantity, negative in quality, and categorical in relation. Its unexpressed modality is likely assertoric. The one making this judgment likely intends it neither as apodictic (“John must be a beer drinker”) nor as problematic (“John may be a beer drinker”). I say “likely” here because, if the modality of a judgment is unexpressed, we can determine what it is with confidence only by asking the speaker what he intends. But whatever uncertainty we might have regarding what the modality of a given judgment is does not mean that it lacks a modality. A judgment essentially lacking modality is not a judgment at all. 15 �word. Does this individual judgment, “All dogs are (necessarily) animals,” according to its form, exhibit a fifth general characteristic, like quantity, quality, relation, and modality, distinct from but on a level with these. It is hard, to say the least, to see how it does. What could it be? Still, one might ask, is there not perhaps some other individual judgment that exhibits a fifth general characteristic in addition to quantity, quality, relation, and modality? This question obviously cannot be answered by taking every possible individual judgment and examining it to see if it happens to exhibit a fifth general characteristic on a level with quantity, quality, relation, and modality, for there is no limit to the number of possible individual judgments. Kant can challenge his critic to find a single individual judgment that does exhibit this (ostensibly) fifth general characteristic. And, in the absence of such a finding, Kant can plausibly argue that his table is complete: there are only four general characteristics of judgment. Rather than advance either a definitive argument for his table’s not containing too many forms of judgment (as I have tried to do in the preceding paragraph) or a plausible argument for his table’s not containing too few forms of judgment (as I have tried to do in this paragraph) Kant advanced no argument in the Critique of Pure Reason at all.32 It should be noted, however, that if his table in fact contains too few forms of judgment, then the derived table of categories contains too few categories as well. And, in that case nature, as the complex of phenomena governed by a priori laws prescribed to it by the human understanding,33 would be more, not less, architectonically determined than Kant thought it was. If that were so, it should go without saying, Kant’s response to Hume would not be compromised in the least. 32 Kant says that we cannot know exactly why we have twelve and only twelve forms of judgment, and hence twelve and only twelve categories. See the last sentence of § 21, B 146. He may at some point have entertained the possibility of deriving these forms from the primordial judgment “I think.” But, as far as I know, he never carried out such a derivation. In Notes and Fragments (a volume in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, edited by Paul Guyer), Note 5854 (p. 300), Kant gives a short but quite interesting account of why, under each of the four general “titles” of judgments, there must be exactly three “moments,” no more and no fewer. 33 B 163. Cf. B xix. 16 �3. The question of right (quid juris) As noted earlier, we have a faculty of understanding, which is to say, a faculty of concepts, only because our intuition is sensible rather than intellectual. We think, not intuitively, but discursively only. As Kant says, in a much quoted sentence, “Thoughts without content are empty. Intuitions without concepts are blind.”34 So, neither (sensible) intuition nor concepts yield knowledge by themselves. But intuition has a kind of primacy over concepts. To repeat, Kant argues that the only reason we even have concepts is to make up for the fact that do not have an intellectual intuition.35 But what is their origin? In the case of empirical concepts, the answer is a relatively obvious. We derive them from sense experience, via generalization, by attending to what perceived individuals have in common. We cannot, however, derive pure concepts, or categories, from experience. This is how Kant describes the relation of categories to intuition in the Metaphysical Deduction. The same function that gives unity to the synthesis of various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, generally expressed, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding then, indeed through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form 34 A 51, B 75. In this sentence, Kant is speaking only of sensible intuitions. See B 72; A 50-52, B 74-76. According to Kant, the human understanding, is discursive only, not intuitive, as God’s understanding is, if he exists. 35 17 �of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.36 Kant has argued that we need concepts only because our intuition is merely sensible; and he has argued that we have not just empirical concepts but pure concepts, the categories, which are resident a priori in the human understanding, manifesting themselves in the very way we think, that is, in the very way we judge. If Kant is right on these two points, it follows that the pure concepts have a relation, an a priori and necessary relation, to intuition. He announces in the passage just quoted what this relation has to be, if the categories apply to intuitions in such a way as to yield a priori knowledge of the general structure of human experience, and thereby of the general structure of nature itself as the sum of all appearances.37 The categories can have this relation by virtue of their unifying function, which is at work in both the logical forms of judgment and—he says without yet accounting for the manner in which this happens—in intuition as well. The account of the manner in which this happens is the task of the Transcendental Deduction.38 It is striking how sharply Kant distinguishes between the two modes of cognition we have at our disposal, sensibility and the understanding. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only insofar as they unite (sich vereinigen), can knowledge arise. But that is no reason to 36 A 79, B 105. B 163-165. 38 A 85, B 117. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant argues generally that a priori categories are applied with “right” to what is provided by the senses. In the chapters following the Transcendental Deduction, Kant tries to show how each of the a priori categories is applied to what is provided by the senses. 37 18 �confound the contribution of either with that of the other; rather it is a strong reason to carefully separate and distinguish the one from the other.39 It is the very sharpness of this distinction that requires Kant to undertake a Transcendental Deduction of the categories, which purports to show that the categories of the understanding apply, with right,40 to whatever is encountered in spatio-temporal sense experience. On the other hand, it also the very sharpness of the distinction that enables Kant to carry out the Transcendental Deduction and, among other things, begin to answer Hume by justifying the claim that the category of cause and effect, though not derived from experience nonetheless determines experience.41 Put with greatest possible simplicity, Kant’s project in the Transcendental Aesthetic and in the Transcendental Analytic is to show that and how, in spite of the sharpness of the distinction between sensibility and the understanding, these two modes of cognition are nonetheless intimately, and intelligibly, related to each other. His project is to show that the categories, which are unifying functions in judgments, are at the same time unifying functions in objects (o). Whatever can be given to us in sense experience, whatever can enter our receiving rooms of space and time, is subject to the categories. It can be grasped a priori with respect to its general features, and moreover judged with respect to these features in fundamental propositions that hold a priori for whatever can be met with in experience. Such is the accomplishment of the faculty of understanding in relation to the faculty of sensibility. Or so Kant attempts to show. 39 A 51-52, B 75-76. A 84-85, B 116-117; cf. B xxxiv-xxxx. 41 I say that Kant begins to answer Hume on the question of causality in the Transcendental Deduction. He completes his answer to Hume in the Second Analogy of the Chapter entitled “System of All Principles (or fundamental propositions—Grundsätze) of Pure Understanding.” 40 19 �Let us focus on only one of the judgments and its corresponding category. The hypothetical judgment, “if p then q,” is one judgment. But it possesses two components. Each of these components is a proposition, a judgment, and can be considered by itself: I can think the proposition, “p”, by itself and without a preceding “if”; and I can think the proposition, “q”, by itself and without a preceding “then.” The complex judgment, “if p then q” unites these two propositions, and it unites them as ground and consequence.42 This relation is a purely logical one and does not rely on temporal entities or on time itself. Consider the judgment, “If a triangle has two sides equal, then the angles subtending them are equal as well.” In this judgment, the “if” clause names the ground, the “then” clause names the consequent. This relationship is nontemporal, though, of course, we need time to think it through. Our mind moves discursively through time as it thinks the proposition. But the proposition itself does not move through time. Such a thing is not even conceivable. Thinking through a proposition occurs rapidly or slowly. The proposition that is thought through does not itself move rapidly or slowly. It does not move at all. The proposition retains its identity across multiple acts of thinking about it, acts separated by intervals when it is not thought about. And it retains its identity for multiple subjects thinking at the same time and at different times as well.43 These subjects can agree about the truth of the proposition and its provability, or they can disagree about one or the other of these, or they can disagree about both.44 But this proposition has to be self-identical, it has to be the same proposition for multiple subjects, for them to have either meaningful agreement or meaningful disagreement about its truth and provability. 42 A 73, B 98. A sentence is bound to a particular language; a proposition is not. For that reason, one and the same proposition can be expressed in multiple languages, or even reformulated (slightly) in different sentences within the same language. For example, in the geometrical proposition stated above we can substitute “also” for “as well,” and we can omit “then”: “If a triangle has two sides equal, the angles subtending them are also equal.” There is a difference between these two sentences. But the same proposition is expressed in both of them. 44 By “proposition” here, I mean only what is to be proved, not the actual proof itself. 43 20 �To restate the matter for the sake of clarity and emphasis, in the general hypothetical judgment form, “if p then q,” each of the two component propositions can be considered in isolation from the other. Neither “p,” taken by itself, nor “q,” taken by itself, need have a reference to the other, inasmuch as “p” here just stands for a proposition you like, and “q” likewise.45 Only when they are united in the single hypothetical judgment form do “p” and “q” refer to each other. Their reference is of ground to consequence. Now a ground according to its sense is the ground of a consequent, and a consequent according to its sense is the consequent of a ground. The relation of ground and consequent is the unifying function in the hypothetical judgment, “if p then q.” We can also express this unifying function as the single, albeit complex, category of causality and dependence, or of cause and effect.46 It is a single category because it expresses a relation in which “p” and “q” are united in a special way, not as “p and q,” nor as “either p or q, but not both,” nor in any way other than “if p then q.” We can say that the premises are the cause of the conclusion.47 When speaking of a-temporal relation, as in a logical or geometrical proof, the single category of cause and effect says nothing at all about temporal causation. In the Second Analogy, however, Kant will try to demonstrate that every event, everything that happens in time (unlike the conclusion of a proof), has a temporally antecedent 45 There can be false as well as true instantiations of “if p then q.” E.g., “If a lead weight is dropped from the top of mast in a rapidly sailing ship, then it will land some distance behind the mast.” We can come up with particular instantiations of “p” and “q” that do have a logical relationship to each other—e.g., where “p” stands for “All men are animals and all animals are mortal” and “q” stands for “All men are mortal.” But in speaking of the form of the hypothetical judgment, our concern is only with the general “if… then” relationship, without regard to how “p” or “q” get instantiated in this or that concrete judgment. 46 At A 73, B 98, prior to identifying the categories, Kant names one of the “relations of thought in judgment” as that “of ground to consequent” (des Grundes zur Folge). This is the relation of the propositions “p” and “q,” respectively, in the hypothetical judgment, “if p then q.” At B 112, after he has identified the categories, he equates, in passing, the relation of cause to effect (der Ursache zur Wirkung, alternatively expressed as Kausalität und Dependenz), which is one of the categories, with the relation of ground to consequent. It should be kept in mind that Kant is not yet speaking of the categories as schematized, i.e., as endowed with a temporal significance. Accordingly, cause and effect, or ground and consequent, need not be thought of as relation holding only within time. See Section 8, below. 47 Cf. Aristotle, Posteriori Analytics 71b16-33; Metaphysics 1013b 20 21 �cause.48 On the way to the Second Analogy, Kant will try to show that the logical concept of cause and effect gets endowed with a temporal meaning, as do all the other categories. Showing that is the task of the Schematism chapter. Kant’s claim is that specifically temporal causation, like causation of any kind, has an anticipatory logical foundation in the unifying function of the hypothetical judgment.49 Time is an a priori form of pure sensible intuition, and the logical category of cause and effect is an a priori category, a pure concept of the understanding. Both are a priori endowments of the human mind. They seem then to fit together perfectly: whatever enters the a priori receiving room of time, which the human mind possesses a priori, occurs there as an event or as a component of an event; and this event is thus subject to the category of cause and effect, which the human mind also possesses a priori.50 Now this is in fact Kant’s view. And it could seem that he has validated it on the basis of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deduction. And so it could seem that with the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant has answered Hume: everything entering the human mind from without, events included, enter the a priori spatiotemporal receptacle of the human mind are thereby subject to the a priori categories of the same human mind. But Kant realizes that he has not yet answered Hume. For there was an “analytic” or “regressive” element in the argument of the Metaphysical Deduction, that requires a 48 See again, A 79, B 105” “The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytic unity, it produced the logical form of judgment…etc.” Note that whereas the judgment, “Every effect must have a cause,” is analytic, the judgment, “Every event must have a cause,” is (as we have already seen) synthetic. 49 See Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1966), 26-33, for an intriguing argument that, even if Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy establishes that events are necessarily connected according to a rule, it still fails to account for the actual experience of causation, this experience being rooted primordially in the role that our own living and moving bodies play in perception (and not, or not solely, in a schematized category derived from the form of the hypothetical judgment). 50 A 144, B 183. 22 �“synthetic” or “progressive, supplementation . Granted that we have a priori forms of intuition, and granted that we have a priori concepts, both of which are necessary for a priori knowledge of nature (including knowledge that “all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect”), Kant has still not shown that our a priori forms of intuition and concepts are sufficient for a priori knowledge of nature. For the sharp distinction between sensibility and the understanding, between sensible intuition and concept, the sustained elaboration of which is one of Kant’s most impressive achievements, raises a new question of its own, a question that only Kant could have raised: by what right do we apply a category, an a priori concept of the understanding, to what is found in our a priori forms of intuition, space and time?51 It is a tribute to Kant’s intelligence that he realized that this question cannot be adequately answered just by noting that the faculties of the understanding and sensibility, even as he has so carefully described them, are faculties of one and the same mind. And it is a tribute to Kant’s honesty that he did not gloss over the awkward fact that his account raises the question of the unity of human mind in its cognitive functioning—a question that few, if any, other thinkers before Kant raised, and none with his sharpness of focus and intensity of concentration. Kant realized that the human mind might be originally cleft in such a way that a perfect fit between its two parts was impossible. The question of right (quid juris), that is, the question by what right can a pure concept of the understanding be applied to what is present in sensibility, is the question of the Transcendental Deduction. The Metaphysical Deduction purported to demonstrate that we have, in the very way that the human mind is articulated, what is necessary for a priori knowledge of the general structure of nature. The Transcendental Deduction will 51 The legitimacy of applying empirical concepts to appearances, which are in space and time, is not essentially problematic, since empirical concepts are derived, by way of generalization, from spatio-temporal experience to begin with. Because, for Kant, the categories are not derived from appearances, the legitimacy of their application to appearances is a special problem, a specifically Kantian problem. 23 �attempt to demonstrate also that we have, in the very way that the human mind operates, what is sufficient for a priori knowledge of the general structure of nature. Since Kant conceded that the first edition version of the Deduction was insufficiently clear,52 I shall limit my remarks in the following to what is going on (some of it) in the second edition version. 4. The Structure of the Transcendental Deduction The two versions of Transcendental Deduction are the most widely contested texts in the history of philosophy, with the exception of Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5, to which the Transcendental Deduction is not entirely unrelated, both texts dealing with what is necessarily and irreducibly active in the mind. Though Kant attempted to clear up obscurities that he thought marred the first edition version of the Transcendental Deduction, the second edition itself is not free of obscurity. Certain terms are used without the qualification that the reader has to supply by attending to the context not just in light of what has already been said elsewhere but even in light of what will be said only later in the Deduction. The text is replete with side observations that, though they are always of considerable interest, can cause the reader to lose the thread of the argument. Assertions are made early on that do not get fully justified until later on. Most strikingly, at the end of § 20 we have what appears to be an announcement that the Deduction has been successfully brought to a conclusion—“Consequently, the manifold of a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories”—only to discover, in § 21 ff., that we have hardly reached the halfway point of the argument. And the Deduction includes, near the end, what 52 In what follows, when I use the abbreviated expression, “Deduction,” by itself, I am referring to the Transcendental Deduction only, not to the Metaphysical Deduction, and only to the version in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. 24 �appears to be an overstatement that, assuming it is not a simple mistake, cries out to be brought into some kind of agreement with what Kant says a few pages earlier in the Deduction. Here is what I take to be the structure of the Transcendental Deduction in the second edition: The first section, § 15, is introductory and speaks of combination in its general character. Kant argues here that any analysis of what is present to the mind, of our representations, always presupposes synthesis. The next three sections, §§ 16-20, comprise the first half of the Deduction. This half can be subdivided into two stages. In the first stage, §§ 16-17, Kant gives an account of apperception—self-consciousness in the act “I think” 53—as such. In the second stage, §§ 18-20, he argues that objectivity (o) is constituted by apperception—though it is in the first stage, in the second paragraph of § 17, that Kant says what he means by an object (o) in the context of the Deduction. In § 20, Kant concludes the first half of the Deduction by arguing that all sensible intuitions are subject to the categories. But he realizes that the Deduction is not finished at this point because he has not yet fully accounted for the synthetic character of sensible intuition itself, which is a presupposition, not a consequence, of the explicit application of categories to intuition in a judgment. § 21 is the bridge from the first to the second half of the Deduction §§ 22-26 comprise the second half of the Deduction. This half too can be subdivided into stages. In the first stage, §§ 22-23, Kant argues that the categories yield no knowledge of things53 By apperception, Kant means self-consciousness (B 68). By transcendental apperception, he means consciousness of self as engaged in the act “I think,” and as thereby constitutive of all a priori knowledge, even (as we shall see) of objectivity itself. Empirical apperception is consciousness of self as having particular memories, inclinations, aspirations, etc. Unlike transcendental apperception, empirical apperception varies from individual to individual. 25 �in-themselves, and yet that they extend to objects (g) of sensible intuition in general, that is to any intuition, be it like or unlike ours, that is receptive and not active (or intellectual, as God’s is, if he exists). In the second stage, the first three paragraphs of § 24, Kant introduces the imagination, barely even alluded to up to this point in the Deduction, though silently presupposed all along; and here he distinguishes between two a priori syntheses, figurative and intellectual. The remainder of § 24 through the whole of § 25 arrests the development of the second half of the Deduction. This passage could be called a “digression,” did not the observations made in it have such a massive bearing, not only on the chief claims of the Critique of Pure Reason, but on the whole of Kant’s mature philosophy.54 The third stage (proper) of the second half of the Deduction, § 26, continues from where the third paragraph of § 24 left off. Here Kant completes the Deduction by arguing that the categories apply to our sensible intuition, hence to whatever data enter into it from without, hence to whatever can be perceived, and that they are therefore valid a priori for all possible objects (g) of experience. § 27 states the “Outcome” of the Transcendental Deduction, and argues briefly against two alternative ways of construing the relation between experience and categories. 5. The Transcendental Deduction §§15-20 54 Kant begins this passage with, “This is a suitable place for explaining the paradox…etc.” I think that it is, in fact, not a suitable place, and that he should have treated this paradox after § 26. Still, this passage does speak to questions that, even as early as § 16, will likely have occurred to an intelligent reader. Kant may have placed it where he did in order to forestall objections to the winding up of his argument in § 26 (which is entitled “Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Use in Experience of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding”). The passage in § 24 beginning, “This is a suitable place…etc.,” and the whole of § 25 looks like an insert. I suspect that Kant originally ended § 24 after the first three paragraphs and the section now given as § 26 followed immediately as § 25. Hence the reference in the note at B 136 to § 25, when the more obvious reference would be to § 26. 26 �Kant holds that all synthesis of what is present to the mind is performed by the understanding which, construed broadly, is the faculty of combination. We are not, according to Kant, originally given wholes—whether single individuals, Gestalten, eidē, or any other kind of organized wholes—but only manifolds of discontinuous and unconnected discreta.55 Because sensibility, considered independently of the synthetic contribution of the understanding, is nothing more than a passive faculty of receptivity, it cannot combine. It can only “take in.” Lacking spatial and temporal continuity, sense data are not yet appearances but, again, the matter of appearances. Appearances owe their form to the synthetic operation of the mind. Analysis, according to Kant, presupposes synthesis. The human mind can know something about its objects by analyzing them only because it has originally synthesized them.56 In breaking down an empirical object into its constituent parts in order to understand how it is, as we tellingly say, “put together,” the mind aims, or should aim, at following up this analysis with a recombination of the parts back into a whole. In such recombining, the mind recapitulates and makes explicit to itself its own prior activity. The synthesis that follows analysis is always, for Kant, a re-synthesis. The power of the human understanding consists, then, less in taking things apart than in putting them together in the first place. Synthesis, regarded as mere putting together, does not by itself does result in knowledge. For knowledge, what has been merely put together must be conceptually unified. In the Metaphysical Deduction Kant said, 55 How broad this claim is becomes clear only in the second half of the Transcendental Deduction. See especially B 160, note. 56 This claim has been disputed at length and in numerous studies by Aron Gurwitsch, both on phenomenological grounds and in light of the empirical findings of gestalt psychologists such as Kurt Kofka and Wolfgang Köhler. See especially Gurwitsch’s Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology (Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 3-68, 175-286. 27 �By means of analysis different representations are brought under one concept—a procedure (Geschäft) with which general logic deals. What transcendental logic [in the Transcendental Analytic], on the other hand, teaches is how we bring to concepts not representations [merely] but the pure synthesis of representations.57 It is through the pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, that this pure synthesis of representations gets unified. That which bestows conceptual unity on the pure synthesis of representations is the thinking subject, the ego. The ego bestows this unity in a self-conscious act that Kant calls transcendental apperception, expressed in the fundamental proposition (Grundsatz), “I think,” which, Kant says, is “the highest [proposition] in the whole sphere of human knowledge.”58 It should be obvious that we do not, and cannot, infer the fundamental proposition, “I think,” from the assumed validity of Newtonian science or from anything else. As an act, the “I think” is originally present, and I can attend to thematically as long as I exist. As an act, regardless of what it acts upon, that is, regardless of what content, representation, or object (g), the “I think,” in an act of attention, is actually directed to at any given moment, it is abiding and unchanging throughout consciousness. Otherwise I would not know, it would not even occur to me, that I have thought, and can think, of different things at different times; or even that I who am thinking the middle of this sentence is the same I that thought the beginning of it. I am a priori conscious of the act, “I think,” as self-identical regardless of what I happen to think about.59 The act, “I think,” does not depend on the particular content of empirical thinking, 57 A 78, B 104 (emphasis in the original). Kant speaks frequently of bringing something already synthesized to concepts or to the unity of apperception.. 58 B 135. 59 A 108: “This very transcendental unity of apperception makes out of all possible appearances, which can always be together in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws. For this unity of 28 �which may undergo all kinds of changes. I am a priori self-conscious. I am conscious of myself as doing, as putting together representations in various ways.60 And that means that even at the level of speculative reason, quite apart from practical (i.e., moral) reason, I am conscious of myself as an agent. Human thinking is not just a matter of passively gazing at bits and pieces of mental data as they happen to float by in time. Rather, human thinking is active. It does not create; but it does synthesize.61 That I think is self-evident. The question about the act, “I think,” concerns not its existence its scope. Kant says: It must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations for otherwise something would be represented in me (in mir vorgestellt) that could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing for me (für mich nichts). This single sentence deserves more scrutiny than can be given here.62 I limit myself to a few observations. (1) By representations, Kant means broadly whatever is present to the mind: its acts, objects, appearances, sense data, even fictions and fantasies. (2) Kant says that it must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations; he does not say that the “I think” consciousness would be impossible, if the mind in cognition (Erkenntnis) of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of the function whereby it synthetically combines it in one cognition.” 60 For an alternative account see Aron Gurwitsch, “A Non-egological Conception of Consciousness,” in Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, 287-300. 61 As we shall see in Section 9, below, though I am conscious that I think, and of course that I am, I do not know exactly what I am. I am conscious that the act, “I think,” has a unifying effect. (A proposition or judgment constituted by thought has a unity, of subject and predicate in the simplest case: it is one judgment, not two.) So I do know that I am a unifying agent. But I do not know that this unifying agent that I am—“in myself,” apart from this act and apart from how I merely appear to myself—is itself an indissoluble unity. Or so Kant argues. 62 This sentence was considered in detail by Dieter Henrich in a course on the Critique of Pure Reason given at Columbia University in the spring of 1972. See also his article, “The Proof Structure of Kant’s’ Transcendental Deduction” (Kant on Pure Reason, edited by Ralph C.S. Walker, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 77. 29 �does accompany all my representations.63 For the “I think” to accompany a representation, that representation must be actually thought about, that is, it must be homed in on, or targeted, in a focused act of attention and conceptually grasped in a judgment. There are many representations that are mine, that are present in my spatial and temporal field of view, but which I do not attend to, such as colors and shapes at the periphery of my vision, or barely audible noises, such as the sound of an air conditioner that, strangely enough, I seem to become aware of only when it goes off. (Another example: distinctive odors in a certain building that one never noticed until returning to it after having been away for some time.) What Kant is claiming is that it must possible for me to think about, to think about coherently with categories, or to judge, any particular representation that I have, though by no means all of them at once. The “I think” need not, or rather cannot, accompany all my representations. I might never have thought about the sound of the air conditioner, had it not gone off and ceased to make a sound. The “I think” cannot even accompany all the representations it has at any given moment. I cannot think about Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, and at the same time think about the background noise in this room, the ambient temperature, all the different colors and shapes in it, the texture of the pencil I am holding, etc., even though all these representations are present—as a twentieth century philosopher will say—at the margin of my field of consciousness, though not as the theme of my consciousness.64 What Kant is claiming in this sentence is only that I can think about any of these representations simply by attending to them.65 (3) Kant concludes this sentence with a 63 Cf. A 116: “For in me [representations]…must be at least capable [!] of being so connected….etc.” Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964. 65 See B 134: “The thought: these representations given in intuition one and all belong to me, means…that I unite them in one consciousness, or can at least unite them therein….[O]nly insofar as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them (nenne ich dieselben) one and all mine.” (Emphasis added in the translation.) That I can unite representations given in intuition is sufficient to establish that the manifold representations in an intuition are subject to (or stand under--stehen unter) the categories. Even representations of mine that are not accompanied by the “I think” are nonetheless subject to the categories. B 136: “[I]nsofar as [the manifold representations of intuition] must be capable [!] of being combined (müssen verbunden werden können) in 64 30 �reason justifying the first part of it: “for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible.” By this Kant means that something present in the mind that nonetheless could not be thought about would impossible. But (4!) he ends the sentence with striking qualification, “or at least would be nothing for me.” Kant does not think that the oddity of something’s being “in me” but nonetheless “nothing for me” can be dismissed out of hand. Such a thing is conceivable, again, in light of his earlier and sharp distinction—a distinction that has to be, certainly not abandoned, but modified, something Kant has not yet done but will do shortly—between sensibility and the understanding.66 The qualification “or at least would be nothing for me,” points to one of the principal tasks of the Transcendental Deduction: to show that whatever is in me, in particular, whatever is in my spatio-temporal receiving room, really can become something for me, by being accompanied by the “I think”—which, for Kant, is just a different way of saying that whatever is in space and time really is subject to the categories.67 In the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant had argued that the categories are unifying functions in judgment. In the Transcendental Deduction, he states the relation between judgment and the apperceptive act, “I think.” [A] judgment is nothing more than the manner of bringing given cognitions to the objective (o) unity of apperception. 68 one consciousness, they are subject to [the conditions of the original-synthetic unity of apperception].” (Emphasis in the original.) 66 Henrich “The Proof Structure of Kant’s’ Transcendental Deduction,” p. 77. 67 Cf. A 90. B 123; A 116. 68 B 141. The word translated here as “cognitions,” Erkenntnisse, Kemp Smith translates as “modes of knowledge,” since “knowledges,” in the plural, does not accord with English usage. A cognition need not take the form of a 31 �Every individual judgment can be reformulated, without any sacrifice to its essential meaning, by employing the copula “is” (or “are” in the case of subjects expressed in the plural) which connects subject with predicate.69 The copula “is,” Kant says, is used in order to distinguish the objective (o) unity of given representations from the subjective. It indicates their reference (Beziehung) to original apperception and its necessary unity….Only in this way does there arise… a judgment, that is, a relation (Verhältnis) that is objectively (o) valid.70 Kant has given objectivity a new meaning. It does not mean things as they are in themselves and independent of whatever relation they have to our cognitive faculties. Nor does objectivity mean what all subjects may happen to agree upon, for all subjects may get something wrong, say, judging (long ago) that things resting on the surface of the earth would necessarily fly off it if the earth were spinning about its axis. Kant distinguishes objects (o) both from merely subjective representations and from things-in-themselves. He defines an object and explicates his definition of it thus. Object (o) is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united (vereinigt). Now all unification of representations demands unity of proposition. Kant explicitly speaks of intuition as a cognition (A 19,B 33); and an intuition, pure or empirical, is not a proposition. When he speaks in the above passage of given cognitions, I understand him to be thinking of intuitions. For given cognitions can be brought to the unity of apperception only if they preexist being brought to the unity of apperception. See the passages quoted at the end fn. 79, infra. 69 See fn. 31, supra. The judgment “Bodies of different weights fall with the same speed in a vacuum,” can be reformulated as “Bodies of different weights are in the class of bodies of that fall with the same speed in a vacuum.” Such reformulations are certainly odd-sounding. Still, they can be made while perfectly preserving the essential meaning of the original sentence. Judgments are not, according to Kant, all categorical. Hypothetical and disjunctive judgements cannot be reduced to categorical judgments. See B 141. But their component judgments, or propositions, can be formulated, or reformulated, by employing the copula “is.” For example the general hypothetical judgment, “If p then q,” can be reformulated, depending on the content of the judgments “p” and “q,” along the lines of “If A is B, then A is C,” where each these two judgments is categorical. 70 B 141-142. 32 �consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes (ausmacht) the reference (Beziehung) of representations to an object (g), and therefore their objective (o) validity.71 My consciousness has a dimension, one might say, that is peculiar to me as distinct from you, hence subjective in the usual sense of the word. But my consciousness also has a dimension that is not peculiar to me but is common to all of us—and it is consciousness in this latter sense that constitutes objects (o), and thereby objectivity itself. Kant distinguishes within consciousness between the empirical ego and the transcendental ego. The empirical ego differs essentially from subject to subject: my upbringing, antipathies, inclinations, etc., vs. yours. The transcendental ego does not differ essentially from subject to subject. Though “instantiated” in multiple thinking human beings, the transcendental ego is essentially the same in all of them. The intersubjective agreement that can be achieved in mathematics and the sciences—an agreement that is quite remarkable, indeed astonishing, when you think about it—Kant accounts for by reference to transcendental ego; and in the same way he accounts for agreement about ordinary objects of experience as well. It is because you and I constitute objects in the same way, by means of the same categories and within the same space and time, that we can agree on what we have constituted. As a consequence, I can say not only that, to use Kant’s example, “If I support a body, I feel an impression of heaviness (einen Druck der Schwere),” but that “It, the body, is heavy.”72 So, though we have knowledge only of appearances within the mind, we nonetheless can distinguish between what is merely subjective in these appearances, what holds for you but not necessarily for me, and what is objective in them, what necessarily holds for both of us— 71 B 137 (emphasis in the original). When Kant uses Gegenstand the second sentence in this passage, he surely seems to mean that special kind of Gegenstand that is an Objekt. One cannot fault Kemp Smith too harshly for translating both terms as “object,” not only for reasons of style but also because Kant himself does not always use these terms precisely. 72 B 142. 33 �objectivity being (to repeat) constituted by the subject not in its private and empirical functioning but in its common and transcendental functioning. As a consequence, science can be a common enterprise and an objective one too, without pretending to transcend appearances and determine what is in-itself.73 In concluding the first half of the Deduction, Kant says that “all sensible intuitions are subject to the categories.” [T]that act of understanding… by which the manifold of given representations (be they intuitions or concepts) is brought under one apperception, is the logical function of judgment....The categories are nothing other than these functions of judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined in view of them (in Ansehung ihrer).74 The first half of the Transcendental Deduction has at its conclusion that the manifold in a given intuition—an already synthesized intuition, it must be emphasized 75—is necessarily subject to 73 And so Kant can say that “the proud name of an ontology, which ps to give, in systematic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori knowledge of things in general…must give place to a mere Analytic of the pure understanding.” A 247, B 303. 74 B 143. 75 See § 20. “Also steht auch das Mannigfaltige in einer gegebnenen Anschauung notwendig unter Kategorien.” Two sentences earlier Kant writes, “Also ist alles Mannigfaltige, sofern es in Einer empirische Anschauung gegeben ist, in Ansehung einer der logischen Funtionen zu urteilen bestimmt, durch die es nämlich zu einem Bewusstsein überhaupt gebracht wird. Henrich notes that, whereas the German word “einer” can be translated as the indefinite article, “a” or “an,” it can also be translated as “one.” It is, in fact, cognate with Einheit (unity). Henrich interprets the peculiar capitalization of Einer as a hint from Kant that what he has in mind here is the “inner unity” of the intuition. (“The Proof Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction,” 70.) This seems right to me. We must keep in mind, however, that Kant had another word at his disposal. He could have used vereinigt (unified), also cognate with Einheit. But he has used vereinigt earlier and with emphasis, in his definition of an object (o): “Objekt aber ist das, in dessen Begriff das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung vereinigt ist” (§ 17, at B 137). In that sentence he was speaking of the unity effected by the apperceptive act, “I think.” In § 20, on the other hand, he is speaking of a unity presupposed by the apperceptive act: “All the manifold, insofar (!) as it is given in Einer empirical intuition…etc.” (Note the expression, gebracht wird, which is used twice in § 20.) Since Kant has spoken earlier, and twice in this very section also, of the “unity” (“Einheit”) of apperception, he needs to distinguish the unity that characterizes the intuition, qua intuition, from the unity of apperception. His way of doing this in § 20 is by capitalizing “Einer” when speaking of the former. In the concluding sentence of § 20, he does not resort to the artificial capitalization of “einer” But he expects the reader to keep in mind what the previous capitalization of the 34 �(steht unter) the categories.76 The prior synthesis of the manifold of intuition can be brought to the unity of apperception in a judgment. But the scope of this prior synthesis has to be determined in order to rule out the worrisome possibility that some datum of sensibility might be in me but nothing for me. The first half of the Deduction proceeded on the assumption that whatever is in me, that whatever happens to be in my spatial and temporal forms of intuition, really can be something for me. This assumption, it turns out, is equivalent to the assumption that the pure manifold of sensible intuition provided by sensibility has already been synthesized into a formal intuition.77 A formal intuition can then be conceptually grasped (begriffen) in an act of judgment, which employs concepts (Begriffe). The second half of the Transcendental Deduction aims at validating this assumption. 6. The Transcendental Deduction §§21-24 (first three paragraphs), § 26. I must apologize in advance for belaboring certain points in this section. My hope is that the overkill, though inelegant, will contribute to clarity. The important passage from the Metaphysical Deduction that I quoted in Section 3 above, bears requoting here. words was intended to convey. Consider the first sentence of § 21; the note to that sentence; the second sentence of § 21, where he capitalizes “Einer” again; and the entire note in § 26, at B 160, beginning “Der Raum, als Gegenstand vorgestellt….” 76 The expressions “stehen unter” in the title of § 20 and “steht unter” in the concluding sentence of § 20, do not mean that all sensible intuitions are united in a judgment employing categories, but only that any and every sensible intuition, because it has been antecedently synthesized by the imagination can be united by category application-which occurs when the synthesis already accomplished by the imagination is subsequently brought to concepts (A 79, B 104) in the act, “I think.” 77 On “formal intuition” vs. mere “form of intuition” (the latter is all that sensibility considered by itself contains), see again B 160, note. We shall return to this distinction shortly. 35 �The same function that gives unity to the synthesis of various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.78 As I noted, this passage claims that the categories, derived a priori not from intuition but from the understanding, can through their unifying function be applied to sensible intuition and make knowledge possible. On the basis of the first half of the Transcendental Deduction, we can begin to appreciate Kant’s earlier statement, here in the Metaphysical Deduction, that the category “gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition.” The unity effected by the category, is itself a synthesis. But it presupposes a synthesis, which in this passage from the Metaphysical Deduction Kant calls a “mere” (blossen) synthesis, presumably because it produces only contiguous unity of temporal and spatial representations. But once synthesized at this level, these representations can be accompanied by the “I think,” in a synthesis that is anything but “mere,” for it produces conceptual unity. As Kant put the matter at the end of § 16, I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis [of representations], which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all 78 A 79, B 105. 36 �representations that are given to me must stand, but under which they must also be brought by means of a synthesis.79 The first synthesis mentioned in this sentence can be called a “higher-order synthesis.” It is the chief theme of the first half of the Deduction. The second synthesis mentioned in this sentence is a “lower-order synthesis.” It is the chief theme of the second half of the Deduction. The passage from the Metaphysical Deduction that I have now quoted twice ends with a curious formulation that is easy to overlook, given all the other interesting things Kant says there. In speaking of “intuition in general,” Kant is clearly speaking of sensible, not intellectual, intuition which, to repeat, we do not possess. But he is not speaking exclusively of our sensible intuition. By sensible intuition in general, Kant means neither an intellectual intuition nor our special sensible intuition, that is, our spatio-temporal sensible intuition. If there are other finite but thinking beings, then they too possess a merely sensible intuition; but it need not be a spatiotemporal sensible intuition.80 We cannot know what alternative form(s) of sensible intuition other finite thinking beings would possess, or even if there are such beings (angels?), like us in possessing sensible intuition, but unlike us in possessing a sensible intuition different from ours. 79 “[I]ch mir einer notwendigen Synthesis [gegenbenen Vorstellungen] a priori bewusst bin, welche die ursprünglische synthetische Einhiet der Apperzeption heisst, unter der alle mir gegenben Vorstelungen stehen, aber unter die sie auch durch eine Synthesis gebracht werden müssen.” B 135-36. Cf. Jonathan Bennet (Kant’s Analytic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 112) points out that Norman Kemp Smith inserts the word “first” into his translation of the concluding clause: “…but under which they have also first to be brought by means of a synthesis.” Kemp Smith’s translation is indeed inaccurate, but as an interpretation it is on target. See the use of “first” (erste) at A 78, B 104; and especially at B 152: “die erste Anwendung…,” a formulation that we shall consider further in what follows. Regarding the formulation in quoted text above, “but under which they must also be brought by means of a synthesis,” consider A 78, B 103: “[T]o bring this synthesis [accomplished by the imagination] to concepts is a function that belongs to the understanding,” and A 78, B 104”: “What transcendental logic teaches is how we bring to concepts…the pure synthesis of representations.” (Emphasis in the original in both these sentences.) 80 As forms of sensible intuition, space and time allow for manifolds to be given simultaneously and successively. But there is no reason in principle why manifolds could not be given some other way than simultaneously and successively, though we cannot imagine, i.e., form an image of, other modes of receptivity besides these two. There is no analytic connection between the concept of receptivity and the concepts of spatiality and temporality. 37 �Kant is not just indulging his fancy by entertaining the possibility of a sensible intuition other than ours. The notion of a sensible intuition in general plays an important role in the argument of the second half of the Deduction. 81 These are the points Kant wishes to make: (1) The categories of their very nature have a relation to sensible intuition. (2) There is no reason to think that our sensible intuition is the only sensible intuition that is possible. (3) Because the categories are not derived from our sensible intuition, they are in their application not restricted to our sensible intuition, though this application is of no cognitive use to us. (4) And so, since the categories do not of their very nature refer to our specifically spatio-temporal intuition, it is possible to think, without contradiction, of a-spatial and a-temporal things, though by means of the categories we can know nothing of them.82 Finally (5), on this interpretation of the broad scope of category application, the locus of the categories in the a priori forms of judgment is reasserted. If the categories of their own nature had a relation only to our specifically spatiotemporal intuition, one might suspect, falsely, that they were somehow derived from spatiotemporal intuition, as empirical judgments are derived from experience. If, per impossibile, the 81 See B 148: “The pure concepts of the understanding are free from this limitation [i.e., restriction to spatiotemporal objects] and extend to objects (g) of intuition in general, be [the intuition] similar to ours or not, if only it be sensible.” Cf. B 146: “space and time are the only forms of our [!] possible intuition”; B 150: first sentence of § 24; B 159: first two sentences of § 26—note the distinction here between “objects (g) of a [sensible] intuition in general” and “whatever objects (g) may present themselves to our [!] senses” (emphasis in the original); B 161: note the formulation “combination of the manifold of a given [= sensible] intuition in general ” in relation to the formulation “…in so far as the combination is applied to our [!] sensible intuition” (both emphases in the original); and B 72 (in a part of the Transcendental Aesthetic that appears only in the second edition.) In § 20, which concludes the first half of the Deduction, Kant says that all sensible intuitions as subject to the categories. The full force of this sentence does not become clear until the first paragraph of § 23. John Wetlaufer, in an important but underappreciated article, “On the Transcendental Deduction: Some Problems of Interpretation and Elements of a New Reading” (Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 5:1, 1975, 113–131), places appropriate emphasis on Kant’s distinction between our sensible intuition and a sensible intuition in general (126-127). 82 If we had other forms of sensible intuition, in addition to, or even instead of, space and time, their manifolds too would be subject to the categories. We would still not in any way know things-in-themselves by means of the categories. For things-in-themselves, according to Kant, cannot be given in any sensible intuition, be it like or unlike ours. Knowledge by means of the categories is limited to what can be antecedently given to sensible intuition. What is given to sensible intuition—vs. what is produced, or created, by intellectual intuition—are not things (inthemselves) but mere representations (Vorstellungen) of things. These representations, mere pointillistic sense data prior to the syntheses carried out by the faculty of spontaneity, are not extra-mental things but only the effects that extra-mental things produce on our (finite) mind. These representations are, however, worked up by the understanding via its categories into that law-governed whole of phenomena that goes by the name of “nature.” 38 �categories were derived from the forms of intuition that characterize our passive faculty of sensibility, they could not play the role Kant assigns to them in our active faculty of the understanding. Having spoken in §§ 22-23 of the relation of categories to sensible intuition in general, Kant turns in § 24 to the relation of categories to our sensible intuition. Here he distinguishes between (1) the original synthetic unity of apperception, the “I think,” which constitutes what I have called the “higher-order” order synthesis and which Kant calls “intellectual,” and (2) the “lower-order” synthesis, which he calls “figurative.”83 The latter synthesis is accomplished by the imagination, more precisely, by what Kant calls the productive imagination, which is also a priori and hence is distinct from the reproductive imagination, the latter being subject to empirical laws of association and not a priori.84 The productive imagination is responsible for the original synthesis of the pure a priori manifold of space and time. As a result of this original synthesis, any empirical manifold, any data entering space and time from outside the mind, gets synthesized as a matter of course. Though the Transcendental Aesthetic spoke of the a priori forms of intuition, space and time, as though they were originally present to us as already unified, the question of how they come to possess unity was temporarily suppressed. It resurfaces in the second half of the Transcendental Deduction. According to Kant, even the mere togetherness of points in empty space or of moments in empty time is a product of the synthetic activity of the understanding, construed not narrowly as judgment solely but broadly as combination in general.85 83 B 151. B 152. 85 For some places where Kant speaks of manifold of pure or a priori intuition (as distinct from a manifold of empirical or a posteriori intuition, i.e., a manifold of sense data), see A 77, B 103; A 78-79, B 104; A 99-100; B 130; B 140; B 150; B 160, note.; cf. B 202-203. 84 39 �Combination, then, takes two distinct forms: what is accomplished by the productive imagination and what is accomplished by apperception. Time itself undergoes the synthesis of the productive imagination, without which it would be only a manifold of moments. It would not be one continuously flowing time. The synthesis of time is not an accomplishment of sensibility, for this faculty is, again, only passive. Synthesis, or combination, however, is active; and “all combination—whether we become (werden) conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition, or of various concepts…is an act of the understanding.” And yet, to repeat, the original synthesis of time is not an act of judgment, an apperceptive synthesis, but a synthesis that precedes this. In what is the most helpful footnote in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant writes. Space represented as object (g) (as we need to do in geometry) contains more than more form of intuition, [it also contains] combination (Zusammenfassung) of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition gives only a manifold, the formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have reckoned this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, in order to note that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact, it presupposes as syntheses that does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since by its means (in that the understanding determines sensibility) space and time are first given as intuitions, the unity (Einheit) of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding. 86 86 B 160, note.. Why Kant says in this context that the understanding, and not the imagination, determines sensibility we shall consider below. 40 �The a priori synthesis of time, as the form of inner sense, is eo ipso the a priori synthesis of space, as form of outer space. For whatever I am conscious of as being in space, I am also conscious of as being in time, if only as enduring motionless against the flow of time. In this way, the a priori synthesis of time affects whatever material or empirical content is received a posteriori in space and time from sources outside the mind. This “figurative synthesis,” Kant also calls “the transcendental synthesis of the imagination.” Immediately after identifying the figurative synthesis and the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, Kant writes, “Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object (g) that is not itself present.”87 Imagination can do this in fantasy, of course, and it has an especially important role to play in artistic production.88 But it also does this in the recollection, memory, retention, anticipation, and expectation of such things as colors, sounds, and actual objects of experience. This is the work of the empirical or reproductive synthesis of the imagination. But the imagination, as transcendental and productive, retains the past moments of pure time themselves in intuition, prior to and independently of the particular empirical content of what happens to be met with in time. Similarly, the imagination functioning at this a priori level also anticipates the future moments of pure time themselves in intuition. This synthesis accomplished by the productive imagination makes what is in one sense “absent”—the “no-longer” and the “not-yet”—in another most peculiar sense “present” or, perhaps better, “quasi-present”89 Without this foundational transcendental synthesis of the imagination, a thoroughgoing empirical and reproductive synthesis of sense data given from without not be possible. Without the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the manifold of pure intuition itself would be only a 87 B 151 “Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen.” (Emphasis in the original.) 88 Kant also speaks of the imagination as productive, not only in artistic production, but in even in a judgment of taste. Critique of Judgment, “General Remark” following § 22. 89 The imagination accomplishes these syntheses in what Husserl will later call “retention” and “protention.” 41 �manifold of unconnected points in space and time, a manifold of pure discreta. But, one might object, we cannot imagine unconnected points in space and time. Exactly! We cannot do such a thing, Kant would reply, because to imagine points in space and time is precisely to combine them. Pure, or empty, space and time, considered apart from the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, are forms of intuition only. The points of pure space and time are originally unconnected because they belong to a faculty of the mind, sensibility, that is, considered by itself, simply passive and receptive. As formal intuitions, however, space and time can be analyzed. They can be divided indefinitely into smaller and smaller elements. And that means, for Kant, that they were originally synthesized. These formal intuitions, as synthesized wholes, owe the unity they possess to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. The members, elements, or data of the manifold, pure or empirical, that is synthesized by the imagination are side by side contiguously in space and they succeed one another contiguously in time. But they are not just somehow stuck together. The effect of the synthesis accomplished by the imagination is that each element of the synthesized manifold refers, or “points,” from within outward and beyond itself, to other spatially and temporally contiguous elements.90 At every moment of my mental life, I am retaining past moments and anticipating future moments. As retained and anticipated, these moments are both present and not present, though in two different senses of “present,” in different senses that we are manifestly aware of in temporal consciousness. These difference between the immediate presence of “the now,” and the imagined presence of the “no longer” and the “not yet,” we can describe, since we all recognize it. But we cannot explicate the difference between these two senses of “present” beyond attending to it and describing it. 90 Compare Hegel, Encyclopedia - Philosophy of Nature §§ 255-259.. 42 �To illustrate with a few examples from experience: In the middle of listening to a piece of music, say, a simple melody, I retain what I have just heard and I anticipate what I am about to hear.91 When listening to a symphony, I retain, depending on the capacity of my tonal memory, what I have already heard, and I anticipate what I am about to hear. Even when I anticipate incorrectly and get a surprise, the surprise is effective because there was an immediately preceding anticipation that went “unfulfilled” (as Husserl will say). Without that anticipation, no surprise would be possible. In watching a leaf fall, I am aware of its falling by means of my imagination’s making what is absent, the immediate past and the immediate future, present or quasi-present. When turning my head and looking about this room, I retain what I have just seen and I anticipate what I am about to see. Even when staring fixedly at an immobile object, say, a painting, my awareness that it is not moving is made possible by seeing that it is now what and where it was a moment ago, or even an hour ago. To return from the empirical to the a priori, Kant says that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination is an action (Wirkung) of the understanding [!] on sensibility; and is its first application (and thereby the ground of all its other applications) to the objects (g) of our possible intuition.92 91 This happens even at first note of the melody. It is by retaining in imagination the absence of a prior note that I hear this one as the first note, as the beginning. And at the last note of the melody, something comparable happens. I anticipate the absence of a following note, especially if the melody is tonal and the last note is the tonic. 92 B 152. The use of the expression “first application,” to say nothing of “ground,” in this passage should remove any doubt one might have that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination precedes and conditions the a priori apperceptive synthesis, as well all a posteriori synthesis of empirical representations or data. Already in the Aesthetic Kant has said, at B 67, “that which, as representation, can precede (vorhergehen) any and every act of thinking, is intuition”—a formulation that takes on considerable weight in light of the note at B 160-161. Consider A 79, B 104. “The concepts…give unity (Einheit) to this pure synthesis [i.e., the synthesis of the imagination].” Kant virtually defines thinking (Denken) as “the act (Handlung) of bringing the synthesis of a manifold, given to the understanding from elsewhere in intuition, to the unity of apperception.” B 145. In a note to the Preface of the 43 �So the imagination is not a third distinct faculty situated between the distinct faculties of sensibility and the understanding, as certain passages in the first edition of the Transcendental Deduction have mislead some to think.93 The imagination is the understanding itself—but qua acting on what is available to it from sensibility, at the transcendental level by acting on the manifolds of pure temporal and spatial discreta. By connecting these discreta, the imagination bestows unity on space and time. It turns them from forms of intuition into formal intuitions, and thereby makes possible a priori sciences of them, geometry most obviously.94 But it also makes possible an a priori science of the architectonic propositions of nature in general. Without the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, our a priori forms of intuition would be, strange to say, porous, like a net. All sensory data entering the mind from without would be, by virtue of entering it, in me. But those data that did not caught in fabric of the net, that slipped through the gaps in it, could become nothing for me. By virtue of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, there are no “gaps” in our forms of intuitions. They are formal, which is to say unified, intuitions. They are not porous. Kant understands the figurative synthesis of the imagination to be, qua synthesis, an expression of the spontaneity of the human understanding, which he says is responsible for whatever synthetic features our representations exhibit—and these features are synthetic because they can be analyzed, or broken down into smaller parts. The understanding as spontaneity is at second edition, where Kant is speaking of his Refutation of Idealism, he distinguishes between “empirical consciousness” and “intellectual consciousness;” and he says that the latter precedes (vorangeht) consciousness of a relation to something outside me. He is speaking there of the priority of apperception to consciousness of anything empirical whatsoever. 93 Consider A 124, where a pure imagination is said to be “one of the fundamental [!] faculties of the human soul.” 94 Arithmetic also makes use of space. I count two spatial objects, e.g., two fingers ( B 15-16). But I could in principle count any discrete spatial objects. Because counting does not rely on any particular spatial object and its particular features, arithmetic is also an a priori science. 44 �work, and it is at work on two levels. But it is not compelled to be at work at all. It is at work by virtue of what it is. Kant says, It is one and the same spontaneity that, in the one case, under the name (unter den Namen) of the imagination, and in the other, under the name of the understanding, brings combination to the manifold of intuition.95 Though the vast majority of my representations are never attended to by the “I think” in a specifically intellectual synthesis, they are all effected by the figurative synthesis.96 The intellectual synthesis that takes place in the apperceptive act, “I think,” is the accomplishment of the faculty of spontaneity’s judging, under the “name” of the understanding, this or that item within the figurative synthesis that has already been accomplished by the same faculty of spontaneity, under the “name” of the imagination. What the faculty of spontaneity accomplishes in the figurative synthesis is the preparation of the entirety of sensibility, both its intrinsic, a priori, and pure manifold of intuition, and its contingent, a posteriori and empirical filling, for explicit category application in the intellectual synthesis that occurs when the “I think” accompanies a particular representation in a judgment.97 The figurative synthesis is in fact performed with reference to a possible, hence subsequent, intellectual synthesis, whether or not the latter synthesis is actually performed in the case of a given empirical representation, 95 B 162, note b (emphasis added). Cf. B 153: “The understanding, under the title (unter der Benennung) of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination….” Compare B 152: “[The imagination’s] synthesis is an exercise (Ausübung) of spontaneity….Imagination is spontaneity.” 96 By “representations” here, I exclude the elemental and unconnected manifold data of intuition, since prior to the figurative synthesis of the imagination, we are not even marginally, much less thematically, conscious of them. We are not and cannot be conscious of mere discreta, certainly not of unconnected points in pure, empty space and unconnected moments in pure, empty time, for consciousness is essentially synthetic. As for empirical discreta, such as separate and small points of color in space and separate and brief sounds in time, these are still synthetically connected to the stretches of space and time that surround them. It is that very connection to the surrounding space and time that enables us to be conscious of distinct points of color as separate from each other and of intermittently occurring sounds as separate from each other. 97 Compare Aristotle, De Anima, 431b3: “ta men oun eidē to noētikon en tois phantasmasi noei…” 45 �synthesized by the imagination. It is the intimate relationship between these two syntheses that enables Kant to understand them as two operations of one and the same spontaneity. Had Kant treated the imagination as a third faculty of the human mind, situated between and distinct from both sensibility and the understanding, he would have had to show not only that and how the faculty of the imagination is related to a faculty of sensibility distinct it—which is difficult enough to show, but which he does show in §§ 24 and 26—he would also have had to show that and how the faculty of the understanding is related to a faculty of the imagination ostensibly distinct from it. Kant’s understanding of the human mind as irreducibly two-fold—as sensibility and the understanding—generates for him the formidable task of showing that, and how, these two heterogeneous cognitive faculties can fit together so as to yield knowledge (albeit of what is in space and time only). If he understood the human mind as irreducibly threefold—the faculty of sensibility and the faculty of understanding, and also, between these two, a separate faculty of imagination—his task would have been impossible to fulfill. By construing the synthesis of the imagination and the synthesis of apperception as two teleologically related accomplishments—a lower-order synthesis for the sake of a higher-order synthesis—of “one and the same faculty of spontaneity,” Kant is disburdened of this impossible task. But, one might ask, has he not thereby made things too easy for himself. I think not. There is nothing contradictory about one faculty functioning at two levels. A comparison might help here. It is by one and the same “faculty” that I both pick up a hammer and subsequently hammer a nail with it. I cannot do the latter without doing the former, though I can do the former without doing the latter. And yet I am doing, with one and the same “faculty,” both things. What is distinctive about the figurative synthesis of the productive imagination and the subsequent 46 �intellectual synthesis of apperception is that both are “doings,” unlike sensibility which is a passive and receptive “being done to,” only. The combination that allows for human knowledge, as distinct from sensation merely, requires a priori the following: (1) a given manifold, a plethora of discrete “pointillistic” data, which is the original content of sensibility; (2) a putting together of these data, side by side and one after the other, which is accomplished by the imagination; and (3) an expressly conceptual unifying of this togetherness, which is accomplished by the “I think” in an act of judgment. The bare “given-ness” of the manifold, whether pure or empirical, is all that sensibility by itself provides. The putting together, simultaneously and successively, of the manifold, and the subsequent conceptual unifying of what has been put together, are the two different syntheses accomplished by one faculty of combination, that is, of spontaneity, or the understanding construed broadly. The first synthesis is for the sake of the latter synthesis. I noted earlier that the second edition version of the Deduction contains what appears to be an overstatement. It occurs in the concluding paragraph of § 26. As mere representations, [appearances] are subject to (stehen unter) no law of connection (Verknüpfung) save what the connecting faculty (das verknüpfnede Vermögen) prescribes. Now it is imagination that connects the manifold of sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the unity (Einheit) of its intellectual [!] synthesis upon the understanding, and for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon sensibility. All possible perception is thus dependent upon synthesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis in turn upon transcendental synthesis, and therefore upon the categories. Consequently, all 47 �possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can [!] come to empirical consciousness, that is, all appearances of nature must, so far as their connection is concerned, be subject to the categories.98 In this passage, Kant is emphasizing the dependency of all that we can be conscious of a posteriori, on the categories. What is surprising is his speaking of an intellectual synthesis accomplished by the imagination. For, as we have seen, a few pages earlier he identified the transcendental synthesis of the imagination with figurative synthesis, and he contrasted it with intellectual synthesis: “the intellectual synthesis…is carried out by the understanding alone without aid of the imagination.”99 Kant also glossed “figurative synthesis” with the Latin “synthesis speciosa”—and the word speiciosa (from specio—to see or look at) has a reference to sight.100 In the above passage, Kant is arguing that perception is dependent upon the categories by way of being conditioned by the unity accomplished a priori by the productive synthesis of the imagination, which of course conditions everything than can be given to us in space and time, sights most obviously, but perceptions of any kind. But how can Kant speak of an intellectual synthesis of the imagination? To address this question, let us return to the empirical example from § 19 that we briefly considered earlier. I can say, “If I support a body, I feel an impression of heaviness.” According 98 B164. By consciousness (Bewusstsein), Kant typically means not just any awareness, however so vague or “marginal,” but the apperceptive act in its reference to an already synthesized intuition. Hence when Kant writes here, “everything that can come to empirical consciousness,” he is thinking of anything that be a matter of experience. And by “experience” he typically means not just any awareness but empirical cognition (B 161, 166, 218). Kant uses “can” here as he used “must be able to” in the first sentence of § 16 (which I commented on earlier), and with the same import. 99 B 152. 100 In the Metaphysical Deduction, at A 78, B 103, Kant wrote of the imagination that it is “a blind, but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.” This sentence, though preserved in the second edition, was part of the first edition, as was the passage at A 79, B 105 where Kant spoke of a “mere” synthesis. As Kant explicates the performance of the imagination in the second edition, it turns out that its synthesis is not exactly “blind” after all. And its synthesis is “mere” only in the sense that it is not a judgment. 48 �to Kant, this formulation possesses only subjective validity. It says something about me, about what I feel. But if I employ the copula “is,” I make a judgment, and it possesses objective validity. To say, “The body is heavy,” is not merely to state that the two representations have always been conjoined in my perception, however often that perception is repeated; what we are asserting is that they are combined in the object, whatever the state of the subject may be.101 The two representations are “body” and “heavy.” Each of these two representations, taken by itself, is a synthesis of a manifold. These representations are not a mere multiplicity of sense data. They are perceptual representations, apprehended through sight and touch; and, as Kant has said, even perception is subject to the categories. So the perceptions of both “body” and “heavy” are subject to the categories; but neither the individual body, seen as extended, nor its particular heaviness, felt as pressure, is an object (o), strictly so called. One can say that each of these is an object in the sense of a Gegenstand. But because neither of them, in the two perceptions achieved by the synthesis of the imagination, is yet judged, neither is yet an object in the sense of an Objekt.102 For if they were objects in this latter sense, then concepts would be used in the synthesis of them that is accomplished by the imagination.103 Kant has said, however, 101 B 142 (emphasis in the original). In this connection see B 234 – A 191, B 236, where Kant distinguishes between loose and strict use of the word, Objekt. 103 B 137. 102 49 �Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thinking (Denkens)….The only use the understanding can make of concepts is to judge by means of them…. Thinking is cognition (Erkenntnis) through concepts.104 Perceiving is not thinking; it is not judging. Still, what the imagination has synthesized—in this case body and heaviness—has a reference, according to its very sense, to a possible judgment. It is in this sense, and only in this sense, that each of these two representations of perception is subject to the categories. But when these two representations are actually brought to concepts in a judgment, something new emerges, not merely two representations, even two Gegenstände, a seen body and a felt heaviness, but an Objekt, in which the two representations are combined, indeed unified, in the apperceptive act, I think. This empirical judgment, “The body is heavy,” is, to be sure, not deducible from what is accomplished at the a priori level. It presupposes experience. But though a posteriori, the judgment is made possible by, and must conform to, what is accomplished at the a priori level. The above passages shed should make more understandable the implication of the first sentence of § 16 that, though not every one of my representations, even when construed as having an inner unity produced by synthesis of the imagination, is in fact accompanied by the “I think,” it can be accompanied by it. The inner unity of space and of time, which they possess by being elevated from mere forms of intuitions to formal intuitions, is a unity that, Kant says, “precedes any concept.” But, he also says, “it presupposes a synthesis,” by means of which “the understanding determines sensibility.”105 One might have expected him to say that, in this synthesis, “the imagination determines sensibility.” But he is using the term, “understanding,” 104 105 A 68-69, B 93-94. B 160, note. 50 �broadly, as spontaneity and combination of any kind and at any level. He uses the term “understanding” broadly this way not only in second edition of the Transcendental Deduction, but in the first edition as well: The unity of apperception in reference (or relation, Beziehung) to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this same unity, with respect (beziehungsweise) to the transcendental synthesis of imagination, [is] the pure understanding.106 This sentence is actually a definition of the faculty of understanding, broadly construed, which is so far from being a faculty distinct from the imagination that it said here to be precisely the reference of the “I think” to what the imagination, by synthesizing the manifold of intuition, offers to it, originally at the a priori level, and subsequently at the empirical level.107 Since there would be no productive synthesis of the imagination at all without its having a necessary relation to a possible judgment, the inner unity of a formal intuition, which is accomplished by the productive synthesis of the imagination, is said to depend upon the categories.108 The figurative 106 A 119 (emphasis in the original). Compare the sentence occurring at A 118: “Thus the transcendental unity of apperception refers itself (bezieht sich) to the pure synthesis of imagination.” In an unpublished fragment, Kant writes, “The unity of apperception in relation to the faculty of imagination is the understanding.” Notes and Fragments (translated by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005—from the series, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.), 258. Immediately following this sentence, Kant has written the one word, “Rules,” after which he expatiates further along the lines of the second clause quoted in the text above. 107 The distinction between or “originally” and “subsequently,” or between a priori and a posteriori, should not be taken in a literally temporal sense, as though there was some time when a priori operations alone took place, after which empirical operations followed. Kant’s distinction between a priori and a posteriori should be understood only in terms of what in cognition is, respectively, “founding” and “founded,” or between what the human mind supplies out of its own resources and what is supplied to it from without. “[T]he impressions of the senses supplying the first stimulus, the whole faculty of knowledge opens out to them (in Ansehung ihrer), and experience is brought into existence” (A 86). “In the order of time…no knowledge in us precedes experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins. But though all our knowledge begins with experience it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.” (B 1—emphasis in the original.) 108 B 144 note: “[T]he unity of intuition, whereby an object (g) is given…always includes in itself a synthesis of the manifold given for an intuition, and already contains the reference (Beziehung) of this manifold to the unity of apperception.” (Emphasis added.). In § 24, Kant can speak of the understanding both as determining inner sense and 51 �synthesis and the intellectual synthesis are as intimately connected as is possible without being simply identical.109 It is for this reason, I think, that Kant momentarily, and in opposition to what he has said earlier, speaks of an intellectual synthesis of the imagination. The imagination would not be what it is without its intrinsic reference to the unity of apperception. The Transcendental Deduction, with all its twists and turns, returns in § 26 to the claim made in § 15 that all combination—whether we become conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition, or of various concepts…is an act of the understanding. To this act the general name “synthesis” may be assigned….110 as thinking (i.e., judging): B 150: “the understanding, as spontaneity, is able to determine (bestimmen) inner sense through the manifold of given representations in conformity with (gemäss) the synthetic unity of apperception, and thus [so] to think synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition….” And yet, in the same section, at B 152, he can assign the first of these two but intimately related operations to the imagination: The, the synthesis of the imagination “.insofar as it is an exercise of spontaneity… is able to determine sense a priori in respect of its form in conformity with the unity of apperception….[I]ts synthesis of intuition, conforming as it does to categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination.” (Emphasis in the original.) That the manifold representations of intuition must be capable of being combined in one consciousness, and that they thereby subject to the conditions of the original-synthetic unity of apperception (B 136), whether are not they are attended to in an act of judgment, is the reason why Kant can call the synthesis of the imagination both “figurative” and, in his apparent overstatement, “intellectual.” Without this intrinsic reference of the imagination to the synthetic unity of apperception the former would provide us with, at most, a mere “rhapsody of perceptions” (A156, B 195). Since for Kant, the categories extend to objects (g) of a sensible intuition in general (B 148, 159, discussed in Section 6, above), one might raise the question of whether those (hypothetically entertained) thinking and finite beings different from us and possessing forms of sensible intuition different from ours would also need imagination to synthesize the manifold of their sensible intuition prior to judgment. The answer is that they would definitiely need imagination. But, no more for them than for us, would they need or even have an imagination independent of the understanding. The imagination, as Kant makes amply clear, especially in the second edition version of the Transcendental Deduction, is so to speak part and parcel of the understanding. For the very purpose of the understanding, in the case of being whose intuition is only sensible, is to connect and unify what sensibility, taken by itself, can only receive. From the great mass of data present in sensibility, but already synthesized figuratively by the imagination, the “I think” selectively attends to, or “accompanies,” this or that representation, thereby synthesizing it intellectually in a judgment. 109 John Wetlaufer speaks of the manifold in an intuition (synthesized by the imagination) as possessing a kind of “pre-predicative unity.” (“On the Transcendental Deduction: Some Problems of Interpretation and Elements of a New Reading,” 124). That’s sound right. But one could go a bit further and say that, for Kant, the manifold in an intuition synthesized by the imagination possesses a “proto-predicative unity.” For it does not just precede predication (or judgment); it has an intrinsic, anticipatory, and prefigured reference to a possible predication. 110 § 15 B 130 (emphasis added). In this sentence, Kant writes, in reference to the manifold of intuition, “sinnlichen oder nicht sinnlichen.” Because our understanding does not combine the manifold of an intellectual intuition, it has 52 �That, and how,111 one faculty—call it “synthesis in general,”112 “combination in general,” “spontaneity” simply, or “understanding” broadly—accomplishes two distinct but intimately related a priori syntheses is what Kant attempts to show in the Transcendental Deduction. The validity of the argument of the Transcendental Deduction, which is progressive and synthetic throughout, stands or falls with the success or failure of this attempt. Representations synthesized in me virtue of the productive synthesis of the imagination, which conditions all reproductive and empirical syntheses of the imagination, are not just in me. Every representation, synthesized in me by virtue of the faculty of spontaneity “under the title of the imagination,” can become an object (o) synthesized for me by virtue of the faculty of spontaneity “under the title of the understanding.” And this is just what happens when I turn my attention to something already synthesized by the imagination. From the fact that a representation has been synthesized by the imagination it follows that it is, as Kant says, subject to the categories, a formulation that means this much, but, as far as I can see, not more than this: it is possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany it. This is what the Transcendental Deduction has purportedly demonstrated. And so it can now be said, at the end of the Transcendental Deduction, simply and without a qualifying clause: It must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations. been proposed that this phrase be emended to “empirischen oder nicht empirischen.” It is conceivable, though just barely, that Kant was thinking momentarily of an intuitive understanding—cf. supra fn. 19—which might well combine, or rather create and order, the manifold of a “nicht sinnlichen” intuition. Yet in the continuation of the sentence Kant speaks about how we represent things to ourselves. But whatever we are to make of the phrase, “sinnlichen oder nicht sinnlichen,” Kant’s general claim in § 15 is clear, though controversial: whatever we can analyze into parts, we ourselves have previously synthesized into wholes. 111 With, however, more to be said about “how” in the Schematism chapter. 112 Even in the first edition, Kant ties the imagination to conceptual unifying, i.e., to judgment, as two moments or stages of synthesis, broadly construed. Cf., e.g., A 77-78, B103: “By synthesis in its most general sense, I mean the act (Handlung) of putting different representations together and [!] of grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition….[S]ynthesis is that which gathers (sammelt) the elements for cognition and [!] unites (vereinigt) them into (zu) a certain content.” 53 �Period. There can be only one source of unity, even if it is effective at two levels. I have emphasized the productive synthesis of the imagination as “first”—following Kant: “the understanding’s first application and the ground of all its other applications.” Kant may have thought that there was never a time when an imaginative synthesis was occurring without apperception taking place. Apperception is always directed to something synthesized. But, to repeat, not all that gets synthesized by the imagination gets “apperceived.” The synthesis of the imagination includes vastly more than does the synthesis of apperception. It should be noted that the Transcendental Deduction does not depend on the specific table of categories that Kant presents earlier in the Transcendental Analytic. Its conclusion therefore holds whether or not the table is complete. But Kant has argued that the category of ground and consequent is embedded in the hypothetical judgment—if p then q—as its unifying function. It makes no sense to claim that we received this form of judgment from experience. It is simply one of the ways in which the human mind thinks and must think. To the objection that we cannot be so confident that how we humans think applies to things “outside” the mind, Kant would respond, “Right on!” The categories apply only to appearances which, as such, are in space and time, hence “inside” the mind.113 An appearance, as a distinct from a thing-in- itself, exists only within, or as coordinated with, the human mind. So Kant grants, or rather insists on, the inapplicability of the human mind’s categories to things “outside,” or beyond, or existing independently of, the human mind, to things-in-themselves as distinct from appearances. But it is 113 I put “outside” and “inside” in quotations here, because these terms have spatial connotations, and space itself is, for Kant, “inside” the mind. In the “Refutation of Idealism” (B 274-279), Kant sets out to prove “the existence of objects (g) in space [!] outside me” (emphasis added). Contrary to what is occasionally said, he does not attempt in the “Refutation of Idealism” to prove the existence of things-in-themselves in space outside me. For the latter are not in space at all. 54 �the application of categories to intra-mental appearances that elevates them to objects (o), to rule-governed features of an objective, hence inter-subjectively accessible, world of spatiotemporal experience, or nature. The Transcendental Deduction does not purport to show in detail how the categories apply to objects of experience. To answer the question of “how” more adequately, and that means with reference to the table presented in the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant needs the following “Schematism” chapter, the task of which is to show how each of the categories get endowed with a temporal meaning. Nor does the Transcendental Deduction demonstrate the individual a priori principles, or fundamental propositions (Grundsätze), among which is the a priori synthetic judgment, “Every event has a cause.” These fundamental propositions need their own proofs, and supplying them is the task of the chapter Principles” chapter, which purports to demonstrate that these fundamental propositions are true and hold for nature as such, that is, that they are true regardless of the particular empirical findings of natural science.114 These propositions are not proven by, nor do they immediately follow from, the Transcendental Deduction’s preparatory proof that the categories can be applied with right to appearances. What the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic (the latter being only first part of the Transcendental Logic) together purport to show is there are a priori synthetic judgments, demonstratively true, and serving as general architectonic laws of nature, laws to which special empirical laws—discovered a posteriori through experience—must conform, but from which they cannot be derived, either by logical deduction or in any other way.115 Kant’s 114 See A.C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (London: Methuen & Co., Second Edition, 1950), 134-135 for a helpful table coordinating in detail the various forms of judgment, categories, schemata, and fundamental propositions. 115 B 163-165. If properly empirical laws were somehow deducible in their particularity from the architectonic laws of nature, from the fundamental propositions treated in the “Principles” chapter, they too would be a priori and not 55 �grounding of natural science does not go so far as to endow specific empirical laws of nature with the certainty that can hold only for a priori laws. But—assuming it is successful—this grounding does demonstrate (1) that there must be causes for all events in nature, causes distinct from and preceding the events themselves, (2) that these causes are also events in nature and depend on further causes, which are also events, and (3) that the natural scientist who is engaged in searching for causes is engaged in an objective enterprise. This is the advance that Kant has made over Hume’s skepticism; and the modesty of this advance, given the extraordinary complex and extended argumentation that Kant has to employ, can only deepen our respect for the penetration of Hume’s insight into the problem of causality. 7. Reason and the Unconditioned The Transcendental Analytic, with reliance on the Transcendental Aesthetic, aims at demonstrating a set of a priori synthetic judgments that hold for everything that appears or can appear to human mind. These are the fundamental propositions of a metaphysics of nature. The The Transcendental Dialectic, aims at showing that the most venerable arguments of classical metaphysics, arguments pertaining to things, not just as they appear to the human mind, but as they are in themselves, are irremediably flawed. Such are the arguments advanced on behalf of the immortality of the soul and arguments advanced on behalf of the existence of God. Such also are the arguments advanced for the limited or unlimited extent of the world in space and time, and arguments for and against freedom of the will. These last two, and arguments relating to empirical at all. That empirical laws of nature in their particularity and interconnectedness are not constituted, or even anticipated, a priori is, for Kant, a source of “a marked pleasure, even of admiration (Bewunderung),” as they should be for all of us. Critique of Judgment, Introduction, VI (Werke Band 8, 261). Kant realizes that, even on his interpretation of the human mind, there are limits to what it constitutes in the phenomenal realm (to say nothing of the noumenal realm). 56 �them, generate, Kant tries to show, antinomies—or opposed conclusions—by logically valid proofs that are nonetheless unsound because they assume without warrant that space and time, and the sum of appearances in space and time called nature, have an existence independent from our minds. A solution to the antinomies, Kant holds, is possible only if we make the distinction between nature, as the sum of appearances in space and time, and things-in-themselves. The existence of the Antinomies is not deduced from the argument of first part of the Critique, but is met with, Kant argues, in the investigation of nature itself. The existence of the Antinomies serves, then, as an independent confirmation of the argument of the first part of the Critique. That argument can, however, be appealed to in working out a solution to the Antinomies. According to Kant, the inconclusive proofs and contradictory conclusions that have marred the history of metaphysics have arisen from the attempts of speculative reason to comprehend what he calls “the Unconditioned,” that is, an ultimate uncaused cause or ground of all that, on inspection, presents itself as conditioned. Kant maintains that we set out in quest for the Unconditioned, not because of a mere psychological need, be it hubris, insecurity, fear of the death, unwillingness to gaze into the abyss, or what have you, but because this quest is demanded—Kant even says commanded—by reason itself.116 Dialectical illusion arises unavoidably only to the extent that reason seeks its fulfillment, its telos, in a theoretical apprehension of the Unconditioned. In the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant suggests that reason might find its telos, the Unconditioned, not in theoria but in praxis, in the realm of human willing and action. Turning this suggestion into a demonstration is initiated in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and is completed in the Critique of Practical Reason. 116 B xx; A 296, B 353. 57 �In the latter work, Kant attempts to show that reason can legislate an unconditional moral law, a law expressing to us humans not what is, unconditionally, but what ought to be, unconditionally. The word “ought”—when used in reference to human action—expresses an imperative addressed to a rational being, who by virtue of his sensuous (or animal) nature, is inclined to disobey it. This [practical] rule … is, for a being in whom reason is not the sole determining ground of the will [but who has inclinations that can be opposed to reason], an imperative, that is, a rule that is designated by an “ought” (ein Sollen), which expresses the objective (o) necessity of the act, and signifies that if reason entirely determined the will the act would inevitably happen according to the rule.117 Kant agrees with Hume that “the ought” cannot be derived from “the is”—unless, of course, we already endow “the is” with a moral character. But, that “the ought” cannot be derived from “the is” does not mean that it is irrational. Quite the opposite. The “ought” is derived from the conditional “would.” What I, a rational being encumbered by sensuous inclinations, ought to do is what a rational being unencumbered by sensuous inclinations would do.118 117 Critique of Practical Reason. Book 1, Chapter 1, 1, Definition, Remark (Werke, Band 6, 126). Inclinations for Kant pertain to the senses and feelings, to what he calls the lower faculty of desire. The higher faculty of desire is practical reason itself. See ibid. Chapter 1, Theorem 2, Remark 1 (129-133). 118 Though Kant defines obligation with reference to what a purely rational being, i.e., God, would do, he does not derive the moral law from religious belief. Quite the opposite: “Even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he is recognized as such.” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Second Section, (James Ellington translation, Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1981, 21); Werke, Band VI, 36. Leo Strauss, who is generally worlds away from Kant in his understanding of morality, agrees with him that morality does not come from religious belief. Quite the opposite: “One has not to be naturally pious, he has merely to have a passionate interest in genuine morality, in order to long with all his heart for revelation: moral man as such is the potential [!] believer.” The Law of Reason in the Kuzari (in Persecution and the Art of Writing, Glencoe IL: The Free Press, 1952), 140. Kant would add that, since the moral law cannot issue from religion, even less from experience, it can only issue from reason itself. 58 �Acting rationally means, minimally, not acting inconsistently. Acting inconsistently means acting in opposition to what he calls the categorical imperative. 119 Kant gives several formulations of the categorical imperative. I shall focus here on the formulation that is, in my opinion, the clearest and least vulnerable to criticism. Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end [that is, as possessing intrinsic worth] and never as a means, or instrument, merely [that is, as possessing worth only for someone else.].120 Kant holds that every rational being must think of himself as an end. It is not possible for a rational being, Kant says, to think of himself as mere means—as, we sometimes say, merely a “doormat” for others to wipe their feet on. If I think that you have slighted me, I say naturally something along the lines of, “Treat me like a human being.” I do not naturally say, “Treat me like a person who lives three hundred miles north of here,” or “Treat me like a music lover,” or “Treat me like a hunter.” I can say these latter things to be sure, and in certain very odd contexts they may be exactly the right things to say.” But it is much more natural to say “Treat me like a human being.” Now a human being is a rational animal. And since I do not mean, “Treat me like an animal,” when I say “Treat me like a human being,” I must mean by this expression, “Treat me like a rational being.”121 We insist on being treated as rational beings because we immediately recognize that rationality, which is constitutive of our humanity, has intrinsic worth. 119 Kant also calls the categorical imperative the moral law, more precisely, the moral law as it holds for a rational, but nonetheless finite being. An infinite rational being, or God (if he exists), acts according to the moral law. But the moral law does not address him in the form of an imperative, since, unlike finite rational beings, he has no inclination to act against it. 120 Werke, Band 6, 61: “Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden andern, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloss als Mittel brauchest.” Consider Thomas Aquinas, ST 2-2 q. 64 art. 2, ad 3: “man is naturally free and existing for himself” (homo est naturaliter liber et propter seipsum existens,). 121 I mean something similar when I say, “Treat me like an adult.” We understand an adult to have reached, as we say, the age of reason and to be, as we also say, responsible for his actions. 59 �Reason has intrinsic worth because through it we humans, unlike irrationals animals, are oriented to the Unconditioned. Now, any reason I can give for why you should treat me as an end, and not a means merely, is at the same time a reason that you can give for why I should treat you as an end and not as a means merely.122 Reason, as such, ignores what is private about us, and speaks only to what we have in common. If you are an end, and I treat you as a means merely, I am treating you as something you are not. I am acting irrationally. For me to treat you as means merely is as irrational as treating an automobile as a washing machine, or a shoe as a pencil. In fact, it is much more irrational. For in these amusing cases, I would only be treating one thing as another thing. But in treating you as a mere means, I am now treating a person as a thing;123 and that is not so amusing. It is reason itself commands us not to act irrationally and opposition to the categorical imperative, just as it commands us not to think irrationally and in opposition to the principle of non-contradiction.124 122 If you say that you do not regard yourself as an end but as a means merely, I cannot prove that you are wrong, though I can doubt that you are telling the truth. If, however, I come to think that you are telling the truth and really do regard yourself as a means merely, then I have to be wary of the implications of how you regard yourself for how you will treat me. Still, your regarding yourself as a mere means does not entitle me to treat you as a mere means, not if I think you are mistaken in how you regard yourself. Should one assert, circumspectly and sotto voce of course, that, though some human beings (the wise few?) are ends, others (the unwise many?) are means merely, i.e., that they are only things and not persons, Kant would respond that, until and unless a rigorous argument is advanced on behalf of this assertion, it does not merit serious consideration. For it is too much at odds with how we actually encounter and interact with others, especially with how we require them to treat us. We cannot reasonably require those we treat as mere things to treat us as something other than mere things, or reasonably expect, or even hope, that they will do so. 123 Consider Boethius’s definition of person, “A person is an individual substance of a rational nature,” and Thomas Aquinas’s defense of this definition in Summa Theologiae 1, q. 29, art. 1. Boethius’ definition is elegant. An individual substance of a non-rational nature is only a thing. A universal substance of a rational nature is only a concept, such as a genus or a species. Compare Kant’s definition, which is in basic agreement with Boethius’s. “A person is a subject whose acts admit of imputation. Moral personality is nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws.” Metaphysics of Morals, Introduction IV “Preliminary Concepts.” 124 The categorical imperative (especially in the formulation considered above) causes, or should cause, the phenomenal world itself to look differently that it would without it. See the striking formulation in the Critique of Practical Reason, On the Deduction of the Fundamental Propositions of Pure Practical Reason: “This law is to procure for the sensible world, as a sensible nature (regarding what pertains to rational beings), the form of an intelligible, that is, of a supersensible, nature, though without interrupting the mechanism of the former.” (Dieses 60 �Kant understands the categorical imperative to be constituted by reason itself, which precisely qua reason frames its propositions in the language of universals. This is true of ordinary political legislation too; and it is true of speculative reason in all its ventures as well. Because reason is not private but common, we can reason together, about both practical matters and speculative matters. Reason has, we might say, “a mind of its own.” We can ignore reason, to be sure. But doing so will lead to error, to falsity in speculation and to immorality in action. There is a striking parallelism in the accounts of our relationship to others in the first and second Critiques. Just as, in the Critique of Pure Reason, the possibility of intersubjective agreement in theoretical matters is founded upon an objectivity made possible by distinguishing between the empirical ego and the transcendental ego, so, in the Critique of Practical Reason, the recognition of others as ends in themselves with respect to whom I have obligations is founded on consciousness of the moral law as an expression of the ego, not as a bundle of subjective inclinations, but as rational will articulating objective law. And just as the self that knows by constituting objectivity differs in no essential way from other human knowers, so the self that acts morally differs in no essential way from other human actors.125 The Critique of Pure Reason grounds a metaphysics of nature, and the Critique of Practical Reason grounds a metaphysics of morals. The dual metaphysics that emerges from these two critiques is an account of human nature that harmonizes the modern conception of nature, the world of appearances Gesetz soll der Sinnenwelt, als einer sinnliche Natur (was die vernünftigen Wesen betrifft), die Form einer Verstandeswelt, d.i., einer übersinnlichen Natur verschaffen, ohne doch jener ihrem Mechanism Abbruch zu tun. Werke, Band 6, 156.) Kant is saying here that, though we know (through the argument of the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason) that all appearances in space and time, including the bodies of human beings, are governed by thoroughgoing determinism, our consciousness of the moral law actually makes human beings appear as persons, and not as spatio-temporal objects merely. 125 There are, of course, many empirical egos. But there are just as many transcendental egos, or—perhaps it would be better to say—just as many instantiations of the transcendental ego, although in the rules of their proper operation they do not differ from one another. 61 �standing under architectonic laws prescribed a priori by the human understanding, with the with the ancient and medieval conception of man as teleological. The Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason could seem to rule out the very freedom that the Critique of Practical Reason presupposes. Such a thing would be catastrophic for reason, for it would then be in conflict with itself. Kant attempts to solve this problem by arguing that we human beings are members of two worlds, the world as it appears, which (Kant argues) can be known to be exhibit thoroughgoing determinism, and the world as it is “in itself,” which (Kant also argues) can be thought, without the slightest contradiction, to have room for freedom. Both metaphysics are rooted ultimately in the consciousness that the ego has of itself, as a synthesizing agent in the act of knowing and as a rationally autonomous agent in the act of willing, the former characterized by spontaneity, the latter by freedom. 126 We have already considered something of what Kant means by spontaneity, but we need to take a closer look at it. 8. Empirical character and intelligible character It is sometimes is sometimes said that, according to Kant, everything of which we are conscious is subject to time. Whereas this is true of what we know in the strict sense of that word, it is not true of what we are only conscious of. Knowledge always requires an intuition adequate to the thing known. 126 In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (concluding note to Part 1), Kant equates freedom with spontaneity. 62 �In whatever manner and by whatever means a cognition may refer (beziehen) to objects (g), intuition is that through which it immediately refers to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed… Thought must…refer ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility because in no other way can an object (g) be given to us.127 It is clear that in this passage, as in others that we have considered, Kant is concerned with how objects are known, with how they are constituted. But what of the subject that engages in the act of constituting objects? I do not mean here the empirical ego, with its particular perceptions, feelings, memories, anticipations, hopes, fears, pleasures, pains, longings and the like, all of which go into distinguishing you from me. For Kant, just as much as for Hume, the ego understood this way is only a process of transitory perceptions and feelings. By the subject engaged in the act of constituting objects I am speaking of the transcendental ego. In his solution to the Third Antinomy, Kant does not base his argument for the possibility of freedom on our consciousness of the moral law, for the latter does not get thematically treated until the Critique of Practical Reason. In the solution to the Third Antimony, Kant argues for a freedom that is presupposed by, but not yet identified with, properly moral freedom—a “freedom-from,” one might call it, not yet identified with “freedom-for.” Kant says, We should, therefore, in a subject belonging to the sensible world have, first, an empirical character, whereby its actions (Handlungen) as appearances, stand in thoroughgoing connection with other appearances in accordance with unvarying laws of nature. And since these actions can be derived from the other 127 A 19, B 33. 63 �appearances, they constitute together with them a single series in the order of nature.128 The “empirical character” of the subject is what makes it an empirical ago. Its actions are appearances in time, and these are connected with other appearances, forming “a single series in the order of nature.” In this sense the empirical ego or subject is entirely subject to the principle of cause and effect. It is not free. But, Kant continues: Secondly, we should also have to allow the subject an intelligible character, by which it is indeed the cause of those same actions as appearances, but which does not itself stand under any conditions of sensibility, and is not itself appearance. We can entitle the former [i.e., the empirical character of the subject] the character of such a thing as (or in) appearance, the latter [i.e., the intelligible character of the subject] its character as thing-in-itself. Now this acting subject would not, in its intelligible character, stand under any conditions of time, for time is only the condition of appearances, not of things-inthemselves. In this subject [as a thing-in-itself], no action would begin or cease; and it would not, therefore, have to conform to the law of the determination of all that is alterable in time: that everything that happens must have its cause in the appearances that precede it. In its causality [as a thing-in-itself], so far as it is intellectual (intellektuell), it would not have a place in the series of those 128 A 539, B 567 ff. 64 �empirical conditions through which the event is rendered necessary in the world of sense.129 Kant argues that the thing-in-itself can be consistently thought of as both free, because it is not in time and thereby not subject to the schematized category of cause and effect, and yet also as a cause, because without the thing-in-itself there would be no appearances (appearances being, for Kant, appearances of something that does not itself appear). For these reasons the thing-in-itself can be consistently thought of as a free cause, even a free will. Kant removes the will from the phenomenal realm and lodges it in the noumenal realm of things-in-themselves. But he also argues that the subject as thinking, and not only as willing, must be thought of as thing-in-itself, and equally free from the thoroughgoing determinism of nature. Man is one of the appearances of the sensible world, and in so far one of the natural causes, whose causality must stand under empirical laws. Like all other things in nature he must have an empirical character. This character we observe (bemerken) through the powers and faculties which he reveals in his actions. In lifeless or merely animal nature we find no basis for thinking that any faculty is conditioned otherwise than in a merely sensible manner. Man however, who knows (kennt) all the rest of nature through the sense, cognizes himself (erkennt 129 Ibid., cont. Kemp Smith mistranslates intellektuell as “intelligible.” His note 3 (p. 468) suggests that he does not understand exactly what is going on in this particular passage. The subject has an intelligible character, insofar as it can be thought, and must be thought, apart from the data of sense-experience. But its activity is an intellectual (vs. phenomenal) causality—not identical to an intellectual (i.e., divine) intuition, but imaging it, one might say. 65 �sich selbst) through pure apperception; and this indeed in inner acts and inner determinations which he cannot reckon as impressions of the senses.130 Kant’s claim here that man “cognizes himself through pure apperception” is striking. For “pure apperception” clearly means non-empirical apperception. Pure apperception is the act of the transcendental ego. So this particular thing-in-itself, the transcendental ego, can be in some sense known, or cognized, after all. But how is this possible if all concepts, pure as well as empirical, have meaning and yield knowledge only of objects of possible experience,131 that is, knowledge of what can be given to us from without—however our much our faculty of understanding in its syntheses contributes to making what is given objective? Kant answers, more precisely he gives us the means to answer, this question in the apparent digression from the argument of Transcendental Deduction that I referred to earlier. 9. Transcendental Deduction, § 24 (last five paragraphs) - § 25. The passages dealing with the intelligible vs. the empirical character of the ego that I have quoted above occur in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Like most of what occurs in the first edition, these passages are included in the second edition as well. In rewriting the Transcendental Deduction for the second edition, Kant elaborates further on his conception of the transcendental ego as active in thinking, not just in willing. [The understanding’s] synthesis, therefore, if the synthesis be considered by itself alone is nothing but the unity of the act, of which as an act, it is conscious to 130 A 546, B 574. Kant claims at B 147 that even mathematical concepts yield knowledge only insofar as they can be applied to empirical intuition. Cf. A 156, B 195. 131 66 �itself, even without sensibility, but through which it is yet able to determine sensibility.132 When Kant says here, “if the synthesis be viewed by itself,” he means if it be considered independently of exactly what it synthesizes. The unity of the act is the unity of the “I think.” Thought is an act. It is, to be sure “empty”, without a corresponding intuition, for then it has no content, it has nothing to synthetically grasp, that is, to conceptualize.133 It is for this reason that, when Kant says that the understanding is conscious to itself of the unity of its act “even apart from sensibility,” I understand him to mean that the act of the understanding can be isolated from the particular content of sensibility that it is able to determine through its acts.134 Still, this selfconsciousness, as Kant elaborates it in the second edition of Transcendental Deduction, is not knowledge strictly so-called. [I]n the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am 132 B 153. Kemp Smith glosses “without sensibility” as “without the aid of sensibility.” The consciousness “I think” is not consciousness of a manifold merely but rather consciousness of an act, albeit an act of synthesizing a manifold. I interpret Kant to be arguing, not that the “I think” could occur even without any manifold, pure or empirical, to synthesize, but only that self-consciousness, as occurring in the apperceptive act, does not rely on any particular manifold given through sensibility, not even on the pure manifolds of the forms of sensible intuition that are peculiar to us. Still, some form of sensible intuition must be given for the “I think” to be the act of synthesis that Kant holds it to be. B 133; 135. 133 See B 422, note, concluding sentence. 134 See B 135. “The fundamental proposition of the necessary unity of apperception (the ‘I think’)…reveals the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in intuition, without which the thoroughgoing identity of selfconsciousness cannot be thought” (emphasis added). What is at issue here is the identity of self-consciousness, its identity over time, as distinct from the manifold of representations, which vary over time. Identity of selfconsciousness over time surely presupposes the unity of its act: the former is a consequence of the latter, not vice versa. 67 �conscious (bewusst) of myself, not as I appear to myself, not as I am in myself, but only that I am.135 Note the absence of the apophantic “as” in transcendental apperception. In transcendental apperception I am conscious of myself, neither as I appear not as I am, but only that I am.136 Indeed, Kant has said earlier in the Deduction, This fundamental proposition of the necessary unity of apperception is…an identical, and therefore analytic proposition.137 The fundamental proposition is the very “I think” that can accompany all my representations. The predicate “think” is analytically contained in the concept of the subject “I.” The ego is conscious of itself in thinking, and thinking is, according to Kant, an act. The contradictory of any analytic proposition is one that cannot be thought without contradiction, and the proposition “I think” is no exception. The proposition, “I do not think,” is a proposition that I cannot think without contradiction. But as an analytic proposition, or judgment, the “I think,” does not extend my knowledge. The predicate only explicates what is already thought that in the subject.138 This representation [i.e., the original synthetic unity of apperception – the “I think] is a thought, not an intuition. Now in order to know ourselves, there is required in addition to (or beyond—ausser) the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate 135 B 157. Consider the distinction Kant makes, in the Preface to second edition between “intellectual consciousness of my existence” [which I possess] and “determination of my existence through intellectual intuition [which I do not possess].” B xi (emphasis in the original). 136 There is a curious parallel between what Kant says here about the transcendental ego and what Thomas Aquinas repeatedly says about God: we can know that he exists, but we cannot know his essence. 137 B 135. 138 Kant calls analytic judgments “explicative,” and synthetic judgments “ampliative.” Only the predicates in the latter add something beyond what is already thought (even if confusedly thought) in the concept of the subject. A 7, B 11. 68 �mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; it therefore follows that although my own existence is not indeed appearance (still less illusion), the determination of my existence can take place only in conformity with the form of inner sense [i.e., time]….Accordingly I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is very far from being knowledge of the self….I exist as intelligence, which is conscious solely of its power of combination (Verbindungsvermögen); but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subject to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of the understanding strictly regarded (eigentlichen Verstandesbegriffen).139 Mere consciousness of self is not genuine knowledge of self because it lacks the appropriate intuition. By means of sensible, temporal intuition I can know myself as I appear. The consciousness that “I am,” however, is not the consciousness of myself as just appearing (whatever that might mean), but as being, as existing, unequivocally. But to this selfconsciousness I have no corresponding intuition, no intellectual intuition, that would enable me to determine in what manner I exist, i.e., what I am in addition to that I am. Nonetheless mere consciousness of self, though not knowledge properly so called, is not insignificant. The “I think” expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given.140 139 140 B 157 – B 159. B 158, note. 69 �Kant emphasizes again that in the “I think,” existence is thereby given. “I think” (hence “I exist’) is an analytic, indeed an identical proposition.”141 …since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the determining in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of determination, as time does in the case of determinable, I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being.142 Note again that knowledge is the determination of what something is, determination through concepts and intuition. “I cannot [in the “I think” of transcendental apperception] determine my existence as a self-active being.” A self-active being would be active in the strongest sense of the expression. It would be able act in relation to itself and not only in relation to what is given to it. A self-active being would be would be self-determining or morally free. But, according to Kant, consciousness of my synthetic, productive, and determining activity in relation to what is other than me (a manifold of intuition, pure or empirical, to be united; or even diverse concepts to be connected) is not conscious of self-determination. Whether I—as I am “in-myself”—am morally free or not, or for that matter, immortal or mortal, remains unknown. [All] that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is [the spontaneity] of the determination [or, more precisely, the spontaneity of the act of determination]; and my existence is still only determinable, sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance.” (Emphasis added). 141 Compare B 420-425 (from the Paralogisms) with B 131-135 and B 155-159 (both from the Transcendental Deduction). If we take these passages together it looks as though a fourth possibility not explored in the Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, and tempting to dismiss as nonsensical, is taken seriously by Kant. “I think” is an analytic, but nonetheless empirical, proposition (or judgment). Only by making this claim, strange though it sounds, can Kant both accomplish the task Transcendental Deduction and rule out the possibility of a proof for the immortality of the soul. This matter requires further exploration, which, however, will not be undertaken here. 142 Ibid. 70 �To this Kant adds a qualification. But it is owing to this spontaneity [of my thought] that I entitle myself an intelligence.143 It is only consciousness of the spontaneity of thought that (assuming he did not change his mind on this point) Kant must have been thinking of when, in the solution to the Second Antinomy, he said that man “cognizes himself through pure apperception.” We are now in a position to respond to one of the most common criticisms of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, that Kant applies the categories to the things-in-themselves, which transcend any possible experience, by saying that they exist, even that they are causes. But in doing so he violates his express claim that the categories, existence and cause among them, apply only to objects of experience. Kant cannot be rescued from this criticism solely by repeating his observation that the categories can be used to think, though not to know, things-in-themselves. For we must really know, and not just think, that at least one a-spatial, a-temporal thing-in-itself really does exist in order to be able to say that our spatial, temporal experience is of appearances only and not of things as they are in-themselves. The whole argument of the Critique of Pure Reason depends on our knowing at least this much. Nor can Kant be rescued from the charge of applying the categories to things that transcends any possible experience solely by saying that it is the unschematized categories, the categories without temporal meaning, that he applies to things-in- 143 Ibid. 71 �themselves. For Kant also teaches that, without this temporal meaning, the categories yield not even the slightest knowledge of objects.144. Of objects. But what does this say about the relation of categories to the subject, to the ego itself? Here we note a curiosity: though Kant uses the expression “things-in-themselves,” in the plural, to name the unknowable that lies behind appearances, he also frequently uses the expression “the thing-in-itself,” in the singular, to name the same unknowable that lies behind appearances. As far as I know, the only individual thing-in-itself that Kant ever says that we know exists, the only thing that he says we know is not just a spatio-temporal appearance, is the transcendental ego itself.145 Now, in transcendental apperception I am conscious that I am, but I do not know what I am, for this self-consciousness lacks the intuition that would elevate it to knowledge properly so called, to a knowledge that would determine my existence, to a knowledge of what I am. And yet the consciousness that I am is surely, in some circumscribed sense of the word, knowledge that I am. This knowledge that I am is highly restricted in that 1) it is not knowledge of an object at all, but of the subject; and 2) it is expressed in the analytic proposition “I think,”146 which as analytic does count as an extension of our knowledge. The existence, then, and not just the appearance, of the knowing subject is self-evident, precisely because “I think” is an analytic judgment. My existence is given with, is in fact identical with, 144 A 146, B 185: “The schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding are thus the true and sole conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects (o) and so possess significance (or meaning—Bedeutung).” (Emphasis in the original.) See the sentence that at the end of B 150. 145 The other candidate for a thing-in-itself, not construable as an appearance only, would be God. However, Kant argues at great length in the section of Critique of Pure Reason called “The Ideal of Pure Reason,” that we do not and cannot know that God exists. But he also argues there and elsewhere that we can think, without contradiction, that God exists. And more than that. He argues in the Critique of Practical Reason (Book II, Chapter II, sections 46; Werke, Band 6, 252-264) that we must postulate that God exists (and also that the soul is immortal) in order to make sense to ourselves of how the highest good—according to Kant, happiness in proportion to moral worth— which ought to be, could be. 146 B 135; 407. 72 �my thinking.147 Consequently, it is self-evident that at least one thing-in itself exists, namely, the ego that which is that is engaged in thinking. This self-evident knowledge is sufficient to ground the distinction between appearances and the thing-in-itself that the argument of the book turns on. Two questions arise. Does this distinction itself entail an illegitimate application of the category of existence? And when we say that the ego as thing-in-itself is a transcendental cause of appearances, does this amount to an illegitimate application of the category of causality? No. For the issue of legitimate vs. illegitimate category application (in relation to knowing, as distinct from thinking merely) always concerns application of the categories to objects, legitimately to objects of a possible experience and illegitimately to objects that transcend any possible experience. In fact, even when these categories are employed in speaking about the subject, they are not applied to the subject.148 Rather, the subject—in a way that Kant, unlike his greatest successors, seems to have thought does not admit of further explication—is itself the origin of the categories.149 We must remember that the categories are functions of unity in judgments, and that the table of categories is derived from the table of judgments. A judgment expresses the “I think” and the different forms of judgment express the different ways in which I think. Accordingly the categories are originally, though, so to speak, only latently, present “within” the “I think.” In saying that the “I think” discloses my existence to me, and even the causality of my thought as regards the constitution of objects, these two categories are not applied at all, for there is nothing genuinely distinct from them, like an intuition, to which they could be applied. The fundamental proposition “I think,” even “I think” actively and not passively, is explicative only, not ampliative. Because the proposition is analytic, the predicate, 147 B 422, note. B 131; B 408-409; 422, and note. 149 The subject, unlike an object, is surely not constituted as existing by applying the category of existence to it. For all category application presupposes an existing subject to perform it. 148 73 �“think,” adds nothing to the subject, “I,” but only makes explicit what already thought in this subject.150 When categories are applied to an object, the application extends them beyond their origin in the subject. When the categories are employed with reference to the knowing subject, they remain where they are: they come with the subject, originally. The existence and the causality (in constituting objects) of the transcendental subject, and the unity of its act, are evident in self-consciousness. In fact, not only is it a mistake to say that the categories are applied to the subject, to the ego that thinks; when one uses expressions like “existence,” “causality,” and “unity” with reference to the “I think,” it is a mistake even to call then “categories,” which are, after all, only “concepts of an object [g] in general.” [T]he concept of combination (Verbindung) contains, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise out of the combination. Rather, it is what, by adding itself to the representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of the combination. This unity, which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is not the category [!] of unity (§ 10); for all categories are grounded in logical functions of judgment, and in these functions combination, and therefore unity of given concepts is already thought. Thus the 150 I cannot, for example, infer from the proposition, “I think,” not even from the “I think” understood as existent and actively constituting objects in categorial syntheses, the proposition, “I am a simple substance” (and hence, by virtue of being simple that I cannot be de-composed, i.e. that I am naturally immortal). For the latter is a synthetic judgment that goes outside of the subject “I” and appends to it a predicate “simple substance” that is not thought in the subject. On other hand, and as already noted several times, the proposition, “I think,” is analytic. The concept of the subject, “I,” contains within itself the predicate “think”—and thinking, as Kant understands it, is essentially active, constitutive of objects, even causative of them qua objects. 74 �category already presupposes combination. We must therefore seek yet higher for this unity (as qualitative, § 12), namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgments, and therefore of the possibility of the understanding, even as regards its logical employment.151 The question of how Kant can apply the categories to things-in-themselves resolves into the question of how the thinking subject can know that he is and not simply that he appears. Kant’s answer is that it is immediately evident that the thinking subject is self-conscious and, moreover, can it direct itself to its own faculties and operation. The transcendental ego’s recognition that it exists as thinking, and thereby as active, even causative (of combination), and that its act possesses unity, is—instead of category application to something given from without— reflection, a self-relation that is inward and original, even originating. One may not be fully satisfied with this answer to the question of how Kant can employ the terms “existence,” “causality,” and “unity” when speaking of the thing-in-itself that is the transcendental ego. But it is, I submit, Kant’s answer, indeed, the only possible answer that can be given in Kantian terms. And it bears serious consideration, touching as it does and the overarching question that will occur to the thoughtful reader of the First Critique: “How is a Critique of Pure Reason Possible?”152 However that question is to be answered adequately, or even adequately addressed, Kant was surely not deaf to it. He did not, as is commonly alleged, thoughtlessly violate his own rules of category application any more than he naively assumed the validity of Newtonian science in order to prove the validity of Newtonian science. He did not spend the decade in which he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason in a stupor. 151 B 128. B 129-131. The part of the First Critique that includes Kant’s treatment of the “I think,” he calls the “Transcendental Analytic.” It consists, he says, in the dissection (Zergliederung) of all our a priori knowledge into the elements of the pure understanding (Verstaneserkenntnis). A 64, B 89. 152 75 �In conclusion I draw attention to a most interesting parallel and opposition between the self-consciousness of transcendental apperception and the consciousness of the moral law, between the a priori analytic proposition, “I think,” and the a priori synthetic proposition, “I am obliged” (to act such that the maxim of my will could always hold at the same as principle establishing universal law). The predicate “think” is analytically contained in the concept of the ego. But the predicate “am obliged etc.” is not analytically contained in concept of the ego; it is synthetically connected to the concept of the ego by an act of practical reason, which thereby makes the consciousness of the moral law “a fact of reason,” even “the sole fact of reason.” 153 The analytic proposition, “I think,” expresses the spontaneity of the understanding; the a priori synthetic proposition “I am obliged…” expresses the freedom of the will. In both propositions the ego is conscious of itself as active.154 The conception of the ego as active, in both thinking and willing, is the ultimate ground of Kant’s dual metaphysics, of nature and of morals. 153 B 135; Critique of Practical Reason § 7 (Werke, Band 6, 141-142). Needless to say, the fact of reason is not what gets called “a brute fact.” A fact of reason is something made (factum) by reason. 154 The general parallelisms within the dual metaphysics that Kant attempts to ground are striking. Speculative Reason: The argument of the Prolegomena moves “regressively” from taking the existence of natural science properly so called—which Hume had called into question—as given, without a rigorously justifying argument, to the point of departure for the Critique of Pure Reason. The latter then moves “progressively” by arguing rigorously from what Kant attempts to show pertains to the very nature of speculative reason to a justification of what was merely assumed in the Prolegomena—thereby answering Hume. The Prolegomena is not an essential part of Kant’s speculative philosophy, but only an introduction to it, starting from what is commonly taken for granted. The Critique of Pure Reason, however, grounds an a priori science of nature, explicated in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, which in turn grounds empirical natural science (which for Kant is, paradigmatically, physics, since he holds, controversially, that there is only so much science in given field of inquiry as there is mathematics in it). Practical Reason: The argument of the Groundwork moves “regressively” from taking the existence of free choice and duty (which the “eudaemonists” had called into question) as given, without a rigorously justifying argument, to the point of departure for the Critique of Practical Reason. The latter work then moves “progressively” by arguing rigorously from what Kant thinks pertains to the very nature of practical reason to a justification of what was merely assumed in the Groundwork (thereby answering the “eudaemonists,” and also Hume, who says: “Reason is, and ought [!] only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office but to serve and obey them.” A Treatise of Human Nature, II, iii, 3). The Groundwork is not an essential part of Kant’s practical philosophy, but only an introduction to it, starting from what is commonly taken for granted. The Critique of Practical Reason, however, grounds an a priori science of morals, explicated in the Metaphysics of Morals (consisting of a “Doctrine of Right” and a “Doctrine of Virtue”),which in turn grounds an empirical moral science, explicated in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Publication dates of the above works: Critique of Pure Reason (1781; second edition: 1787) 76 �Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics (1783) Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) Critique of Practical Reason (1788) Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) Publication dates of three other late, and major works. Critique of Judgment (1790); Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (1793), Opus Postumum (1804). 77 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Transcripts—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Description An account of the resource Items in this collection are part of a series of lectures given every year at St. John's College at the Santa Fe, NM campus. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data paper Page numeration Number of pages in the original item. 77 pages Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Kant's grounding of a dual metaphysics Description An account of the resource Transcript of a lecture given on February 8, 2017 by James Carey as part of the Dean's Lecture and Concert Series. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carey, James Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017-02-08 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource text Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource pdf Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context Carey, J. 2017-02-08 Subject The topic of the resource Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/f6f5bad443e137d4adcbce427bb8e811.mp3 28bfe02586c8c7aef9caa57c65fdf943 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Recordings—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Sound A resource primarily intended to be heard. Examples include a music playback file format, an audio compact disc, and recorded speech or sounds. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data m4a Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 01:06:16 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Duns Scotus’s Modal Argument for the Existence of God - An Introduction Description An account of the resource Audio recording of a lecture given by tutor James Carey on April 12, 2023 as part of the Dean's Lecture & Concert Series. The Dean's Office has provided this description of the event: "John Duns Scotus (c. 1266 –1308) was a Franciscan friar and theologian so renowned for his logical acumen and ingenuity that he early on acquired the appellation “the subtle doctor.” His argument for the existence of God is not nearly as well-known as are the arguments of Anselm (c. 1033–1109) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), though it is held by some to be the most powerful of them all. Scotus’s argument is “modal” in that it turns on the concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity. It does not rely on the claims of revelation; and it does not rely on an Aristotelian theory of motion either. Scotus’ argument is complex. And it is long too, occupying in one version, On the First Principle (De Primo Principio), some 70 pages of tight reasoning and concentrated, technical prose. My lecture is only an introduction, and it presupposes no prior familiarity with Scotus. I presented an earlier version of this lecture here in 2015. Some faculty heard it, though few, if any, current students. Sophomores, in particular, might find it of interest." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carey, James Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2023-04-12 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource sound Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource mp3 Subject The topic of the resource Duns Scotus, John, approximately 1266-1308 God Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context SF_CareyJ_Duns_Scotus_Modal_Argument_for_the_Existence_of_God_2023-04-12 https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/61c3997bb4b7b4f1c7d115ac82658949.mp3 c500a65ebe5eb75b9180f3a5e8bd2e88 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource St. John's College Lecture Recordings—Santa Fe Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource St. John's College Meem Library Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Sound A resource primarily intended to be heard. Examples include a music playback file format, an audio compact disc, and recorded speech or sounds. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data M4A Duration Length of time involved (seconds, minutes, hours, days, class periods, etc.) 01:06:11 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Taking the Measure of Metaphysics Description An account of the resource Audio recording of a lecture given by tutor Jim Carey on April 24, 2026 as part of the Dean’s Lecture & Concert Series. The Dean’s Office has provided this description of the event: “According to Aristotle, there is a science (epistēmē) that considers being as being, or that which is insofar as it is. This science later came to be known as ‘metaphysics,’ a word that Aristotle himself does not use but which came into use a few centuries after he died and has been with us ever since. Metaphysics does not consider that which is in terms of its particular features, as do other sciences such as astronomy, chemistry, biology, and psychology. The concern of metaphysics is broader than that of physics. Physics limits itself to the study of perceivable beings, to bodies that are in motion or capable of being put into motion. Though metaphysics does not limit itself this way, it does not adopt as a premise that there is something outside the domain of physics. Instead, it begins by considering the very things that physics considers, but in a different way. Whether, starting from such a basis, metaphysics can demonstrate the existence of something ‘beyond’ nature, and, if so, what pertains to its essence, is a controversial question. The various answers to this question constitute the history of metaphysics, or discourse about being, from Classical Antiquity through the Middle Ages and into Modernity. In my talk I will highlight and attempt an assessment of what I consider to be the most consequential events in this history, which culminates, after a fashion, in Heidegger’s claim that not only is discourse about being historical, but being itself is historical." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carey, James Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available St. John's College Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Santa Fe, NM Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2026-04-24 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource Meem Library has been given permission to make this item available online. Type The nature or genre of the resource sound Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource mp3 Subject The topic of the resource Metaphysics Language A language of the resource English Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context SF_CareyJ_Taking_the_Measure_of_Metaphysics_2026-04-24 Friday night lecture