1
20
180
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/65087a9712c19003ca7c6d880d2889ca.pdf
bd4ddef05ddd3ff3ed86938c6600092b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
12 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1967
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
A Unique Opportunity for Summer Graduate Study
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1967
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1967.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/d1bcd1210ac77a902b166d011549e6d4.pdf
9607d49df8e6014c20d286131b0ed886
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
12 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1968
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
A Unique Opportunity for Summer Graduate Study
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1968
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1968.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/19e806b2e6946c6699de1bec3d3bd664.pdf
85949c0f10e5b9cd2bf2916078de3c33
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
12 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1969
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1969
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1969.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/76050d3abef2776fbb0d1df4e76f73ed.pdf
490bef0459a80ffffb941109a9cbafde
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
13 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1970
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1970
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1970.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/e53587d486a1a6db45145bd8acef35e0.pdf
55426ba6390c1138c9537f6450311a0b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
16 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1971
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College in Santa Fe 1971
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1971
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1971.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/8848b5744855ecbadd062439cd22ab91.pdf
bc7dd65b57e9bd8df2d9b9870f8d8773
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
13 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1972
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College Santa Fe, New Mexico 1972
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1972
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1972.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/79e14c85b1ce74645cc7794afbe3d551.pdf
5824b76126341ca3d2b74d7622556829
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
13 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1973
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College in Santa Fe 1973
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1973
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1973.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/f0801b20030ac14ce704ae16e91be19d.pdf
4b998f651ed1f553ffb50b8bc68befdb
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
18 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1974
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College, Santa Fe, New Mexico 1974
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1974
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1974.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/c98f8901cfda66cdf6693f39fb4e55e3.pdf
db634185836357e1efb70b3593f25b61
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
20 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1975
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College, Santa Fe, New Mexico 1975
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1975
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1975.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/7b3c5c46bb2327faaddcc4b96935edef.pdf
96a5cc7aef62505690fb943bb9177dda
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
18 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1976
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College Santa Fe, New Mexico 1976
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1976
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1976.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/7c86d0b396b002cc444b0c9eca156944.pdf
4291e7f934ae532a6a7d4e6b2fa8023f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
12 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1978
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College Santa Fe, New Mexico and Annapolis, Maryland 1978
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1978
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1978.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/d9190e5c959097a4188f5ff469d07616.pdf
b3442839fcfe23fee8cd338d2076802d
PDF Text
Text
Summer Lectures (1979)
8 June
Michael Dink
15 June
Elliot Zuckerman
22 June
Jon Lenkowski
29 June
Samuel Kutler
6 July
David Lachterman
13 July
John White
20 July
ESSAYS DUE
27 July
Mary Hannah Jones
3 August James Carey
Friendship in Plato’s Phaedo
An Opinion about Major and Minor
On Definitions
Play and Seriousness
On Aristotle’s Metaphysics
Aristotle’s Poetics
Muθos in the Odyssey
Aristotle and the Problems of Intelligibility
�\T
k ! lt'-J
l! 1it'\l
t
•
,, .
,n
~ C'
J 1 1~ '·'A'~Y·.
,.
i<u
t{l
\
\l"
,t;,~ I
'.
•rtt\l
.,. I
[G~
lli) IJ~•l4
11 M.\ \
U'
l•: r !>..
7•lck.
'
.
7
l
··~~~n.
' <)..tSr •
r.:•
J)f
f in.i ... i;:H
t. t I er
~·c
·~r ·8.!)
.iotctJ.e'~ f..t?t t·
, h Jon-.::s
8
I'
6/-17
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series
Description
An account of the resource
The Wednesday Night Lecture Series, hosted during the summer term by the Graduate Institute at St. John’s College in Annapolis, is a less-formal version of the college’s formal Friday Night Lectures. The Wednesday Night lectures are an opportunity for tutors and for graduates of the college who are pursuing academic careers to present the first fruits of their thinking to an attentive and inquisitive audience. The lectures, held in the King William Room of the Barr-Buchanan Center at 7:30 p.m., with a question period afterward in a neighboring classroom, are free and open to the public.<br /><br />For more information, and for a schedule of upcoming lectures, please visit the <strong><a title="Summer lecture series" href="https://www.sjc.edu/annapolis/events/lectures/summer-wednesday-night-lecture-series" target="_blank">St. John's College website</a></strong>.<br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=31">Items in the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
2 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Graduate Institute
Title
A name given to the resource
Summer Lectures (1979)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1979
Description
An account of the resource
Schedule of lectures and concerts in Summer 1979, sponsored by the Graduate Institute.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lecture Schedule 1979 Summer
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Dink, Michael
Zuckerman, Elliott
Lenkowski, Jon
Kulter, Samuel
Lachterman, David Rapport, 1944-
White, John
Jones, Mary Hannah
Carey, James
Graduate Institute
Lecture schedule
Summer lecture series
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/e72887bb0ed9def6cafbe452d29a131d.pdf
3cbdbf242ca2f4c05cc55b292f94481c
PDF Text
Text
GRADUATE INSTITUTE
in
LIBERAL EDUCATION
ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE
ANNAPOLIS, M A R Y L A N D
SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO
1696-1980
FOURTEENTH ANNUAL
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES
THURSDAY, AUGUST FOURTEENTH
NINETEEN HUNDRED EIGHTY
�^^ss^s^ss^^&^^m^^s^ss^ss^s^^s^^ss^s^
PR
P R O G R A M
for ^h»
SECOND
of the
GRADUATE INSTITUTE in ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
I
3 3:0° ?- M- >
QR&AT HALL
1 ACADEMIC PROCESSION
|
INVOCATION
MICHAEL S. LITTLETON, Tutor, St. John's College fc:
WELCOME
EDWARD 6. SPARROW, Acting President
COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS
1
DAVID STARR, Director-elect Graduate Institute f|
CONFERRING OF DEGREES
EDWARD & 0 HARROW, Acting President
MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE
EfoUCt QLASCfW 6.BGW6JN
$ON PARK O'DONNCLL
Hyattsville, Maryland
MROLD F3SHCR
Largo, Maryland
SHARON MCDL&J PURC6LL
Gates Mills, Ohio
Lanham, Maryland
A£/V/V£77/ UMLLJAft K£MP
Tipton, Iowa
CHARLCS AUSTJ/V R3CHAROSON
Annapolis, Maryland
MUK COVWAy hO)LJN
3NNA WJNOCOUn UHLJQ
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Annapolis, Maryland
LOUTA COLSON WOOD
Fort Lee, New Jersey
I
BENEDICTION
MICHAEL S. LITTLETON, Tutor, St. John's College
] ACADEMIC PROCESSION
i
i
4:00 P.M.,
BALCWJN ROOM
^
FAREWELL COCKTAIL PARTY
K
I
^
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Commencement Programs and Addresses
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Addresses given at commencement and programs of events related to, and including, the annual commencement ceremonies at St. John's College. Includes both the undergraduate and Graduate Institute commencements. <br /><br />The College Archives holds programs and/or addresses for the following years:<br />
<ul>
<li>1796</li>
<li>1835-1836</li>
<li>1842</li>
<li>1852</li>
<li>1856-1857</li>
<li>1870</li>
<li>1878</li>
<li>1880</li>
<li>1890</li>
<li>1893</li>
<li>1895</li>
<li>1897</li>
<li>1907</li>
<li>1910-1918</li>
<li>1920-1924</li>
<li>1928-1929</li>
<li>1932</li>
<li>1936-1937</li>
<li>1939-1945</li>
<li>1947-present </li>
</ul>
Click on <strong><a title="Commencement Programs and Addresses" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=18&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the Commencement Programs and Addresses Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
commencementprograms
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
2 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1980-08-14
Description
An account of the resource
Program for the second commencement of the Graduate Institute in Annapolis, Maryland.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GICommencementExercises1980
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Subject
The topic of the resource
Commencement (St. John's College, Annapolis, MD)
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute Commencement Program, 1980
Commencement
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/b66747e43e665d6bd1a8435c764d8230.pdf
3b48e5885059330e9d230ccee5239e36
PDF Text
Text
LECTURE SCHEDULE
Summer 1981 - February Freshman
Samuel Kutler
On Perfection
June 12
John White
Poetics (of Aristotle)
June 19
Douglas Allanbrook
Concert
Great Hall
June 26
Donald Conroy
Pindar
July
Mr. Lindemuth
Ethics of Aristotle
July 10
Elliott Zuckerman
On Major and Minor
July 17
N o
July 24
Joe Sachs
Metaphysics of Aristotle
July 31
Winfree Smith
The Wandering Moon
June
5
3
L e c t u r e
(essay week-end)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series
Description
An account of the resource
The Wednesday Night Lecture Series, hosted during the summer term by the Graduate Institute at St. John’s College in Annapolis, is a less-formal version of the college’s formal Friday Night Lectures. The Wednesday Night lectures are an opportunity for tutors and for graduates of the college who are pursuing academic careers to present the first fruits of their thinking to an attentive and inquisitive audience. The lectures, held in the King William Room of the Barr-Buchanan Center at 7:30 p.m., with a question period afterward in a neighboring classroom, are free and open to the public.<br /><br />For more information, and for a schedule of upcoming lectures, please visit the <strong><a title="Summer lecture series" href="https://www.sjc.edu/annapolis/events/lectures/summer-wednesday-night-lecture-series" target="_blank">St. John's College website</a></strong>.<br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=31">Items in the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
1 page
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Graduate Institute
Title
A name given to the resource
Lecture Schedule, Summer 1981 - February Freshman
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1981
Description
An account of the resource
Schedule of lectures and concerts in Summer 1981, sponsored by the Graduate Institute.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lecture Schedule 1981 Summer
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Kutler, Samuel
White, John
Allanbrook, Douglas
Conroy, Donald
Lindemuth, Donald
Zuckerman, Elliott
Sachs, Joe
Smith, J. Winfree
Graduate Institute
Lecture schedule
Summer lecture series
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/73afa0678e0f093b83984c9374152d8a.pdf
abb89a6bcf467722f6510132125dc7f1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
ii, 18 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1982
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1982
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1982.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/b542762124e85ddb297b8414f6f17dcd.pdf
dc20a91725fb0413e06dc43a8baf7721
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
ii, 18 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1983
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1983
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for summer 1983.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/d69d250ca23c7f8714280fcab7732302.pdf
ce19176cafd7ed9d3dc440ec07816aa0
PDF Text
Text
Joe Sachs, draft of introduction to his translation of Aristotle's Physics
Delivered as a lecture for the Graduate Institute, August 6, 1983
1
INfRODUCTION
Philosophic writing
The activity known as philosophy did not originate among the ancient
Greeks. It is a permanent human possibility, that must have arisen in all
places and times when anyone paused in the business of life to wonder
about the way things are. But it was among the Greeks that it was named
and described, and began to be reflected in written texts. It was two
thinkers who wrote during the fourth centucy B.C., Plato and Aristotle, who
showed the world for all time the clearest examples of philosophic
thinking.
Plato's dialogues display the inescapable beginnings of
philosophy in all questions that touch on how a human being should
live~
and show that such questions must open up for examination all the
comfortable assumptions we make about the world. Aristotle's writings
trace an immense labor of the intellect, striving to push the power of
thinking to its limits.
Reading Aristotle, to be sure, is not at all like reading Plato. The
dialogues are beautiful in style, sensitive in the depiction of living and
breathing people, and altogether polished works meant for the widest
public. The writings of Aristotle that we possess as wholes are school texts
that, with the possible exception of the Nicomachean Ethics, were never
meant for publication. The title that we have with the Physics describes it
as a "course of listening." The likeliest conjecture is that these works
_-. . originated as oral discourses by Aristotle, written down by students,
.
corrected by Aristotle, and eventually assembled into longer connected
. arguments.
They presuppose acquaintance with arguments that are
referred to without being made (such as the "third
m~"),
and with
�2
examples that are never spelled out (such as the incommensurability of
.•
i"
the diagonal). They 'are demanding texts to follow, and are less interested
in beauty of composition than in exactness of statement. But in the most
important respect, the writings of Plato and Aristotle are more like each
other than either is like anything else. Both authors knew how to breathe
philosophic life into dead words on a page.
In Plato's dialogues, it is the figure of Socrates, always questioning,
always disclaiming knowledge, always pointing to what is not yet
understood, who keeps the tension of live thinking present. Despite the
efforts of misguided commentators, one need only read any dialogue to see
that there is no dogma there to be carried off, but only work to be done,
work of thinking into which Plato draws us. It may appear that Aristotle
rejects this Platonic path, giving his thought the closure of answers and
doctrine, turning philosophy into "science,"
but this is a distortion
produced by transmission through a long tradition and by bad translations.
The tradition speaks of physics, metaphysics, ethics, and so on as sciences
in the sense of conclusions deduced from first principles, but the books
written by Aristotle that bear those names contain no such "sciences."
What they all contain is dialectical reasoning, argument that does not start
with the highest knowledge in hand, but goes in quest 'of it, beginning with
whatever opinions seem worth examining. Exactly like Plato's dialogues,
Aristotle's writings lead the reader on from untested opinions toward more
reliable ones. Unlike the author of the dialogues, Aristotle records his best
~·, efforts to get beyond trial
and error to trustworthy ·conclusions. What
keeps those conclusions from becoming items of dogma? The available
translations hide the fact, but Aristotle devises a philosophic vocabulary
that is incapable of dogmatic ·use.
�3
This claim will come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the lore of
substances and accidents, categories, essences, per se individuals, and so
forth, but if Aristotle were somehow to reappear among us he would be
even more surprised to find such a thicket of impenetrable verbiage
attributed to him. Aristotle made his students work hard, but he gave
them materials they could work with, words and phrases taken from the
simplest contents of everyday speech, the kind of language that is richest
in meaning and most firmly embedded in experience and imagination. The
only trouble with ordinary speech, for the purposes of philosophy, is that it
carries too much meaning; we are so accustomed to its use that it
automatically carries along all sorts of assumptions about things, that we
make without being aware of them. Aristotle's genius consists in putting
together the most ordinary words in unaccustomed combinations. Since
the combinations are jarring, our thinking always has to be at work, right
now, afresh as we are reading, but since the words combined are so readily
understood by everyone, our thinking always has something to work with.
The meanings of the words in Aristotle's philosophic vocabulary are so
straightforward and inescapable that two results are assured: we will be
thinking about something, and not stringing together empty formulas, and
we will be reliably in communication with Aristotle; ·thinking about the
· very things he intended.
. We need to illustrate both the sort of thing that Aristotle wrote, and the
way the translations we have destroy its effect.
Consider the word
essence. This is an English word, and we all know more or less how to use
it. Perfumes have essences, beef stock can be boiled down to its essence,
and the most important part of anything can be called its essenceo It
seems to have some connection with necessity, since we occasionally
�4
dismiss something as not essential. By the testimony of usage, that is
about it. Essence is a relatively vague English word. If we know Latin, the
word begins to have some resonance, but none of the:it has crossed over
into English. So what do we do when we find a translation of Aristotle full
of the word essence?
We have to turn to expert help.
Ordinary
dictionaries will probably not be sufficient, but we will need philosophic
dictionaries, commentaries on Aristotle, textbooks on philosophy, or
trained lecturers who possess the appropriate degrees. In short, we need
to be initiated into a special dub; it may make us feel superior to the
ordinary run of human beings, and it will at least make us think that
philosophy is not for people in general, but only for specialists. Medical
doctors, for example, seek just those effects for their area of expert
knowledge by never using an ordinary, understandable name for anything,
but only a Latin derivative with many syllables. But did Aristotle want
such a result? If not, writing in such a style can hardly be presented as a
translation of Aristotle.
What did Aristotle write where the translators put the word essence?
In some places he wrote "the what" something is, or "the being" of it. In
most places he wrote "what something keeps on being in order to be at all,"
or "what it is for something to be." These phrases brlng us to a stop, not
because we cannot attach meaning to them, but because it takes some
·work to get hold of what they mean. Since Aristotle chose to write that
way, is it not reasonable to assume that he wanted us to do just that?
When the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins writes the line "Though worlds of
· · wanwood leafmeal lie," everything in his words is readily accessible,
though the pieces are combined in unusual ways. We recognize this sort of
word-play as a standard device of poetry, that works on .us through the
�5
ear, the visual imagination, and our feelings.
The poet makes us
experience a fresh act of imagining and feeling, at his direction. (Think of
all that would be lost if he had written "Notwithstanding the fact that an
immeasurable acreage of deciduous forest manifests the state of affairs
characteristic of its incipiently dormant condition.") Aristotle's phrases in
the present example do something that is exactly analogous to the poet's
word-play, but is directed only at the intellect and understanding. Other
words and phrases of his do carry imaginative content, but subordinated to
the intellect and understanding. Aristotle is not a poet, but a philosophic
writer, one who, like a poet, loosened and recombined the most vivid parts
· · of ordinary speech to make the reader ·see and think afresh.
Many
philosophers have written books, but few have worked as carefully and
deliberately to make the word be suited to the philosophic deed
Tra.nslati.on and tradition
A long stretch of centuries stands between Aristotle and us. The usual
translations of his writings stand as the end-product of all the history that
befell them in those centuries. For about five centuries up to 1600 they
were the source of the dominant teachings of the European universities; for
about four centuries since then they have been reviled as the source of a
rigid and empty dogmatism that stifled any genuine pursuit of knowledge.
One has to be very learned indeed to uncover all that history, but
fortunately for those of us who are interested only in understanding the
writings themselves, no such historical background is of any use. In fact it
takes us far away from anything Aristotle wrote or meant.
By chance1
when Aristotle's books dominated the centers of European learning, the
common language of higher learning was Latin. When in tum later
�6
thinkers rebelled against the tyranny of the established schools, it was a
Latinized version of Aristotle that they attacked. They wrote in the
various modern European languages, but the words and phrases of
Aristotle that they argued with and about came into those languages with
the smallest possible departures from the Latin.
Thomas Hobbes, for example, writing in 1651 (in the next to last
chapter of the last part of Leviathan), makes a common complaint in a
memorable way: "I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly
said in naturall Philosophy, than that which is now called Aristoteles
Metaphysiques...An.d since the Authority of Aristotle is onely current [in
the universities], that study is not properly Philosophy, (the nature
whereof dependeth not on Authors,) but Aristotelity...To know now upon
what grounds they say there be Essences Abstract, or Substantial] Formes,
wee are to consider what those words do properly signifie...But what then
would become of these Terms, of Entity, Essence, Essential], Essentiality,
that. ..are... no Names of Things... [T]his doctrine of Separated Essences, built
on the Vain Philosophy of Aristotle, would fright [men] ...with empty names
as men fright Birds from the Corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a
crooked stick."
The usual translations of Aristotle are concerned most of all with
preserving a continuity of tradition back though these early modem critics
of Aristotle. Richard McKean, in a note to a philosophic glossary, defends
this practice: "The tendency recently in translations from greek and latin
philosophers, has been to seek out anglo-saxon terms, and to avoid latin
derivatives. Words as clear and as definitely fixed in a long tradition of
usage as privation, accident, and even substance, have been replaced by
barbarous compound terms, which awaken no echo in the mind of one
�7
familiar with the tradition, and afford no entrance into the tradition to one
unfamiliar with it. In the translations above an attempt has been made to
return to the terminology of the... english philosophers of the seventeenth
century. Most of the latin derivatives which are used...have justification in
the works of Hobbes, Kenelm Digby, Cudworth, Culveiwell, even Bacon, and
scores of writers contemporary with them... ff]he mass of commentary on
Aristotle will be rendered more difficult, if not impossible, of
understanding if the terms of the discussion are changed arbitrarily after
two thousand years." (Selections from Medieval Philosophers, Vol. II, pp.
422-3., Scribner's, 1930)
The tendency deplored by McKeon has not made its way into any
translations of the writings of Aristotle known to this writer. There was
some hope of it when Hippocrates Apostle announced a new series of
translations, and included the following among its principles: "The terms
should be familiar, that is, commonly used and with their usual meanings.
If such terms are available, the use of strange terms, whether in English or
in some other language, adds nothing scientific to the translation but
unnecessarily strains the reader's thought and often clouds or misleads it."
(Aristotle's Metaphysics, p. x, Indiana U.P., 1966) This is a sentiment
worth endorsing, but Apostle respects it only to the minor extent of
avoiding such pretentious phrases as ceteris paribus (Latin for "other
things being equal"), and nothing in his translations would disturb McKeon.
But if Apostle's general claim is correct, and if in addition Aristotle never
used technical jargon in his own language, then surely to use such language
to translate him is to confuse Aristotle's writings with a tradition that
adapted them to purposes that were not his. And if that Latin tradition
distorted Aristotle's meaning and was untrue to his philosophic spirit, until
�8
all that remained was the straw man so easily ridiculed by Hobbes and
every other lively thinker of his time, then to insist on keeping Aristotle
within the confines of that caricature is perverse.
It is never possible to translate anything from one language to another
with complete accuracy, and it is especially difficult to translate an author
who takes liberties with common usage in his own language. But in this
case there is one simple rule that is easy to follow and always tends in a
good direction, and that is to avoid all the conventional technical words
that have been routinely used for Aristotle's central vocabulary. In fact,
virtually all those words are poor translations of the Greek they mean to
stand for. The word privation, for instance, will not be found in this
translation for the simple reason that its meaning cannot be expected to be
known to all educated readers of English. The commentaries on Aristotle
use the word extensively, but if the Greek word it refers to has been
adequately translated in the first place, you will not need commentaries to
tell you what it means. Here that Greek word will be translated sometimes
as deprivation, sometimes as lack, according as one or the other fits more
comfortably into its context. What matters is not whether Latin or AngloSaxon derivatives are used, but whether an understandable English word
translates an understandable Greek one. Accident is a perfectly good
· English word, but not in the sense in which it appears in commentaries on
·Aristotle; the Greek word it replaces has a broad sense, that corresponds to
our word attribute, and a narrower one that can be conveyed by the
phrase "incidental attribute." In this case again, Latin derivatives are
available which cany clear and appropriate meanings in English, since one
does not need to know any Latin to ferret them out. It is true that adcadere has a sense that could have given rise to the meanings we attach to
�9
the words "incidental" and "attribute," but it did not in fact transmit that
meaning to its English derivatives. There is some pedantic pleasure in
pointing out those connections, but to use the word accident in that sense
is to write a forced Latin masquerading as English, guaranteed to confuse
the non-specialist reader, where Aristotle used the simplest possible
language in a way that keeps the focus off the words and on · the things
meant by them.
But to undo the mischief caused by McKeon's third example, substance,
stronger medicine is required. Joseph Owens records the way this word
became established in the tradition.
(The Doctrine of Being in the
Aristotelian 'Metaphysics', pp. 140-143, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1951) It is a comedy of errors in which Christian scruples were
imposed upon a non-Biblical theology, and a disagreement with Aristotle
was read back into his words as a translation of them. This translator
ignores the contortions of the tradition and without apology uses the
barbarous Anglo-Saxon compound thinghood. This is a central notion in
the Metaphysics, and in all Aristotle's thought, though it occurs rarely in
the Physics, and the word "substance" does nothing but obscure its
meaning. Lively arguments about substance go on today in the secondary
literature, but a choice must be made, and the primary texts of Aristotle
are better, clearer, richer, deeper, easier to absorb, and more worth
pursuing than the commentaries on them. · As it stands in the usual
translations, the word "substance" is little more than an unknown x, for
which meaning has to be deduced by a kind of algebra, while Aristotle
shows (Metaphysics 1028b 2-7) that just asking what the thinghood of
things consists in, and what is responsible for it, unlocks the highest
inquiry of which philosophy is capable. For the promise of such a return, it
�10
is worth risking a little barbarity. The barbarism of a word like thinghood
is just the fact that it falls far outside common usage in our language, and
not in a direction that needs any historical or technical special knowledge
to capture it, but in one that invites the same flexibility that poets ask of
us. We cannot read such a barbarism in a passive way, but must take
responsibility for its meaning. This in itself, in moderation and in welljudged places, is something good, and is an imitation of what Aristotle does
with Greek.
It has already been remarked that the present translation does not
always use the same English word for the same Greek one. This is partly
because no English word ever has the same full range of meaning as any
Greek word, so that such a range has to be conveyed, or unwanted
connotations suppressed, by the use of a variety of near-synonyms. It is
partly because a Greek word may have two or more distinct uses that
differ by context; in this way, the word for thinghood will often be
translated as "an independent thing." It is also partly because Aristotle
always paid attention to the fact that important words are meant in more
than one way. For him this was not a fault of language, but one of the
ways in which it is truthful. A word often has a primary meaning and a
variety of derivative ones, as a reflection of causal reiatlons in the world.
A diet can be healthy only because, in a different and more governing
-sense, an animal can be healthy, and there can be a medical knife only
because there is a medical skill. This array of difference within sameness
usUally cannot be lifted over from Greek to English, and has to be gotten at
indirectly. In the Physics, every kind of change is spoken of as a motion,
though the word for motion is gradually and successively limited until it
refers strictly only to change of place. This progression determines the
�11
main structure of the inquiry, but in English the path is not as clearly
indicated by transitions of meaning within a single word. And finally,
there are some words that have many translations that are equally good in
their different ways. In such cases, this translation rejoices in variety; this
again is an imitation of Aristotle's general practice. Where the traditional
translations are marked by rigid, formulaic repetitions, Aristotle loves to
combine overlapping meanings, or separate intertwined meanings, to point
to things the language has no precise word for. It is the living, naturat
flexible character of thinking that breathes through Aristotle's use of
language, and not the artificial, machine-like fixity one finds in the
translations.
This last point should not be taken as a promise of smooth English, but
just the reverse. Idiomatic expressions and familiar ways of putting words
together conceal unthinking assumptions of just the kind that philosophy
tries to get beyond. The reader will need a willingness to follow sentences
to places where meaning would be lost if it were forced into well-worn
grooves, and will need to follow trains of thought that would not be the
same if they did not preserve Aristotle's own ways of connecting them. As
far as possible, this translation follows the syntax of Aristotle's text.
Montgomery Furth has followed this same procedure in a translation of
part of the Metaphysics, and apologizes for the result as neither English
nor
Gree~
but Eek. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Books Vll-X, p. vi, Hackett,
1985} Furth does this because of an interest in following Aristotle's logic
faithfully, but he retains all the usual Latinized vocabulary of Ross's Oxford
translation, so that the resulting language might better be called Leek. The
present translation goes farther, in vocabulary and syntax both, beyond
the Latin and toward the Greek, and could be called Gringlish, but for this
�12
as well it comes before you without apology.
Furth violates English
sensibilities for the special purposes of graduate students and professional
scholars; this translation violates them for the common human purposes of
joining Aristotle in thinking that breaks through the habitual and into the
philosophic.
A philosophic physics?
Now it may seem odd to combine philosophic aims with the topic of
physics. It may seem that Aristotle had to speculate philosophically about
the natural world because he did not have the benefit of the secure
knowledge we have about it. In the current secondary literature, one sees
at least some scholars who think they might learn something about
thinking from De Anima, or about being from the Metaphysics, but articles
on the Physics seem at most to pat Aristotle on the head for having come
to some conclusion not utterly in conflict with present-day doctrines. This
kind of smugness is a predictable result of the way the sciences have been
taught to us. Conjectures and assumptions, because they have been part of
authoritative opinion for a few centuries, are presented to us as stories, or
as facts, without recourse to evidence or argument. Particular doctrines,
even when they stand on theoretical structures as complex and fragile as a
house of cards, or even when they presuppose a picture of things that is
flatly in contradiction with itself, tend to be prefaced with the words "we
know... " All the rhetoric that surrounds the physics of our time tells us
. that philosophic inquiry need not enter its territory, that here the
philosophizing is over and done, the best minds agree about everything,
and non-experts couldn't hope to understand enough to assess the
evidence in any case. Strangely, the physics of the twentieth century is
�13
surrounded by the same air of dogmatic authority as was the schoolAristotelianism of the sixteenth century.
But there are two kinds of support for the present-day physics that
seem to lift it above dogmatism. One is a long history of experiment and
successful technology, and the other is the greatest possible reliance on
mathematics. These are both authorities that cannot be swayed by human
preferences, and cannot lie.
Their testimony can, however, be
misunderstood, and can be incorporated into a picture of the world that
fails in other ways. But even if the current physics contains nothing
untrue, one might wish to understand it down to its roots, to unearth the
fundamental daims about things on which it rests, which have been lost
sight of in the onrush of theoretical and practical progress. To do this one
has to stand back from it, to see its founding claims as alternatives to other
ways of looking at the world, chosen for reasons. The earliest advocates of
the "new physics" did just that, and the alternatives they rejected all stem
from Aristotle's Physics. Martin Heidegger has said that "Aristotle's
Physics is the hidden, and therefore never adequately studied,
foundational book of Western philosophy." ("On the Being and Conception
of ct>U:U: in Aristotle's Physics B, 1," in Man and World, IX, 3, 1976, p. 224)
The physics of our time is inescapably philosophic, ifonly in the original
choices, preserved in it, to follow certain paths of thought to the exclusion
of others. To see that physics adequately and whole, we too need to be
philosophic, to lift our gaze to a level at which it can be seen to be one
possibility among many. Only then is it possible to decide rationally and
responsibly to adopt its opinions as our own.
But there is a second respect in which twentieth-century physics has
opened its doors to philosophy, and will not be able to close them. The
�14
physics that came of age in the seventeenth century, and seemed to have
answered all the large questions by the nineteenth, is limping toward the
end of the twentieth century in some confusion.
Mathematics and
technology have coped with all the crises of this century, but the picture of
the world that underlay them has fallen apart. It was demonstrated
conclusively that light is a wave, except when it shines on anything; then it
arrives as particles. It is shown with equal certainty that the electron is a
particle, except when it bounces off a crystal surface; then it must be a
wave, interacting with the surface everywhere at once. Just when atomic
physics seemed ready to uncover the details of the truth underlying all
appearances, it began to undercut all its own assumptions. A wavemechanics that held out an initial promise of reducing all appearances of
particles to the behavior of waves failed to do so, and degenerated into a
computational device for predicting probabilities. The most far-seeing
physicists of the century have shown that particles and waves are equally
necessary, mutually incompatible aspects of every atomic event, and that
physics, at what was supposed to be the ultimate explanatory level, must
abandon its claim to objectivity. The physicist is always describing, in
part, his own decisions to interfere with things in one way rather than
another; this brings along, as a causally necessary conclusion, the collapse
of the belief in causal determinism. When Hobbes laughed at Aristotle, he
.was certain that he knew what a body is. Today all bets are off.
But some physicists have been unwilling to give up their dogmatic
habits without a fight. Even Einstein, after he had taught the world to give
up the rigid Newtonian ideas of time, space, and mass, was unable to
suspend his unquestioned assumption that bodies have sharply defined
places, and cannot interact except by contact or by radiation. Niels Bohr
�15
and Werner Heisenberg had announced the most radical of revolutions,
requiring physicists to ask what knowledge is, and no longer to answer by
pointing to what they do. Einstein, in a famous 1935 collaboration ("Can
Quantum-Mechanical Description of Reality be Considered Complete?",
Physical Review 47), tried to hold off this final revolution, saying in effect
"I know enough about the fundamental structure of the world to be certain
that some things cannot happen." Experiments have revealed that those
very things do happen, that the state of one particle is provably dependent
on whether a measurement is performed on a distant second particle, from
which no signal could have radiated. But a new and opposite tactic permits
some physicists to embrace this or any other seeming impossibility
without admitting the need for any philosophic re-thinking of the way
things are. Listen to these words of Richard Feynman: "We always have
had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that
quantum physics represents. At least I do, because I'm an old enough man
that I haven't got to the point that this stuff is obvious to me...you know
how it always is, every new idea, it takes a generation or two until it
becomes obvious that there's no real problem." (quoted by N. David
Mermin in The Great Ideas Today, 1988, p. 52) So if the discoveries of
quantum physics make you feel an urgent need· to re-examine the
presuppositions of physics, just repress that feeling for a generation or
two, and it will go away.
Perhaps more than any other reason for resisting opening physics to
philosophic examination, there is the plain fact that there is no need for it
to do anything differently.
Whatever happens can be described
mathematically, and new discoveries are readily incorporated into some
mathematical scheme, and then predicted. Technology aQ.vances no less
�16
rapidly in areas in which the explanatory ground has been cut from under
our feet, than in those in which its workings are intelligible. But the new
physics arose out of a desire to know, and has undeniably become a highly
questionable kind of knowing. Indeed, the very fact that its picture of the
world can collapse while leaving its mathematical description and practical
applications intact is a powerful stimulus to wonder. While wishing
physics well in all its dealings, some of us may simply want to understand
what it is and what it isn't. But we cannot see how its various strands
have separated without understanding what it was to begin with, so again
we are thrown back to the choices by which it came into being, and thus in
turn to the picture of the world that it rejected. From this standpoint,
though, that is more than a quest to uncover something past and
superseded.
It entails the risk of being convinced that the original
decisions of the seventeenth century physicists were not all worthy of our
own acceptance. It is possible that parts of Aristotle's understanding of
the world might serve to heal our own dilemmas and confusions.
The things that are
Where should an understanding of the things around us begin? It
might seem that there are plain facts that could serve as uncontroversial
starting points. What are some of the plainest ones? The stars circle us at
night, the sun by day. Rocks fall to earth, but flames leap toward the sky.
Bodies that are thrown or pushed slow down continually until they stop
moving. Animals and plants belong to distinct kinds, which they preserve
from generation to generation. The visible whole is a sphere, with the
earth motionless at its center. These are facts of experience, so obvious
that the only way to be unaware of them is by not paying attention. If you
�17
disbelieve any of them it is not because of observation, but because you
were persuaded not to trust your senses. No physics begins by looking at
the things it studies; those things must always be assigned to some larger
context in which they can be interpreted. Aristotle states this in the first
sentence of his Physics by saying that we do not know anything until we
know its causes. Nothing stands on its own, without connections, and no
event happens in isolation; there must be some comprehensive order of
things in which things are what they are and do what they do. Physics
seeks to understand only a part of this whole, but it cannot begin to do so
without some picture of the whole.
But it has been noted earlier that none of Aristotle's inquiries begins
with the knowledge that most governs the things it studies. We never
start where the truth of things starts, but must find our way there. That
means that we cannot dispense with some preliminary picture of things,
though we must be ready to modify it as the inquiry proceeds. What is
Aristotle's preliminary picture of the whole of things? It is one that
permits the plainest facts of experience to be just the way they appear to
us. We live at the center of a spherical cosmos as one species of living
thing among many, in a world in which some motions are natural and some
forced, but all require causes actively at work, and cease when those
causes cease to act. The natural motions are those by which animals and
. plants live and renew their kinds, the stars circle in unchanging orbits, and
the parts of the cosmos-earth, water, air, and fire-are transformed into
one another by heat and cold, move to their proper places up or down, and
maintain an ever-renewing equilibrium. This picture is confirmed and
fleshed out by Aristotle's inquiries in writings other than the Physics, but
since Aristotle never writes "scientifically," that is deductively, there is no
�18
necessary or right order in which they should be read. All those inquiries
stand in a mutual relation of enriching and casting light upon one another,
and the Physics is in an especially close relation with the Metaphysics.
It is not only a picture of the whole that is assumed in the Physics, but
also a comprehensive understanding of the way things are.
In the
Metaphysics, this latter is not assumed but arrived at by argument,
through the sustained pursuit of the question, what is being? Since being
is meant in many ways, Aristotle looks for the primary sense of it, being as
such or in its own right, on which the other kinds of being are dependent.
That primary sense of being is first identified as thinghood, then
discovered to be the sort of being that belongs only to animals, plants, and
the cosmos as a whole. For these pre-eminent beings, being is being-atwork, since each of them is a whole that maintains itself by its own
activity. For any other sort of being, what it is for it to be is not only
something less than that, but it is in every case dependent on and derived
from those highest beings, as a quality, quantity, or action of one, a relation
between two or more, a chance product of the interaction between two or
more, or an artificial product deliberately made from materials borrowed
from one or more of them. Life is not a strange by-product of things, but
the source of things, and the non-living side of nature has being in a way
strictly analogous to life: as an organized whole that maintains itself by
continual activity. In the central books of the Metaphysics, Aristotle
captures the heart of the meaning of being in a cluster of words and
phrases that are the most powerlul expressions of his thinking. · In the
usual translations-substance, essence, actuality, and actuality again-they
not only fall flat but miss the central point: that the thinghood of a thing is
�19
what it keeps on being in order to be at all, and must be a being-at-work
so that it may achieve and sustain its being-at-work-staying-itself.
Now the physics of our time adopts an understanding of being that is
exactly opposite to that of Aristotle, in the principle of inertia. The
primary beings are what they are passively, by being hard enough to
resist all change, and do nothing but bump and move off blindly in straight
lines. The picture of the world assumed by this physics is of atoms in a
void, so there can be no cosmos, but only infinite emptiness, no life, but
only accidental rearrangements of matter, and no activity at all, except for
motion in space. This is ancient idea, that goes back long before Aristotle's
time. Lucretius finds it appealing, as a doctrine that teaches us that, while
there is little to hope for in life except freedom from pain, there is little to
fear either, since a soul made of atoms will dissolve, but cannot suffer
eternal torment. There are reasons of two other kinds that make this
picture of things attractive to the new physics.
First, it makes it
unnecessary to look for causes. Just because everything is taken to be
reducible to atoms and the void, every possible event is pre-explained.
Mechanical necessity takes over as the only explanation of anything, so the
labor of explanation is finished at one stroke. And second, this picture
makes every attribute that belongs to anything, and every event that can
happen, entirely describable by mathematics. The glory of the new
physics is the power it gains from mathematics. The world that is present
to the senses is set aside as "secondary," and the mathematical imagination
takes over as our way of access to the true world behind the appearances.
The only experience that is allowed to count is the controlled experiment1
designed in the imagination, with a limited array of possible outcomes that
are all interpreted in advance.
�20
From its beginnings, mathematical physics moves from success to
success, but almost from the beginning its mechanistic picture of things
fails. Newton begins his Principia with the assumption that all bodies are
inert, but in the course of it shows that every body is the seat of a
mysterious power of attraction. Is this simply a new discovery to be
added to our picture of the world? Shall we say that there are atoms, void,
and a force of gravitation? But the whole purpose of the new worldpicture was to avoid occult qualities. And where do we put this strange
force of attraction? There is no intelligible way that inert matter can be
conceived as causing an urge in some distant body. Shall we say that the
force resides in a field? A field of what? The Principia shows that the
spaces through which the planets move are void of matter. How can a
point in empty nothing be the bearer of a quantity of energy? This new
discovery can be described mathematically, but it does not fit into the
world-picture that led to it, and cannot be understood as something added
to it. Something similar happens with light, which is discovered by
Maxwell to be describable as an electromagnetic wave. But a wave is a
material conception: a disturbance in a string, or a body of water, or some
such carrier, moves from one place to another while the parts of the body
stay where they were. So when it is shown that a iight-bearing aether
would need to have contradictory properties, electromagnetic radiation is
left as a well-described wave motion taking place in nothing whatever.
In the twentieth century, the mechanist picture underlying
mathematical physics has broken down even more radically, in ways that
have been mentioned above. Popularizations of physics usually tell us that
the ideas of Newton and Maxwell failed when they were applied on an
astronomic or atomic scale, but remain perfectly good approximations to
�21
the phenomena of the middle-sized world. But in what sized world can
matter be inert and not inert, and space empty and not empty? And the
middle-sized world is characterized more than anything else by the
presence of living things, which the atoms-and-void picture never had any
hope of explaining, but only of explaining away. Shall we at least say,
though, that we have learned that the world is not a cosmos? Let us listen
to David Bohm: "The theory of relativity was the first significant indication
in physics of the need to question the mechanist order... [I]t implied that no
coherent concept of an independently existent particle is possible...The
quantum theory presents, however, a much more serious challenge to this
mechanist order... so that the entire universe has to be thought of as an
unbroken whole. In this whole, each element that we can abstract in
thought shows basic properties (wave or particle, etc.) that depend on its
overall environment, in a way that is much more reminiscent of how the
organs constituting living beings are related, than it is of how parts of a
machine interact... [T]he basic concepts of relativity and quantum theory
directly contradict each other... [W]hat they have basically in common...is
undivided wholeness. Though each comes to such wholeness in a different
way, it is clear that it is this to which they are both fundamentally
pointing." (Wholeness and the Implicate Order, Ark, 1983, pp. 173-6)
According to Bohm, it is only prejudice and habit that keep the evidence
of the wholeness of things from being taken seriously. The contrary view
is not just an opinion, but one of those fundamental ways of looking,
thinking, and interpreting that permit us to have opinions at all, and to
decide what is and what isn't a fact. To abandon the ground beneath our
feet feels like violence, especially when no new authority is at hand to
assure us that there is somewhere else for us to land We
t~nd
to prefer to
�22
live with unreconciled dualities. Descartes notoriously makes the relation
of mind and body a "problem." Newton speaks in his General Scholium as
though gravitation were incapable of explanation by physics, a
supernatural element in the world. Leibniz speaks of two kingdoms, one of
souls and one of bodies, as harmoniously superimposed (as in Monadology
79). Kant tells us that we are free, except insofar as our actions are part of
the empirical world.
We sometimes speak of biology as something
unconnected with physics, as though what is at work in a tree or a cat is
not nature in its most proper sense. We have had the habit so long that we
consider it natural to regard ourselves, with our feeling, perception, and
understanding, as an inexplicable eruption out of a nature that has nothing
in common with us. Might it be possible to find a more coherent way to
put together our experience? Perhaps it would be worthwhile to suspend,
at least for a while, our notions of what can be and what it is for something
to be, to try out some other way of looking.
A non-mathematical physics
The world as envisioned in Aristotle's Physics is more diverse than the ·
world described by mathematical physics, and we must accustom
ourselves to a correspondingly richer vocabulary iil order to read it.
Motion means one thing to us, but irreducibly many kinds of thing when
Aristotle speaks of it, and the same is true of cause. We tend to use nature
as an umbrella-word, a collective name for the sum of things, while
Aristotle means it to apply to whatever governs the distinct pattern of
activity of each kind of being. It would be possible to use different English
words for these three ideas, to bring out what is distinctive in Aristotle's
meanings, but here it seems best to keep the familiar words.and push their
�23
limits beyond their prevalent current meanings. Nature, cause, and motion
are the central topics of the Physics, and come to sight first as questions; it
is important to see that Aristotle and the later mathematical physicists
were ultimately asking about the same things. Nature is mathematized not
as an interesting game, or to abandon a harder task in favor of an easier
one, but in order that the truth of it may be found.
In the Assayer, Galileo makes the famous claim that "this grand book,
the universe, .. .is written in the language of mathematics." Later in the
same book, in a discussion of heat, he explains why. "I suspect that people
in general have a concept of this which is very remote from the truth. For
they believe that heat is a real phenomenon, or property, or quality, which
actually resides in the material by which we feel ourselves warmed
...Without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided would
probably never arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes,
odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object
in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the
consciousness.
Hence if the living creature were removed, all these
qualities would be wiped away and annihilated."
But shapes, sizes,
positions, numbers, and such things are not mere names, imposed on
objects by the consciousness of the living creature, because "from these
conditions, I cannot separate [a material or corporeal] substance by any
stretch of my imagination." (Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, Anchor,
1957, pp. 237-8, 274) The direct experience of the world has the taint of
· subjectivity, but the mathematical imagination captures the object just as
it is. Sadder but wiser physicists would no longer try to read themselves
out of physics; they too are living creatures, interpreting the experience of
a consciousness, with all the risk and uncertainty that accompanies such an
�24
activity. But our use of language may betray our second thoughts, and pull
us back to Galileo's point of view.
What is motion? Do you think of something like a geometrical point
changing position? What about a child moving into adolescence? Warmth
moving into your limbs? Blossoms moving out of the buds on a tree? A
ripening tomato, moving to a dark red? Are these other examples motions
in only a metaphorical sense, while the first is correctly so called? Are the
other examples really nothing but complex instances of the first, with
small-scale changes of position adding up to large-scale illusions of
qualitative change? For Aristotle, the differences among the kinds of
motion determine the over-all structure of the Physics, but they first of all
belong together as one kind of experience.
The kinds of becoming
correspond to the ways being belongs to anything, and being-somewhere is
only one aspect of being. A thing can also be of a certain size, or of a
certain sort or quality, and can undergo motion in these respects by
coming to be of another size, or of a different quality, by some gradual
transition. It can even undergo a motion with respect to its thinghood.
One thinks first of birth and death, but eating displays the same kind of
motion. A cow chomps grass, and it is no longer pa.rt of the life of a plant,
and soon it is assimilated into the body of the cow. This is no mere change
of quality, since no whole being persists through it to have first one, then
some other quality belonging to it. Something persists, but first in one,
then in another, kind of thinghood.
In any encounter with the natural world, it is the kinds of change other
than change of place that are most prominent and most productive of
wonder. Mathematical physics must erase them all, and attempt to argue
that they were never anything but deceptive appearances of something
�25
else, changing in some other way. Why? Because those merely local
changes of merely inert bodies can be described mathematically. But if the
testimony of the senses has a claim to "objectivity," and to be taken
seriously, that is at least equal to that of the mathematical imagination,
then there is no necessity of such a reduction. And in fact the reduction of
kinds of motion that is required is not just from four to one, but to less
than one. Aristotle has considerable interest in change of place, but such a
thing is possible only if there are places. Motion as mathematically
conceived happens in space, and in space there are no places. Underneath
the idea of motion that is prevalent today lurks this other idea,
unexamined and taken on faith, that there is such a thing as space.
Aristotle twice makes the argument that space, or empty extension, is
an idea that results only from the mis-use of mathematics. It is the exact
counter-argument to Galileo's claim that ordinary people project their nonmathematical ideas onto the world. Aristotle says that the mathematician
separates in thought the extension that belongs to extended bodies. (This
is sometimes called "abstraction," but the word Aristotle uses is the
ordinary word for subtraction.)
There is nothing wrong with this
falsification of things, which makes it easier to study what has been
isolated artificially, so long as one does not forget that the original
falsification took place. But some people do just that, and read this
extension, which they have subtracted from bodies, back into the world as
though it were empty and somehow existed on its own, prior to bodies.
Now, in the imagination, it is possible
~o
examine this "space" and
determine all sorts of things about it. It is of infinite extent, for example,
and since it is entirely empty, no part of it can have any characteristic by
which it could differ from any other part. If our impulse,. when thinking
�26
about motion, is automatically to give it a mathematical image, that is
because we have pre-supposed that the ultimate structure of the world is
space. But this supposition is laden with consequences and ought not to be
adopted blindly. Aristotle says that one of the reasons physics cannot be
mathematical is that the mathematician abolishes motion. Physics is the
study of beings that move, and motion is a rich and complex topic, but
within the constraints of "space" every form of motion disappears, except
for one which is diminished out of recognition. If it is in space that our
examination begins, nature will be nowhere to be found (but will survive
as a mere name) because space is, from the beginning, a de-natured realm.
Conversely, without the imposition of the idea of space, it is possible for
nature to be understood as part of the true constitution of things, because
motion in all its variety can be present. But since motion is not reduced to
the pre-explained realm of mathematics, it is necessary to understand
what it is. Aristotle says that, so long as we are ignorant of motion, we are
ignorant of nature as well. But how can one give a rational account of
motion? To assign it to some other genus would seem to make it a species
of non-motion. In fact, two of Aristotle's predecessors, Parmenides and
Zeno, had argued that motion is completely illusory. Parmenides argued
that any attempt to say that there is motion must
drum that what is-not
also is. And Zeno, in four famous paradoxes preserved by Aristotle, tried
to show that any description of motion involves self-contradiction of some
kind. It would seem that motion has to be accepted as a brute fact of
experience, from which explanations can begin, but which cannot itself be
explained But Aristotle, for the first and perhaps only time ever, did give
motion a place not only in the world but in a rational account of the world,
explaining it in terms of ideas that go deeper. The Parmenidean challenge
�27
is met by Aristotle primarily in the Metaphysics, where he shows that
being must be meant in more than one way. His response to Zeno's
challenge spreads over the whole of the Physics, and is concentrated in his
definition of motion.
Aristotle defines motion in terms of potency and being-at-work. In the
first book of the Physics there is a preliminary analysis of change that
discovers the ultimate explanatory notions available to the inquiry to be
form, material, and the deprivation of form. Material is described as that
which, by its own nature, inherently yearns for and stretches out toward
form. This should never be called matter, by which we mean something
that stands on its own with a determinate set of properties (has weight,
occupies space, preserves its state of motion in a straight line). What
Aristotle means by material, on the contrary, is (1) not inert, (2) not
necessarily tangible, (3) relative to its form, which may in tum be material
for some other form, (4) not possessed of any definite properties, and (S)
ultimately a purely "ideal" being, incapable of existing in separation, which
would be rejected by any "materialist." Form, in turn, does not mean
shape or arrangement, but some definite way of being-at-work. This is
evident in Book II of the Physics, and arrived at by argument principally
in VIII, 2 of the Metaphysics. Every being consists of material and form,
that is, of an inner striving spilling over into an outward activity. Potency
and being-at-work are the ways of being of material and form.
The usual translations render potency as potentiality, which might
suggest mere indeterminacy or logical possibility, which is never the sense
in which Aristotle uses it. What is worse, though, is the rendering of
being-at-work, and the stronger form of it used in the definition,
being-at~
work-staying-itself, as actuality. This has some reference, by way of Latin,
�28
to activity, but is a useless word that makes it completely impossible to get
anything resembling Aristotle's meaning out of the definition.
"The
actuality of the potentiality as a potentiality" becomes a seventeenthcentury joke, the ultimate example of the destruction of healthy common
sense by pretentious gobbledygook. Does it refer to the actuality that
belonged to the potential thing before it changed? That's not a motion, but
something that precedes one. Does it refer to the actuality that exactly
corresponds to the pre-existent potentiality? That's not a motion either,
but something left when the motion ends. Does it mean, though it would
have to be tortured to give this sense, the gradual transformation of a
potentiality into an actuality? That at least could refer to a motion, but
only by saying that a motion is a certain kind of motion. Perhaps it means
that motion is the actuality of a potentiality to be in motion. This is surely
the silliest version of them all, but respected scholars have defended it
with straight faces. An intelligent misinterpretation of the definition was
put forward by Thomas Aquinas, who took it to mean that the special
condition of a thing in motion is to be partly actual while partly potential,
and directed toward greater actuality of that same potentiality. But this
account would not distinguish motion from a state of balanced equilibrium,
such as that of a rock caught in a hand, still straining downward but
prevented from falling any further.
The account is subject to this
ambiguity because it focusses on an instantaneous condition, a snapshot of
a thing in motion, which is what an actuality is, but by no means what a
being-at-work is.
What Aristotle said was that motion is the being-at-work-staying-itself
of a potency, just as a potency. When an ongoing yearning and striving for
form is not inner and latent, but present in the world just as itself, as a
�29
yearning and striving, there is motion. That is because, when motion is
present, the potency of some material has the very same structure that
form has, forming the being as something holding-on in just that particular
motion. This does not mean that every motion is the unfolding of some
being into its mature form; every such unfolding can fall short, overshoot,
encounter some obstacle, or interact in some incidental way with some
other being. It does mean that no motion of any kind would take place if it
were not for those potencies that emerge of their own accord from beings.
Motion depends on the organization of beings into kinds, with inner
natures that are always straining to spill into activity. Only this dynamic
structure of being, with material straining toward form, and form staying
at work upon material, makes room for motion that is not just an
inexplicable departure from the way things are, but a necessary and
· intrinsic part of the way things are.
For example, consider the most uninteresting motion you can think of,
say the falling of a pencil from the edge of a desk onto the floor. What is
the potency that is at work, and to what being does it belong? The potency
is not that of being at that spot on the floor, and the being that has it is not
the pencil at all, since it is no genuine being. The potency at work here is
that of earth to be down, or of the cosmos to sustain itSelf with earth at the
center. No motive power belongs to the pencil as such, but it can move on
its own because there is present in it a potency of earth, set free to be at
work as itself when the obstacle of the desk is removed. And the motion is
not defined by the position or state in which it happens to end up, but by
the activity that governs its course; the former is an actuality, but is not a
being-at-work. Just as Newton's laws give a set of rules for analyzing any
motion, Aristotle's definition directs us in a different way to bring the
�30
structure of any motion into focus: first, find the being, and then find the
potency of it which the motion displays, or to which the particular motion
is incidental. No motion, however random or incidental, gains entrance
into the world except through the primary beings that constitute the
world.
Aristotle sometimes argues about a body A that moves from B to C. Our
first impulse may be to let A be represented by a point, the motion by a
line, and Band C by positions. But Aristotle always has in mind an A with
some nature, and a motion that may be from one condition to another
rather than one place to another. Even if a motion from place to place is in
question, those places would not be neutral and indifferent positions, but
regions of the cosmos, that might or might not be appropriate surroundings
for body A. The argument might be about something like continuity, so
general that the particular Band C need not be specified, but it makes all
the difference in the world that they represent motion in its fullest sense,
as spelled out in the definition. The mathematized sort of motion, that can
be fully depicted on a blackboard, is vulnerable to the kinds of attack
present in Zeno's paradoxes.
Motion as Aristotle understands it,
constituted by potency and being-at-work, deriving its wholeness and
.·
continuity from a deeper source, overcomes those paradoxes.
(The
particular arguments will be looked at in the commentaries on the text.)
It is evident from this account of motion that material and form are
understood as causes. The usual examples given for material and formal
causes, an inert lump of bronze and a static blueprint, miss the point, that
material meets form half-way, and form is always at work. And it is not
just motions that they cause, but everything that endures. We tend to
speak of causes as events that lead to other events, since that is the only
�31
kind of causality that remains possible in a mathematically-reduced world,
but Aristotle understands everything that is the case as resulting from
causes, and every origin of responsibility as a cause. Something called the
"efficient" cause has been grafted onto Aristotle's account; it means the
proximate cause of motion, like the bumping of billiard balls. This is
sometimes even used as a translation of one of Aristotle's four kinds of
cause, but not correctly. Aristotle speaks of the external source of motion
as one kind of cause, the flrst thing from which the motion proceeds. The
incidental and intermediate links, that merely pass motions around
without originating them, are not causes at all, except in a derivative sense.
All of Aristotle's causes stem from beings, and are found not by looking
backward in time, but upward in a chain of responsibility.
There is a fourth kind of cause, in most cases the most important one of
all, the final cause. This is often equated with purpose, but that is only one
kind of final cause, and not the most general. A deliberate action of an
intelligent being cannot be understood except in terms of its purpose, since
· only in achieving that purpose does the action become complete. The claim
that final causes belong to non-human nature becomes ludicrous if it is
thought that something must in some analogous way have purposes. What
Aristotle in fact means is that every natural being is··a whole, and every
natural activity leads to or sustains that wholeness. His phrase for this
kind of cause is "that for the sake of which" something does what it does or
is what it is. Does rain fall for the sake of the crops that humans grow?
No, but it does fall for the sake of the equilibrium of the cosmos, in which
evaporation is counter-balanced by precipitation in a cycle of
ever~
renewed wholeness. That wholeness provides a stable condition for the
flourishing of plants and of humans, in lives and acts that come to
�32
completion in their own ways. Aristotle's "teleology" is just his claim that
nothing in nature is a fragment or a chance accumulation of parts. To
grasp the final cause of anything is to see how it fits into the ultimate
structure of things. But surely there are fragmentary things and chance
combinations to be found around us. Aristotle finds it as strange that some
thinkers deny chance altogether, as it is that others think chance governs
everything. From Aristotle's standpoint, even chance always points back
to that which acts for the sake of something, since it results from the
interference of two or more such things. It therefore represents not an
absence of final causes, but an over-abundance of them, a failure of final
cause resulting from a conflict among final causes.
Because such incidental interactions lead to innumerable unpredictable
chance results, nature is not a realm of necessity, but neither is it a realm
of randomness, since the forms of natural beings govern all that happens.
Aristotle speaks of the patterns of nature as present not always but "for
the most part." His way of understanding the causes of things does not
need to do violence either to the stability or to the variability of the world,
but affirms the unfailing newness-within-sameness that we observe in the
return of the seasons and the generations of living things. It offers an
example of a physics that interprets causality without recourse to
mechanical necessity or mathematical law. Both the collision of billiard
balls and the co-variation of the two sides of an algebraic equation are too
random in their beginnings and too rigid in their consequences to . be
adequate images of the natures we know.
The shape of the inquiry
�33
It has been mentioned above that all Aristotle's inquiries are dialectical.
His writings have structures that are not rigid but organic, with parts that
are whole in themselves, but arranged so that they build up larger wholes.
In Book I of most of his works, he reviews what has been said by his
predecessors, and here that is combined with a preliminary analysis of
change, which concludes that it must always imply the presence of some
material that can possess. or be deprived of form. This first analysis of
everything changeable into form and material is then available as a
starting point to approach any later question. Next comes the heart of the
Physics, in Book II and the beginning of Book III, of which an account has
been given in the last section of this introduction. It begins with a
definition of nature that has all the characteristics Aristotle attributes in I,
1 to proper beginnings: it starts from what is familiar to us, is clear in its
reference but unclear in its meaning, and takes its topic as a whole and in
general, without separating out its parts or their particular instances.
Since it defines nature as an inner cause of motion, the first task is to
explore the meanings of cause and motion, not as words or logical classes,
but through disciplined reflection on our experience. The result is a
sharpened and deepened understanding of a way of encountering and
interpreting the world. This is a more sustained use of the kind of analysis
that took place in Book I, that dwells on a topic to unfold into clarity what
was already present in an implicit and confused way.
A second kind of analytic reasoning begins after motion has been
defined, a successive examination of conditions presupposed by the
presence of motion in the world. This occupies the rest of Books III and
IV. Zeno had taught everyone that motion presupposes infinity, and
Aristotle turns first to this.
He finds a non-contradictory way to
�34
understand the infinite divisibility of motion, but his conclusion that there
is no infinite extended body is incomplete as it stands. It depends upon
the claim that things have natural places, and so the topic of place must be
e.xplored next. Place is understood as a relation to the parts of the cosmos,
on
but this topic in turn dependsLthe next, since the exclusive array of places
in the world results from the impossibility of void. The e.xploration of the
idea of void completes this sequence, since the arguments against it stand
independently. But motion also entails time, to which Aristotle turns next,
finding that it is not in fact a presupposition but a consequence of motion.
Time is found to result from a comparison of motions to one another, that
can only be carried out by a perceiving soul. Like place, time is not a preexisting container, and not graspable by the mathematical imagination.
Each of them is an intimate relation amongs beings, intelligible only when
the particularlity of this world is taken into account.
The last four books of the Physics take up the kind of cause and the
kind of motion that are least central in Book II. The formal, material, and
final causes of a living thing are internal to it, and constitute its nature,
and it has parents that are external sources of its motions of birth,
development, and growth. But as Aristotle mentions at the end of II, 2,
both other human beings and the sun beget a human being. All life is
dependent upon conditions supplied by the cosmos, which seems to
maintain itself primarily through cycles of local motion. Books V through
VIII trace a complex argument up to the source of all change of place in
the world. In its broadest outline, that argument is reminiscent of the
structure of the Metaphysics. Though the Metaphysics is put together out
of a large number of independent pieces, it has perhaps the clearest line of
unifying structure of any of Aristotle's works. The meaning of being is
�35
pursued through four most general senses, to an eight-fold array of kinds
of non-incidental predications, to its primary sense of thinghood, to the
source of thinghood as form, to the meaning of form as being-at-work, to
the source of all being-at-work in the divine intellect. It thus culminates
in the discovery of the primary being that is the source of all being, and
gets there from the innocent question, which of the meanings of being is
primary?
A similar progressive narrowing of the meanings of motion takes place
in the Physics. In Book III, motion was said to be of four kinds: change of
thinghood, alteration of quality, increase and decrease, and change of place.
In Book V it is argued that motion properly understood is from one
contrary to another, passing through intermediate states or conditions. But
coming-into-being and destruction should be understood strictly as
changes not to a contrary but to a contradictory condition, abrupt changes
that have no intermediate conditions to pass through. Thus in a strict
sense there are only three kinds of motion. But in Book VI it is argued
that there is a certain discontinuity in every qualitative change.
If
something black turns white, it goes through a spectrum of intermediate
shades, but it can be regarded as still being black until sometime in the
course of the motion. In a change of quantity or place·; once the thing is in
motion it has departed from its initial condition, however much one might
try to divide the beginning of the motion. So in the still stricter sense of
being unqualifiedly continuous, there are only two kinds of motion.
Finally, it is pointed out in Book VII that quantitative change must be
caused by something that comes to be present where the changing thing is,
so that it depends always upon a change of place prior to it, and it is
argued in Book VIII that change of place is the primary kind of motion in
�36
every sense in which anything can be primary. The analysis goes one
more step, to the primary motion within the primary kind, which is
circular rotation. This is the most continuous of motions, so much so that it
alone can be considered a simply unchanging motion.
Though the definition of motion in Book III applies to all motions, its
application is most straightforward in the case of those motions most
opposed to the primary kind, those that involve the greatest amount of
change. Birth, development, and growth obviously unfold out of potencies
that are present beforehand, and these changes point most directly to the
inner natures of things that operate as formal, final, and material causes.
But at the opposite extreme of the spectrum of change there is changeless
circular motion. Because it moves without changing, it can be in contact
with a completely unvarying cause. The last step of the inquiry in the
Physics is the uncovering of a motionless first mover, acting on the cosmos
at its outermost sphere. It is a source of local motion that not only holds
the cosmos together, but contributes to the conditions of life by descending
through the lower spheres, including that of sun, to maintain the stable
alternation of the seasons. Nature is thus seen as twofold, originating in
sources of two kinds, the inner natures of living things and the cause
holding together the cosmos as the outer condition of iife. This is reflected
in a bi-polar relation of motion and change, in which the ascending scale of
motions· (leading to the first external mover), is also the descending scale
of changes (starting from the coming-into-being of new beings). The twodirectionality of the scale is all-important. Aristotle does not reduce
change to change of place, but traces it back, along one line of causes. But
the primacy of local motion in the cosmos does not abolish the primacy of
the opposite kind of change, spilling over out of potency, that guarantees
�37
that even changes of place will be wholes, not vulnerable to the attacks of
Zeno. The Physics has a double conclusion, displaying the continuity rooted
in potency as present in the limit of mere change of place, as a final and
deepest refutation of Zeno, which becomes one of the last steps in the
argument that uncovers the motionless cause of motion.
Acknowledgements
The interpretation presented here has been stewing for almost thirty
years, since my first college teacher, Robert Bart, opened my eyes to
Aristotle's definition of motion in particular, and to the whole project of
looking beneath and behind the presuppositions of modern science. Jacob
Klein's "Introduction to Aristotle" is printed here as an appendix to help
those who might wish to read further in Aristotle's writings; it was my
first guide on that journey. Klein had heard Martin Heidegger lecture on
Aristotle in the 1930s. This translation owes much to Heidegger's example
of the possibility of reading Aristotle directly, not through the language of
either the Latin tradition or the science of recent centuries. Heidegger
suffers in translation almost as much as Aristotle does, but a good English
version of his lectures on Book II, Chapter 1 of the Physics is cited earlier
in this introduction. He is too ready to see form
as presence-at-hand,
uninvolved in the joining of things and emptying of one thing into another,
and he is much too ready to talk about "the Greek idea of (whatever),"
when discussing an insight that may have been achieved by only one or
two thinkers, but as an antidote to the deadening effects of most
commentary on Aristotle he is hard to beat.
This translation was a gleam in my eye for about fifteen years, until it
was made possible by the generosity of St. John's College, the National
�38
Endowment for the Humanities, the Beneficial Corporation, and the Hodson
Trust. Students and colleagues at St. john's have read drafts of it in classes
and study groups. I am grateful for their conversation, and above all for
encouragement given to me in 'this work, shortly before his death, by J.
Winfree Smith. Whatever faults this translation may have, it had the
merit of giving delight to that good man.
The marginal page numbers, with their a and b divisions, are from the
standard two-column Bekker edition. The line numbers between them
match up with the lines of the Oxford Classical Text. Ross's text as given
there is followed with a few departures into his notes of variant readings;
in the first paragraph of V, 3, for example, Ross has needlessly scrambled
the text, and the translation follows the manuscripts in everything but the
placement of one sentence. The old Oxford translation by Hardie and Gaye,
outside of Aristotle's central vocabulary, was an invaluable aid to the
meaning of many words and phrases, and Ross's commentary was the
source of a number of references. Ordinary parentheses in the text contain
Aristotle's own parenthetical remarks; square brackets are used
occasionally for my own insertions, when these go beyond repeating an
antecedent of a pronoun. In one instance (at the end of IV, 8), curly
brackets are used around a passage that is not in th·e early manuscripts
but appears in some late sources. The text is interspersed with running
commentary, and preceded by an extensive glossary, intended in part as a
supplement to this introduction.
This translation is not intended to stand in place of Aristotle's inquiry in
pursuit of nature, but to draw you closer to it. If what you find in the
translation makes you want to go further, you should consider reading
Aristotle's own Greek. His grammar is elementary, and · his style is so
�39
repetitious that it doesn't take long to catch on to; the only difficulty in
reading him is the concentration required to keep his pronouns straight.
But if that route does not appeal to you, it is still possible to join with
Aristotle just by doing your own thinking about the questions he raises, in
the light of the broadened and deepened array of possibilities he leads us
to see.
Annapolis, Maryland
May, 1993
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series
Description
An account of the resource
The Wednesday Night Lecture Series, hosted during the summer term by the Graduate Institute at St. John’s College in Annapolis, is a less-formal version of the college’s formal Friday Night Lectures. The Wednesday Night lectures are an opportunity for tutors and for graduates of the college who are pursuing academic careers to present the first fruits of their thinking to an attentive and inquisitive audience. The lectures, held in the King William Room of the Barr-Buchanan Center at 7:30 p.m., with a question period afterward in a neighboring classroom, are free and open to the public.<br /><br />For more information, and for a schedule of upcoming lectures, please visit the <strong><a title="Summer lecture series" href="https://www.sjc.edu/annapolis/events/lectures/summer-wednesday-night-lecture-series" target="_blank">St. John's College website</a></strong>.<br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=31">Items in the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
39 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Introduction: Philosophic Writing
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1983-08-06
Description
An account of the resource
Typescript of a lecture delivered on August 6, 1983 by Joe Sachs s part of the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series. <br /><br />Mr. Sachs is a tutor at St. John's College, Annapolis. His talk is a draft of his introduction to his translation of Aristotle's <em>Metaphysics</em>. His talk compares and contrasts the writings of Plato and Aristotle and in particular the differences and similarities between the Platonic Dialogues and Aristotle's corpus.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
lec Sachs 1983-08-06
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College has been given permission to make this item available online.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Subject
The topic of the resource
Philosophy
Aristotle
Plato
Written communication
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Sachs, Joe, 1946-
Graduate Institute
Summer lecture series
Tutors
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/231908f199f5f556a38bf96ad6381e92.pdf
d71c01a1603107b2a98012f94f9493eb
PDF Text
Text
Graduate Institute
.
In
Liberal Education
ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
1784-1984
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES
THURSDAY, AUGUST NINTH
NINETEEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR
�PROGRAM
MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE
VIRGINIA KEITH BARKER
FOR THE SIXTH COMMENCEMENT OF THE ANNAPOLIS
CAMPUS OF THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE
KEVIN C. BENNETT
Severna Park, Maryland
Franklinville, New York
JACQUELINE MILLER BENTLEY
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
KAREN CAMILLE CARUSO
Upper Marlboro, Maryland
ACADEMIC PROCESSION
WELCOME
COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS
Geoffrey J. Comber
Director, Graduate Institute
Charles A. Nelson
St. John's College, Board of Visitors
and Governors, Member, 1978-84;
Chairman, 1979-83
KATHLEEN SHEEHAN CORLETTA
NORMAN PAUL LaSONDE
Annapolis, Maryland
Knoxville, Tennessee
VIRGINIA A.H. McCONNELL
Boulder, Colorado
JOYCE RAYMOND PHILLIP
Crofton, Maryland
CONFERRING OF DEGREES
ACADEMIC RECf:SSION
HOWARD LEE SHEPHERD
Winston-Salem, North Carolina
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Commencement Programs and Addresses
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Addresses given at commencement and programs of events related to, and including, the annual commencement ceremonies at St. John's College. Includes both the undergraduate and Graduate Institute commencements. <br /><br />The College Archives holds programs and/or addresses for the following years:<br />
<ul>
<li>1796</li>
<li>1835-1836</li>
<li>1842</li>
<li>1852</li>
<li>1856-1857</li>
<li>1870</li>
<li>1878</li>
<li>1880</li>
<li>1890</li>
<li>1893</li>
<li>1895</li>
<li>1897</li>
<li>1907</li>
<li>1910-1918</li>
<li>1920-1924</li>
<li>1928-1929</li>
<li>1932</li>
<li>1936-1937</li>
<li>1939-1945</li>
<li>1947-present </li>
</ul>
Click on <strong><a title="Commencement Programs and Addresses" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=18&sort_field=Dublin+Core%2CDate&sort_dir=d">Items in the Commencement Programs and Addresses Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
commencementprograms
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
3 pages
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
Program for the sixth commencement on the Annapolis campus of the Graduate Institute.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1984-08-09
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Language
A language of the resource
English
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Graduate Institute Commencement Exercises from 1984 {1984-08-09}
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute Commencement Program, 1984
Commencement
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/62d4b74c49013a1e35307b6fef1f28ee.pdf
2726ae062d4a5be2bba805d80a774846
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
College Catalogs and Statements of the Program
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Description
An account of the resource
Statements of the Program are published each Academic Year. They provide an overview of the program and historical information about the college. <br /><br />The titles of these publications have changed over the course of the College's history. From the 19th century through 1971 they were titled Catalogue. During this period, some Catalogues were distributed as issues of <em>The Bulletin of St. John's College</em>. The title changed from Catalogues to Statement of the Program with the 1972-1973 publication. <br /><br />Also included in this collection are Graduate Institute catalogs and promotional publications about the St. John's program. <br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="College Catalogues" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=10">Items in the College Catalogs and Statements of the Program Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
collegecatalogs
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
ii, 20 pages
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
GI Catalog 1984-1985
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
St. John's College
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute in Liberal Education, St. John's College 1984-85
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1984-1985
Description
An account of the resource
GI college catalog for the years 1984 to 1985.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Santa Fe, NM
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Catalog
Catalogue
Graduate Institute
-
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/sjcdigitalarchives/original/b098fa77fe286f019d9fe50f1154d82b.pdf
3198ca38ab6c6c57142b746b6d1cf974
PDF Text
Text
8
.~
i
\
\
~
:
ST
JoHN's CoLLEGE
ANNAPOLIS. MARYLAND 21404
FouNDED 16% AS KING WtLllAM·s ScHOOL
Friday Night Events:
June 7
- Lecture:
Summer 1985
Meno's Paradox and the Zetetic Circle
Mr. Jon Lenkowski
8:15 p.m. in the King William Room
June 14- Lecture:
What Does-counting Presuppose?
Mr. Samuel Kutler
8:15 p.m. in the King William Room
June 21 -_All College Seminar:
Prometheus Bound
8:00 p.m. - Rooms posted
June 28- Lecture:
on Aristotle's Ethics and Politics
Mr. Laurence Berns
8:15 p.m. in the King William Room
July 5
Mr. Douglas Allanbrook
- Concert:
(Program to be announced)
8:15 p.m. F.S.K. Backstage
July 12 -Lecture:
On Plato's Timaeus
Mr. Peter Kalkavage
8:15 p.m. in the King William Room
July 19 - Lecture:
On Sophocles' Antigone
Miss Janet Dougherty
8:15 p.m. in the King William Room
July 26 -Lecture:
Aristotle's Metaphysics VII, 17
Mr. Stewart Umphrey
8:15 p.m. in the King William Room
August 2 - Lecture:
On Lavoisier
Mr. Chester Burke
8:15 p.m. in the King William Room
TELEPHONE 'JOI- 263-2371
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series
Description
An account of the resource
The Wednesday Night Lecture Series, hosted during the summer term by the Graduate Institute at St. John’s College in Annapolis, is a less-formal version of the college’s formal Friday Night Lectures. The Wednesday Night lectures are an opportunity for tutors and for graduates of the college who are pursuing academic careers to present the first fruits of their thinking to an attentive and inquisitive audience. The lectures, held in the King William Room of the Barr-Buchanan Center at 7:30 p.m., with a question period afterward in a neighboring classroom, are free and open to the public.<br /><br />For more information, and for a schedule of upcoming lectures, please visit the <strong><a title="Summer lecture series" href="https://www.sjc.edu/annapolis/events/lectures/summer-wednesday-night-lecture-series" target="_blank">St. John's College website</a></strong>.<br /><br />Click on <strong><a title="Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series" href="http://digitalarchives.sjc.edu/items/browse?collection=31">Items in the Graduate Institute Summer Lecture Series Collection</a></strong> to view and sort all items in the collection.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
St. John's College Greenfield Library
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Page numeration
Number of pages in the original item.
1 page
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
paper
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Graduate Institute
Title
A name given to the resource
Friday Night Events: Summer 1985
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1985
Description
An account of the resource
Schedule of lectures and concerts in Summer 1985, sponsored by the Graduate Institute.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lecture Schedule 1985 Summer
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Annapolis, MD
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
St. John's College
Language
A language of the resource
English
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
text
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
St. John's College owns the rights to this publication.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
pdf
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Lenkowski, Jon
Kutler, Samuel
Berns, Laurence, 1928-
Allanbrook, Douglas
Kalkavage, Peter
Dougherty, Janet
Umphrey, Stewart, 1942-
Burke, Chester
Graduate Institute
Lecture schedule
Summer lecture series
Deprecated: Directive 'allow_url_include' is deprecated in Unknown on line 0